Flight Crew Monitoring During Automatic Flight自动飞行期间机组监控
<P>Flight_Crew_Monitoring_During_Automatic_Flight</P><P>**** Hidden Message *****</P> Page 1 of 4<BR>BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE GROUP<BR>FLIGHT OPERATIONS TECHNICAL BULLETIN<BR>NUMBER: 737-09-2<BR>DATE: March 19, 2009<BR>These bulletins provide information which may prove useful in airline operations or airline training. This<BR>information will remain in effect depending on production changes, customer-originated modifications, and Service<BR>Bulletin incorporation. Information in these bulletins is supplied by the Boeing Company and may not be approved<BR>or endorsed by the FAA at the time of writing. Applicable documentation will be revised as necessary to reflect the<BR>information contained in these bulletins. For further information, contact Boeing Commercial Airplane Group,<BR>Chief Pilot, Flight Technical, P.O. Box 3707, Mail Stop 14-HA, Seattle, WA, USA 98124-2207, Phone (206) 544-<BR>9610, Fax (206) 544-9687, SITA: SEABO7X Station 627.<BR>SUBJECT: Flight Crew Monitoring During Automatic Flight<BR>ATA NO:<BR>APPLIES TO: 737 All<BR>Background Information<BR>An erroneous Low Range Radio Altimeter (LRRA) has been identified in connection with<BR>a recent 737-800 accident.<BR>The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) data indicates that the crew was using both the<BR>autopilot and the autothrottle during an ILS approach. The right LRRA was providing<BR>accurate data to the first officer’s display and the left LRRA was erroneously providing a<BR>reading of -8 feet to the captain’s display. No amber RA flag was displayed because the<BR>left LRRA system did not declare the data invalid.<BR>On some 737s, the autothrottle logic uses left radio altimeter data regardless of the<BR>autopilot selected. In this event, when the airplane descended through approximately<BR>1950 feet on the approach with flaps extended beyond 12 ½ degrees, the autothrottle<BR>erroneously sensed that the airplane was in landing flare. The thrust levers were retarded<BR>to the idle stop where they remained for approximately 100 seconds. For the first 70 of<BR>the 100 seconds, idle thrust was sufficient to maintain the selected airspeed. During the<BR>next 30 seconds, airspeed decreased below the selected MCP speed to approximately 40<BR>knots below the selected approach speed.<BR>The two LRRA systems provide height above ground data to aircraft systems which<BR>include the displays, autothrottle, autopilots and configuration/ground proximity warning.<BR>Page 2 of 4<BR>If one LRRA provides erroneous altitude readings, the associated flight deck effects may<BR>typically include:<BR>• Large differences between displayed radio altitude.<BR>• Inability to engage both autopilots in dual channel approach (APP) mode.<BR>• Unexpected removal of the Flight Director Command Bars during approach on<BR>the pilot’s side with the erroneous radio altimeter display.<BR>• Unexpected Configuration Warnings after takeoff, during approach, or during goaround.<BR>• Inappropriate Flight Mode Annunciation (FMA) indication of autothrottle<BR>RETARD mode during approach phase with the airplane above 27 feet AGL.<BR>There will also be corresponding thrust lever movement towards the idle stop.<BR>The FMA will continue to indicate RETARD after the thrust levers have reached<BR>the idle stop rather than change to ARM.<BR>Boeing Recommendations<BR>Whether in automated or manual flight, flight crews must carefully monitor primary<BR>flight instruments (airspeed, attitude etc.) for aircraft performance and the FMA for<BR>autoflight modes.<BR>The following information is taken from the Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM) and<BR>has been adapted to provide Flight Crews and Operators with guidelines which should be<BR>followed if a flight crew encounters any of the above mentioned indications.<BR>General Guidelines<BR>Condition:<BR>• Large differences between displayed data.<BR>Crew Resource Management (CRM) involves the effective use of all available resources<BR>to operate a flight safely. It is important that all flight deck crewmembers identify and<BR>communicate any situation that appears potentially unsafe or out of the ordinary.<BR>Experience has proven that the most effective way to maintain safety of flight and resolve<BR>these situations is to combine the skills and experience of all crewmembers in the<BR>decision making process to determine the safest course of action.<BR>Situational awareness, or the ability to accurately perceive what is going on in the flight<BR>deck, requires ongoing questioning, crosschecking, communication, and refinement of<BR>perception.<BR>Page 3 of 4<BR>Condition:<BR>• Inability to engage both autopilots in dual channel approach (APP) mode.<BR>• Unexpected removal of the Flight Director Command Bars during approach on<BR>the pilot’s side with the erroneous radio altimeter display.<BR>• Inappropriate Flight Mode Annunciation (FMA) indication of autothrottle<BR>RETARD mode during approach phase with the airplane above 27 feet AGL.<BR>There will also be corresponding thrust lever movement towards the idle stop.<BR>The FMA will continue to indicate RETARD after the thrust levers have reached<BR>the idle stop rather than change to ARM.<BR>Automatic systems give excellent results in the vast majority of situations. Faults can<BR>occur at any point during an automatic approach. Many non-normal situations or<BR>scenarios are possible. The flight deck is designed so that a quick analysis and decision<BR>can be made for virtually all non-normal or fault situations using the autopilot/autothrottle<BR>indicators, FMAs, master caution system and, for fail operational airplanes, autoland<BR>status annunciations. Deviations in intended flight path or unexpected thrust lever<BR>movement may also be an indication of an automation fault.<BR>If the flight crew is aware of a degraded Autopilot Flight Director Systems (AFDS) mode,<BR>special recognition should be given during the Approach Briefing as to how to manage the<BR>use of the automatic features.<BR>Note: Early intervention prevents unsatisfactory airplane performance or a<BR>degraded flight path.<BR>When the automatic systems as described above do not perform as expected, the PF<BR>should reduce the level of automation to ensure proper control of the airplane is<BR>maintained.<BR>The PF should not attempt to restore higher levels of automation until after aircraft<BR>control is assured.<BR>Condition:<BR>• Unexpected Configuration Warnings after takeoff, during approach, or during<BR>go-around.<BR>Flight crew must ensure the proper configuration for the phase of flight. Time may be<BR>required in order to assess the situation, take corrective action and resolve the<BR>discrepancy; therefore a go-around, holding, or additional maneuvering may be<BR>necessary. Flight path control and monitoring of instruments must never be<BR>compromised.<BR>Page 4 of 4<BR>Non-Normal Situation Guidelines<BR>When a non-normal situation occurs, the following guidelines apply.<BR>• NON-NORMAL RECOGNITION:<BR>o The crewmember recognizing the malfunction calls it out clearly and<BR>precisely.<BR>• MAINTAIN AIRPLANE CONTROL:<BR>o It is mandatory that the Pilot Flying (PF) fly the airplane.<BR>• ANALYZE THE SITUATION:<BR>o Any further action should only be initiated after the malfunctioning<BR>system has been positively identified.<BR>Additional Information<BR>Any occurrences of erroneous display data, even if intermittent, should be reported to<BR>maintenance.<BR>More information can be found in the Boeing 737 Flight Crew Training Manual and<BR>Flight Crew Operations Manual. Operators may want to review the following:<BR>737 FCTM<BR>1. Chapter 1 - Crew Resource Management<BR>2. Chapter 1 - Callouts<BR>3. Chapter 1 - AFDS Guidelines<BR>4. Chapter 5 - Approach Briefing<BR>5. Chapter 5 - Stabilized Approach Recommendations<BR>737 FCOM<BR>1. NP11 - Autopilot Flight Director Systems (AFDS) Procedures<BR>2. Chapter 4 - Automatic Flight System Description<BR>3. Chapter 10 - Flight Instruments, Displays System Description<BR>4. Chapter 15 -Warning Systems System Description 谢谢你了,辛苦 哦,看啊看你 谢谢你了,辛苦 :loveliness: :loveliness: nice up up up up 看看专业性质的东西规范自己的操作流程 hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh 好好好好好好好好好好好好好好好好好好好
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