航空 发表于 2011-4-12 08:35:09

CFM56-7 Overall HMU Reliability

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航空 发表于 2011-4-12 08:35:34

CFM56-7<BR>Overall<BR>HMU<BR>Reliability<BR>CFM56 Operators Conference – May 21 - 23, 2001 CFM Proprietary Data Unauthorized Disclosure Prohibited 2<BR>CFM56-7 P07 HMU Removals / MTBUR<BR>0<BR>5<BR>10<BR>15<BR>20<BR>25<BR>30<BR>35<BR>40<BR>45<BR>50<BR>Jan-01<BR>Feb-01<BR>Mar-01<BR>Apr-01<BR>May-01<BR>Jun-01<BR>Jul-01<BR>Aug-01<BR>Sep-01<BR>Oct-01<BR>Nov-01<BR>Dec-01<BR>Removals<BR>0<BR>2000<BR>4000<BR>6000<BR>8000<BR>10000<BR>12000<BR>14000<BR>16000<BR>18000<BR>20000<BR>MTBUR<BR>HMU Removals<BR>6-Month MTBUR<BR>12-Month MTBUR<BR>CFM56 Operators Conference – May 21 - 23, 2001 CFM Proprietary Data Unauthorized Disclosure Prohibited 3<BR>Removal Cause Last 12 Months<BR>116<BR>95<BR>46<BR>43 42 40<BR>33<BR>16 16<BR>9 8<BR>0<BR>20<BR>40<BR>60<BR>80<BR>100<BR>120<BR>140<BR>Chafing / Wrap Fault<BR>FMV F/B<BR>HPSOV Switch<BR>Unknown / Misc<BR>Engine Control Light<BR>DMD/FDBK<BR>BSV<BR>Leak<BR>Precautionary<BR>No Start<BR>No Shutdown<BR>CFM56 Operators Conference – May 21 - 23, 2001 CFM Proprietary Data Unauthorized Disclosure Prohibited 4<BR>• HMU reliability remains flat<BR>- Current 12 Month MTBUR is 12,000 Hr’s<BR>- Average removals, 32 per month over the last year<BR>• Corrective Actions for top removal causes<BR>- Chaffing/Wrap Fault is leading cause for removal<BR>- Wire bracket Intro production 5/01, SB issued 9/14<BR>- HPSOV Switch Latching on Starts<BR>• Investigations - Refer to separate presentations<BR>- FMV Feedback Fault<BR>- MSV / BSV position faults<BR>- Fault accommodation introduced in EEC S/W version 7.B.N -<BR>June 2002<BR>Reliability Summary<BR>CFM56 Operators Conference – May 21 - 23, 2001 CFM Proprietary Data Unauthorized Disclosure Prohibited 5<BR>CFM56-7B HPSOV Indication System<BR>• Background<BR>- HPSOV switch leading cause of HMU removals and D&amp;C’s<BR>- Joint CFMI/Boeing/Honeywell team have studied design alternatives to<BR>increase reliability to acceptable level<BR>- SPST switch eliminates predominant failure mode via run reed deletion<BR>- New HMU P/N (P08) creates one-way engine/aircraft interchangeability<BR>NC<BR>NO<BR>Arm<BR>NC<BR>NO<BR>Arm<BR>Current Double Throw<BR>Proposed Single Throw<BR>Run contact eliminated<BR>Proposed Switch Configuration<BR>CFM56 Operators Conference – May 21 - 23, 2001 CFM Proprietary Data Unauthorized Disclosure Prohibited 6<BR>CFM56-7B HPSOV Field Plan<BR>• Qualification Testing Status<BR>- Completed test program that addressed potential field failure modes<BR>- Endurance testing for both run and shutdown modes<BR>- Bounce testing completed at 1.25X engine “g” levels with Boeing P5-2 card<BR>- Completed 4000 cycle endurance test on prototype switch installed on<BR>development engine<BR>CFM56 Operators Conference – May 21 - 23, 2001 CFM Proprietary Data Unauthorized Disclosure Prohibited 7<BR>CFM56-7B HPSOV Field Plan<BR>• Boeing Production<BR>- Introduce new P5-2 panel circuit cards line # 1047 (Complete)<BR>- Introduce new SPST HMU (P08) line # 1077 (Complete)<BR>• Field retrofit of P5-2 circuit cards<BR>- 60 cards per week available for field retrofit (2 cards per aircraft)<BR>- P5-2 Circuit Cards available for entire fleet in approximately 10 months<BR>- Boeing logistics focal identified and will work with CFM/HW<BR>- Customers “No Charge” Purchase Orders will be required<BR>• Customer Contacts:<BR>- Bill Swearengin - Boeing<BR>- Francois Boitelet - CFM SA<BR>- Don Thurnquist - CFM Inc<BR>- Bob Chojnacki - Honeywell<BR>CFM56 Operators Conference – May 21 - 23, 2001 CFM Proprietary Data Unauthorized Disclosure Prohibited 8<BR>Interim HMU plan until P5-2 cards attain fleet penetration<BR>•Aircraft must be compatible with new SPST switch<BR>- Aircraft must have new P5-2 circuit<BR>- If new card is not available:<BR>- Convert P08 to P07 (CFM SB 73-068; HW SB CHT1 - 73-0015)<BR>- Shop return HMUs to remain P07 until Aug 2002<BR>- Airlines can elect to note on repair PO to upgrade to P08 (SPST)<BR>- HMU switch kits available “Free Of Charge” for airlines that wish to upgrade<BR>proactively<BR>CFM56-7B HPSOV Field Plan<BR>CFM56 Operators Conference – May 21 - 23, 2001 CFM Proprietary Data Unauthorized Disclosure Prohibited 9<BR>Interim HMU plan until P5-2 cards attain fleet penetration<BR>• Honeywell will continue to replace current switches at “No Charge”<BR>- 48 hours notice is required<BR>- Can be accomplished on-wing<BR>- P08 to P07 conversion if required (CFM SB 73-068; HW SB CHT1<BR>- 73-0015)<BR>CFM56-7B HPSOV Field Plan<BR>CFM56 Operators Conference – May 21 - 23, 2001 CFM Proprietary Data Unauthorized Disclosure Prohibited 10<BR>Retrofit Strategy<BR>• Hardware will be maintained for unscheduled use<BR>- Honeywell will have both switch configurations available<BR>- Boeing will have aircraft cards available at Spares Dist. Center<BR>- Boeing AOG system will support urgent orders<BR>• Spare engines will be delivered with P08 HMUs<BR>– Can be changed to P07 at customer request by Honeywell<BR>• CFM lease pool engines will remain equipped with P07<BR>– Converted later in the program to allow for flexibility<BR>CFM56-7B HPSOV Field Plan<BR>CFM56 Operators Conference – May 21 - 23, 2001 CFM Proprietary Data Unauthorized Disclosure Prohibited 11<BR>Summary<BR>• P5-2 circuit card will be FOC to customer<BR>• New switches/installation will be FOC to the customer<BR>• Logistics focal point identified and contact information to be<BR>published<BR>•AOG scenarios addressed<BR>• Your CFM ATPMs and CSMs will be thoroughly engaged with<BR>customer specific field programs<BR>CFM56-7B HPSOV Field Plan<BR>CFM56 Operators Conference – May 21 - 23, 2001 CFM Proprietary Data Unauthorized Disclosure Prohibited 12<BR>Service Bulletin Summary<BR>CFM56-7B HPSOV Field Plan<BR>SB Intent Boeing SB CFM SB H/W SB<BR>On-wing sw N/A 73-037R2 CHT1 73-008R2<BR>replacement<BR>On-wing rev K N/A 73-061R1 CHT1 73-011<BR>sw replacement<BR>with wire support<BR>bracket<BR>Rework P5-2 737-28-1179 N/A N/A<BR>233A3202-28-02<BR>Introduce P08 N/A 73-067 CHT1 73-0014<BR>P08 to P07 N/A 73-068 CHT1 73-0015<BR>Conversion<BR>CFM56 Operators Conference – May 21 - 23, 2001 CFM Proprietary Data Unauthorized Disclosure Prohibited 13<BR>FMV Related Faults<BR>• FMV faults have become leading cause of D&amp;Cs in -7B fleet<BR>- Fault codes 73-x034y, 73-x035y (x=Channel, y=Engine position)<BR>- Faults result in Engine Control Light indication in cockpit<BR>- Driving 10 HMU removals per month<BR>- No operational events<BR>• Extensive root cause investigation on-going<BR>- Analysis, component, systems rig testing<BR>• Design and manufacturing process changes are being incorporated to<BR>address identified failure modes<BR>• Additional changes for improved reliability being defined, evaluated and<BR>tested<BR>- Design, manufacturing, software logic<BR>CFM56 Operators Conference – May 21 - 23, 2001 CFM Proprietary Data Unauthorized Disclosure Prohibited 14<BR>• HMU and resolver analytical efforts<BR>- Tolerance studies, loads, modal, thermal effects including finite<BR>element analysis<BR>• HMU Testing at Burbank<BR>- Run-as-received, electrical checks, inspections (wires, binding,<BR>wobble)<BR>• Resolver Module Testing at Kearfott<BR>- Room temperature electrical tests and thermal cycling (all)<BR>- “Shake &amp; bake” testing (10 units) - no failures observed<BR>- Wire disassembly of unconfirmed units (7) - 2 rubbed rotors observed<BR>FMV Root Cause Investigation - Scope<BR>CFM56 Operators Conference – May 21 - 23, 2001 CFM Proprietary Data Unauthorized Disclosure Prohibited 15<BR>• Systems level testing on CFM systems rig<BR>- Focus on unconfirmed units<BR>- Allows monitoring of individual windings and EEC faults<BR>• HMU / Resolver module testing at Honeywell - South Bend<BR>- Cell 8 rig test temperature and FMV cycling - 11 units<BR>- Vibe testing for intermittent opens / shorts - 26 units<BR>- Thermal and moisture tests of resolvers to check for shorts - 13 units<BR>- Load testing for channel disagree faults - 2 units<BR>FMV Root Cause Investigation - Scope<BR>CFM56 Operators Conference – May 21 - 23, 2001 CFM Proprietary Data Unauthorized Disclosure Prohibited 16<BR>FMV Root Cause Investigation - Findings<BR>• Fault confirmation rate currently 42%<BR>- 74% resolver, 26% HMU-related<BR>• Fault tree analysis used to identify 70 possible failure contributors<BR>- 65 of these have been investigated<BR>• Design and process improvements incorporated for 11 of 12<BR>failure modes identified to date<BR>- Implemented in new production and field return units following<BR>introducPteirocenntage<BR>42%<BR>58%<BR>74%<BR>26%<BR>Unconfirmed Confirmed Resolver<BR>HMU<BR>CFM56 Operators Conference – May 21 - 23, 2001 CFM Proprietary Data Unauthorized Disclosure Prohibited 17<BR>FMV Root Cause Investigation - Findings<BR>• Majority of resolver failures<BR>related to wiring issues<BR>- Quality and position<BR>adjustment lessor<BR>contributors<BR>• “Rotor winding open” to be<BR>addressed 2Q’02<BR>- Improved strain relief at<BR>termination<BR>- Wire gauge increase from<BR>43 to 42 …currently being<BR>tested<BR>0<BR>2<BR>4<BR>6<BR>8<BR>10<BR>12<BR>14<BR>16<BR>Rotor Winging Open<BR>Lamination Damage/Binding<BR>Stator Termination Failure<BR>Sator Winding Open<BR>Insulation Resistance<BR>Rotor Termination Failure<BR>Resolver Position Adjusted<BR>Wire Chafing<BR>High Eng Play<BR>Bent Connector Pin<BR>Mis-pinned Connector<BR>FMV Extension Wobble<BR>End Play Stator Termination<BR>Rotor Opens in<BR>Winding and Near<BR>Termination<BR>Stator Winding<BR>Open<BR>Low Insulation<BR>Resistance<BR>Resolver Schematic<BR>Resolver Failure Pareto<BR>Corrective Action in Process<BR>Corrective Action In Place<BR>No Corrective Action Defined

979199501 发表于 2011-4-12 14:27:20

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CFM56-7 Starter Reliability

kinran 发表于 2011-6-4 23:33:03

:victory: :victory:

bocome 发表于 2011-7-31 04:27:08

CFM56-7 Overall HMU Reliability
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