航空 发表于 2010-5-17 18:54:13

HUMAN FACTORS IN SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS安全管理系统中的人为因素

<P>HUMAN FACTORS IN SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS安全管理系统中的人为因素</P>
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航空 发表于 2010-5-17 18:54:31

Error Management Quarterly, vol. 1 (1), 2004 Human Factors in Safety Management Systems 1<BR>Copyright Error Management Solutions, LLC 2004<BR>The need to manage human error comes as no great<BR>revelation to anyone involved in system safety. Truth be<BR>told, however, the “battle cry” that human error is<BR>associated with 60% to 80% of all accidents in complex,<BR>high-risk systems has become passé in many organizations.<BR>The reason behind this attitude is that human error statistics<BR>have not changed appreciably in more than a half century!<BR>So, while safety professionals can all agree that something<BR>must be done to reduce errors, a growing number of<BR>executives in the boardroom are becoming skeptical to the<BR>idea that something actually can be done.<BR>Unfortunately, most of us don’t have the luxury of<BR>embracing this liaise faire approach to safety. We are paid to<BR>prevent accidents, or at a minimum, mitigate their<BR>consequences. And although some stakeholders express<BR>cynicism while discussing safety behind closed doors, when<BR>an accident does occur, attitudes quickly change.<BR>Unfortunately, it is at these moments that safety engineers<BR>and managers finds themselves at the center of the storm<BR>answering very pointed questions like, “How could this<BR>have happened,” “Why didn’t you do anything to prevent<BR>it,” and “What are you going to do to prevent this from<BR>happening again?”<BR>As former safety officers and accident investigators<BR>ourselves, we too have felt the painful sting of the boss’<BR>stare when an accident occurs. Perhaps that is why we have<BR>relentlessly pursued better ways to manage human error.<BR>Most safety professionals are very familiar with the<BR>traditional system safety approach illustrated in Figure 1.<BR>While there are many variants to the approach, most<BR>involve the following components: collecting data,<BR>identifying and assessing hazards, identifying/developing<BR>interventions, assessing intervention feasibility, intervention<BR>implementation, and system monitoring/program<BR>evaluation. Ideally, this is a dynamic process involving the<BR>real-time identification of hazards, deployment of<BR>interventions and hopefully, improvements in safety.<BR>Hazard<BR>Identification<BR>Hazard<BR>Assessment<BR>Identify<BR>Interventions<BR>Intervention<BR>Assessment<BR>Intervention<BR>Implementation<BR>Data<BR>Monitor<BR>Figure 1. The Safety Management Process<BR>“Managing human error is fundamental to<BR>maintaining the viability and profitability of<BR>any organization.”<BR>Wiegmann &amp; Shappell<BR>“In high-risk industries, accidents are simply the<BR>cost of doing business.”<BR>Anonymous CEO<BR>“When the only tool you have is a hammer,<BR>every problem becomes a nail.”<BR>Anonymous<BR>HUMAN FACTORS IN SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS<BR>Douglas A. Wiegmann, Ph.D. and Scott A. Shappell, Ph.D.<BR>Error Management Solutions, LLC<BR>Error Management Quarterly, vol. 1 (1), 2004 Human Factors in Safety Management Systems 2<BR>Copyright Error Management Solutions, LLC 2004<BR>Historically, this traditional approach to system safety has<BR>been highly successful at addressing mechanical and<BR>engineering problems within a variety of operational<BR>contexts. Albeit, it has been facilitated by the development<BR>of a comprehensive set of engineering tools and techniques<BR>for implementing each step. Not surprising, given the<BR>success of system safety in the engineering world, many<BR>safety professionals have been quick to adopt this same<BR>approach when attempting to manage human error and<BR>other complex human factors issues. But, it hasn’t been<BR>working. Why?<BR>Unfortunately, the requisite tools and techniques for<BR>employing a system safety approach to human error<BR>management have been largely ineffectual or nonexistent.<BR>As a result, it has been virtually impossible to get beyond<BR>the first step in the process - data collection. In fact, when<BR>an accident or incident does happen, the most common<BR>response is simply to collect more data. However, merely<BR>gathering more data about the occurrence of errors is not<BR>the ultimate solution. Organizations have been busy<BR>collecting data for decades. In fact, most safety engineers<BR>and managers are swimming (or perhaps drowning) in data,<BR>particularly given recent advances in technology that have<BR>increased the amount of information available<BR>exponentially.<BR>Most safety professionals have become frustrated with just<BR>watching the human error “data bucket” fill up and are<BR>eager to get beyond this seemingly perpetual data collection<BR>rut. After all, implementing intervention programs that<BR>improve safety is the ultimate goal, and one should not<BR>confuse data collection with safety interventions! Left<BR>without useful tools for systematically studying the<BR>proverbial “boat load” of human error data, the only option<BR>available to safety managers is to bypass the next two highly<BR>critical steps in the system safety process. As illustrated in<BR>Figure 2, these steps that are often skipped involve the<BR>identification and assessment of hazards.<BR>Hazard<BR>Identification<BR>Hazard<BR>Assessment<BR>Identify<BR>Interventions<BR>Intervention<BR>Assessment<BR>Intervention<BR>Implementation<BR>Data<BR>Pretend to Monitor<BR>SSaaffeettyy Maannaaggeemmeenntt PPrroocceessss LLiimmiitteedd HHuummaann FFaaccttoorrss TToooollss aanndd TTeecchhnniiqquueess<BR>No tools/techniques -Interventions therefore<BR>based on “gut feelings” or personality driven<BR>Human factors data is not available to<BR>evaluate interventions<BR>“Data Bucket” filled from accidents,<BR>incidents, safety reports, etc.<BR>Poor tools to code, archive and analyze error<BR>data - key steps are therefore skipped<BR>Figure 2. Lack of effective human factors tools results<BR>in key steps in the safety process being skipped.<BR>The fact is, there has been no way to determine the<BR>common problems that exist throughout the entire system.<BR>As a result, the modus operandi of many organizations has<BR>been the process of simply “cherry picking” the hazards<BR>identified in the most recent incident or focusing on select<BR>“high profile” events that have captured everyone’s<BR>attention. However, these may have no real bearing on the<BR>most threatening systemic hazards that are lying dormant in<BR>the system (and most likely in your database as well). As a<BR>result, the forest is often missed for the trees.<BR>To make matters worse, there have been no effective tools<BR>for systematically generating effective intervention<BR>programs that target specific forms of human error.<BR>Consequently, as also illustrated in Figure 2, this has forced<BR>safety professionals to bypass the next key steps in the<BR>safety management process – generating and evaluating<BR>intervention strategies. Indeed, the typical process for<BR>ginning up error prevention programs is to use simple<BR>intuition, expert opinion, or “pop psychology.”<BR>Unfortunately, such an approach often results in people<BR>pushing their pet projects, or the person with the loudest<BR>voice or highest authority having the last say on what gets<BR>done. Hence, this entire engineering approach to human<BR>error management, although conceivably a good idea, has<BR>met with little success.<BR>“Insanity is doing the same thing over-andover<BR>again and expecting a different outcome.”<BR>Albert Einstein<BR>“Prescription without diagnosis is<BR>malpractice.<BR>Socrates<BR>“Intuition is no substitute for information.”<BR>Wiegmann &amp; Shappell<BR>Error Management Quarterly, vol. 1 (1), 2004 Human Factors in Safety Management Systems 3<BR>Copyright Error Management Solutions, LLC 2004<BR>Over the past several years, we have been working on ways<BR>to improve the integration of human factors into the system<BR>safety process. As both scientists and practitioners, we have<BR>strived to develop methods for managing human error that<BR>are scientifically derived, empirically tested, and proven in<BR>the field. The results of our efforts have been the successful<BR>development of a compendium of tools and techniques that<BR>turn errors into information, information into knowledge,<BR>and knowledge into effective error management solutions.<BR>The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System<BR>(HFACS&reg;) is an empirically derived system-safety model<BR>that effectively bridges the gap between human error theory<BR>and the practice of applied human error analysis. A proven<BR>safety management tool, HFACS facilitates the reliable<BR>identification, classification, and analysis of human error in<BR>complex, high-risk systems such as aviation, healthcare, and<BR>nuclear power industries. As illustrated in Figure 3, the<BR>HFACS framework comprehensively addresses the myriad<BR>of active and latent failures known to influence operator<BR>performance.<BR>Latent Conditions<BR>Latent Conditions<BR>AAccttiivvee aanndd LLaatteenntt CCoonnddiittiioonnss<BR>Failed or<BR>Absent Defenses<BR>Organizational<BR>Factors<BR>Unsafe<BR>Supervision<BR>Preconditions<BR>for<BR>Unsafe Acts<BR>Unsafe<BR>Acts<BR>Active Conditions<BR>Accident<BR>Figure 3. Model of latent and active failures.<BR>In doing so, HFACS allows safety professionals to identity<BR>all of the factors that influence performance and cause<BR>operators to err. As illustrated in Figure 4, these factors<BR>include cognitive and physiological variables, contextual and<BR>technological components, and communication and<BR>interpersonal interactions. Also included, but often<BR>overlooked, are those supervisory and organizational factors<BR>that directly influence the causal chain of events. In other<BR>words, the HFACS framework goes beyond the simple<BR>identification of what an operator did wrong to provide a<BR>clear understanding of the reasons why the error occurred in<BR>the first place. In this way, errors are viewed as<BR>consequences of system failures, and/or symptoms of<BR>deeper systemic problems. They are not simply the fault of<BR>the employee working the “pointy end of the spear.”<BR>Errors<BR>UNSAFE<BR>ACTS<BR>Perceptual<BR>Errors<BR>Skill-Based<BR>Errors<BR>Decision<BR>Errors Routine Exceptional<BR>Violations<BR>Inadequate<BR>Supervision<BR>Planned<BR>Inappropriate<BR>Operations<BR>Failed to<BR>Correct<BR>Problem<BR>Supervisory<BR>Violations<BR>UNSAFE<BR>SUPERVISION<BR>Resource<BR>Management<BR>Organizational<BR>Climate<BR>Organizational<BR>Process<BR>ORGANIZATIONAL<BR>INFLUENCES<BR>PRECONDITIONS<BR>FOR<BR>UNSAFE ACTS<BR>Condition of<BR>Operators<BR>Physical/<BR>Mental<BR>Limitations<BR>Adverse<BR>Mental<BR>States<BR>Technological<BR>Environment<BR>Physical<BR>Environment<BR>Personal<BR>Readiness<BR>Crew Resource<BR>Management<BR>Personnel<BR>Factors<BR>Adverse<BR>Physiological<BR>States<BR>Environmental<BR>Factors<BR>Figure 4. The Human Factors Analysis and<BR>Classification System (HFACS).<BR>We originally developed HFACS as an aviation accident<BR>investigation and analysis tool for the U.S. Navy and Marine<BR>Corps. However, HFACS has since been adopted by all<BR>branches of the U.S. military, as well as the Canadian<BR>Defense Force as a tool for analyzing the role of human<BR>error in military aviation accidents. It is now also widely<BR>utilized by civil aviation organizations around the world,<BR>including the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and<BR>National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), as<BR>an adjunct to their preexisting safety management systems.<BR>This is not to say that HFACS is only applicable to aviation.<BR>Indeed, it has also been proven effective in the analysis of<BR>errors within a variety of other industrial settings, including<BR>healthcare, mining, and manufacturing. Given its theoretical<BR>foundation, HFACS can be applied in virtually any<BR>operational context.<BR>Error Management Solutions<BR>Human Factors Analysis and Classification System<BR>&reg;<BR>Error Management Quarterly, vol. 1 (1), 2004 Human Factors in Safety Management Systems 4<BR>Copyright Error Management Solutions, LLC 2004<BR>Identifying the causes of human error, however, is only half<BR>the battle in the prevention of incidents and accidents. The<BR>development and implementation of effective intervention<BR>programs that reduce the occurrence or consequences of<BR>errors is the next critical step in the safety management<BR>process. Toward these ends, we recently developed the<BR>tools and methodology for mapping intervention strategies<BR>onto specific forms of human error identified within the<BR>HFACS model. Our tool, coined the Human Factors<BR>Intervention matriX (HFIX&reg;) allows safety professionals to<BR>systematically generate comprehensive intervention<BR>strategies that directly target specific error categories, as well<BR>as their underlying causes (see Figure 5).<BR>DDeecciissiioonn<BR>EErrrroorrss<BR>SSkkiillll--based<BR>EErrrroorrss<BR>PPeerrcceeppttuuaall<BR>EErrrroorrss<BR>VViioollaattiioonnss<BR>OOrrggaanniizzaattiioonnaall//<BR>Administrative<BR>Human/<BR>CCrreeww<BR>Technology/<BR>EEnnggiinneeeerriinngg<BR>TTaasskk//<BR>Mission<BR>Operational/<BR>Physical<BR>EEnnvviirroonnmmeenntt<BR>Figure 5. The Human Factors Intervention matriX<BR>(HFIX).<BR>However, HFIX does not stop at simply identifying<BR>interventions. Rather, the model guides safety professionals<BR>when evaluating the potential efficacy of intervention<BR>strategies. For instance, as illustrated in Figure 6, other<BR>factors that need to be considered before implementing any<BR>intervention are cost, feasibility, and acceptability. All of<BR>these, and others, are captured during the process of<BR>applying the HFIX methodology.<BR>FFeeaassiibbiilliittyy<BR>Cost<BR>Effectiveness<BR>Organizational/<BR>Administrative<BR>Human/<BR>Crew<BR>Technology/<BR>Engineering<BR>DDeecciissiioonn<BR>EErrrroorrss<BR>SSkkiillll-based<BR>EErrrroorrss<BR>PPeerrcceeppttuuaall<BR>EErrrroorrss<BR>Task/<BR>Mission<BR>VViioollaattiioonnss<BR>Operational/<BR>Physical<BR>Environment<BR>Acceptability<BR>Figure 6. The Human Factors Intervention matriX<BR>(HFIX) in three dimensions.<BR>Once the need for specific interventions has been identified<BR>and the feasibility of each has been assessed, the next step is<BR>to identify providers for these intervention programs.<BR>Unfortunately, in our experience we have seen too many<BR>organizations simply purchase “off the shelf” intervention<BR>packages that look good on the surface but have no<BR>scientific support to show that they actually work. Another<BR>common problem is that many vendors of human factors<BR>programs have little or no real expertise in human factors or<BR>the safety programs that they are selling. Rather, many are<BR>former operators whose only credentials are that they have<BR>attended human factors training as part of the their<BR>previous job. Worse yet, some are simply retired program<BR>managers who possess little, if any, knowledge of the<BR>content of the various human factors programs they<BR>managed. In the end, many vendors simply download<BR>materials off the web, modify them for a particular domain,<BR>and then market their wares as unique programs or<BR>panaceas for all that ails the unsuspecting organization.<BR>This is not to say that effective human factors safety<BR>programs don’t exist. They do! However, to get your<BR>money’s worth, you need to consult with recognized experts<BR>in the field rather than contracting with some potential<BR>charlatan whose only claim to fame is that he has been<BR>involved in safety for twenty years. The latter may have an<BR>Human Factors Intervention Programs<BR>HFIX Human Factors Intervention matriX<BR>&reg;<BR>Error Management Quarterly, vol. 1 (1), 2004 Human Factors in Safety Management Systems 5<BR>Copyright Error Management Solutions, LLC 2004<BR>abundance of good “war stories” to tell, but it is only the<BR>former who can really help you address your problems and<BR>successfully apply the tools to complete the system safety<BR>loop.<BR>The systematic application of HFACS to the analysis of<BR>human errors, coupled with the methodical utilization of<BR>HFIX to generate intervention solutions, finally ensures<BR>that an organization’s limited personnel and monetary<BR>resources are utilized wisely. This occurs because such<BR>efforts are needs-based and data-driven. They therefore<BR>permit the completion of the system safety process, as<BR>illustrated in Figure 7. Ultimately, this allows for the true<BR>effectiveness of intervention programs to be objectively and<BR>impartially evaluated so that they can be either modified or<BR>reinforced to improve system performance.<BR>Seerrvviicceess Scciieenccee<BR>Hazard<BR>Identification<BR>Hazard<BR>Assessment<BR>Identify<BR>Interventions<BR>Intervention<BR>Assessment<BR>Intervention<BR>Implementation<BR>Data<BR>Safety Management Process<BR>HFIX<BR>Generate Targeted<BR>Interventions<BR>Feasibility<BR>Prioritize<BR>IIddeennttiiffyy//DDeevveelloopp<BR>HF Programs HF Consulting<BR>Monitor<BR>HFACS<BR>FFiieelldd TTooooll<BR>IInnvveessttiiggaattoorr TTrrnngg<BR>HHFFAACCSS AAnnaallyyssiiss<BR>IIddeennttiiffyy<BR>Vulnerabilities<BR>Figure 7. Human Factors in Safety Management<BR>Systems.<BR>CONCLUSION<BR>Managing human error is fundamental to the viability and<BR>profitability of any organization. However, the traditional<BR>system safety approach has not been effective at reducing<BR>errors in most complex systems. Innovative tools are<BR>required that can turn errors into information, information<BR>into knowledge, and knowledge into effective error<BR>management solutions. Such tools are now finally available<BR>and can help effectively integrate human factors into<BR>traditional safety management systems. Managing human<BR>error, which was once considered beyond the reach of<BR>safety professionals, has now been made possible through<BR>the scientific efforts of the founders of “Error Management<BR>Solutions, LLC.”<BR>Shappell, S.A. &amp; Wiegmann, D.A. (2001). Applying Reason:<BR>The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System<BR>(HFACS). Human Factors and Aerospace Safety, 1(1), 59-86.<BR>Wiegmann, D. A. &amp; Shappell, S.A. (2001). Human error<BR>analysis of commercial aviation accidents: Application of<BR>the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System<BR>(HFACS). Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 72,<BR>1006-1016.<BR>Wiegmann, D. A. &amp; Shappell, S.A. (2001). Human error<BR>perspectives in aviation. The International Journal of Aviation<BR>Psychology, 11(4), 341-357.<BR>Wiegmann, D. A. &amp; Shappell, S.A. (2003). Human error<BR>approach to aviation accident analysis: The Human Factors Analysis<BR>and Classification System. VT: Ashgate Press (ISBN 07546<BR>1873 0).<BR>Dr. Douglas A. Wiegmann<BR>Dr. Douglas A. Wiegmann is co-founder and CEO of Error<BR>Management Solutions, LLC. He is also a tenured professor<BR>in the Department of Human Factors<BR>at the University of Illinois in<BR>Urbana-Champaign. Dr. Wiegmann is<BR>an internationally recognized expert<BR>in the fields of human error analysis<BR>and accident investigation. He<BR>formerly served as an aviation<BR>psychologist for the U.S. Navy and an<BR>accident investigator for the U.S.<BR>National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). He was<BR>the official human factors consultant to the U.S.<BR>Department of Energy during the investigation of<BR>the August 2003 blackout and consultant to the Columbia<BR>About the Authors<BR>Bibliography<BR>Completing the System Safety Loop<BR>Error Management Quarterly, vol. 1 (1), 2004 Human Factors in Safety Management Systems 6<BR>Copyright Error Management Solutions, LLC 2004<BR>Accident Investigation Board during their analysis of the<BR>causes underlying the crash of the NASA space shuttle. Dr.<BR>Wiegmann is a board certified human factors professional<BR>and Past-president of the Aerospace Human Factors<BR>Association.<BR>Dr. Scott Shappell<BR>Dr. Shappell is co-founder and President of Error<BR>Management Solutions, LLC. He is an internationally<BR>renowned expert and a highly sought after consultant and<BR>speaker in the fields of human factors, systems safety, error<BR>management, and accident investigation. He formerly<BR>served as Human Factors Branch<BR>Chief at the U.S. Naval Safety Center<BR>and as a human factors accident<BR>investigation consultant for the Joint<BR>Service Safety Chiefs. Prior to the<BR>Naval Safety Center, he served as the<BR>Force Aerospace Psychologist for the<BR>Commander, Naval Air Forces, U.S.<BR>Atlantic Fleet. His work experiences<BR>also include serving as the Human Factors Research Branch<BR>Manager at the Civil Aerospace Medical Institute of the<BR>Federal Aviation Administration in Oklahoma City, OK.<BR>He has published over 50 papers in the fields of human<BR>error analysis and accident investigation, workplace injuries,<BR>and fatigue. Dr. Shappell is a Fellow of the Aerospace<BR>Medical Association and Past-president of the Aerospace<BR>Human Factors Association.<BR>Recognized Experts in the Field<BR>Dr. Shappell and Dr. Wiegmann have received numerous<BR>awards from prestigious organizations for their significant<BR>contributions to error analysis and system safety. These<BR>include:<BR>Admiral Luis de Florez Award (2002) for significant<BR>contributions of aviation safety. Awarded by the Flight<BR>Safety Foundation, International.<BR>Harry G. Moseley Award (2003) for significant<BR>contributions to human factors and aerospace safety.<BR>Awarded by the Aerospace Medical Association.<BR>William B. Collins Award (2002) for best publication in<BR>the area of engineering psychology and human factors.<BR>Awarded by the Aerospace Human Factors<BR>Association.<BR>For more information, you can email us at<BR><A href="mailto:Shappell@errorsolutions.com">Shappell@errorsolutions.com</A> or <A href="mailto:Wiegmann@error">Wiegmann@error</A><BR>solutions.com.. You can also visit us online at<BR><A href="http://www.errorsolutions.com">www.errorsolutions.com</A>. If you wish to speak to one of us<BR>in person, please call (405) 640-5479.<BR>We wrote the book on applied human error<BR>analysis!<BR>Title: A human error approach to aviation<BR>accident analysis: The human factors analysis<BR>and classification system (HFACS). Ashgate<BR>Press (ISBN: 07546 1873 0)<BR>Reviews<BR>'Bridging the gap between system safety theory and practice, this book<BR>provides a clear, comprehensive, field-tested framework to assist<BR>aviation safety professionals with investigating, analyzing, and<BR>assessing the impact of human error in aviation accidents and<BR>incidents. A 'must-read' for all interested in causal factor analysis!'<BR>Dr. James T. Luxh&oslash;j, Rutgers University, USA<BR>'…it is the training in human error analysis using HFACS that has<BR>enabled our Naval Flight Surgeons to serve as the human factors<BR>experts…'<BR>Captain James R. Fraser, M.D., Command Surgeon, Naval Safety<BR>Center, Norfolk, Virginia.<BR>'This book is essential reading for all safety professionals,<BR>investigators and analysts.<BR>Captain Nicholas Webster, MD, MPH, Aeromedical Safety<BR>Professional<BR>'…the book should be required reading for any journalist expected to<BR>cover air accidents. …it contains a wealth of insight and it will be a<BR>useful addition to the bookshelf of anyone with an interest in aviation<BR>safety. '<BR>Navigation News Jan 04<BR>Contact Us<BR>Now Available!

yangy2397 发表于 2010-6-28 14:18:23

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mrmmx 发表于 2010-7-10 17:35:16

so powerful

涟漪雨 发表于 2010-11-11 10:06:36

So great !

f214216709 发表于 2010-11-19 11:55:01

全英文的呀   谢谢

topgun008 发表于 2011-1-12 11:00:59

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hero8848 发表于 2011-2-7 14:52:45

专业贴

谢谢楼主分享

wendellc 发表于 2011-3-11 22:24:57

谢谢一起分享

yikai 发表于 2012-2-29 19:51:32

谢谢分享谢谢分享
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