CFM56-7 HMU FMV / Resolvers
**** Hidden Message ***** February 2002 WTT face to face CFMI / Boeing Proprietary Information - Unauthorized Disclosure, Use, or Export are Prohibited 1<BR>CFM56-7 HMU FMV / Resolvers<BR>February 2002 WTT face to face CFMI / Boeing Proprietary Information - Unauthorized Disclosure, Use, or Export are Prohibited 2<BR>CFM56-7 HMU FMV / Resolvers<BR>February 2002 WTT face to face CFMI / Boeing Proprietary Information - Unauthorized Disclosure, Use, or Export are Prohibited 3<BR>FMV Related Faults<BR>• FMV faults have become leading cause of D&Cs in -7B fleet<BR>- Fault codes 73-x034y, 73-x035y (x=Channel, y=Engine position)<BR>- Faults result in Engine Control Light indication in cockpit<BR>- Driving 10 HMU removals per month<BR>- No operational events<BR>• Extensive root cause investigation on-going<BR>- Analysis, component, systems rig testing<BR>• Design and manufacturing process changes are being<BR>incorporated to address identified failure modes<BR>• Additional changes for improved reliability being defined,<BR>evaluated and tested<BR>- Design, manufacturing, software logic<BR>February 2002 WTT face to face CFMI / Boeing Proprietary Information - Unauthorized Disclosure, Use, or Export are Prohibited 4<BR>• HMU and resolver analytical efforts<BR>- Tolerance studies, loads, modal, thermal effects including finite<BR>element analysis<BR>• HMU Testing at Burbank<BR>- Run-as-received, electrical checks, inspections (wires, binding, wobble)<BR>• Resolver Module Testing at Kearfott<BR>- Room temperature electrical tests and thermal cycling (all)<BR>- “Shake & bake” testing (10 units) - no failures observed<BR>- Wire disassembly of unconfirmed units (7) - 2 rubbed rotors observed<BR>FMV Root Cause Investigation - Scope<BR>February 2002 WTT face to face CFMI / Boeing Proprietary Information - Unauthorized Disclosure, Use, or Export are Prohibited 5<BR>• Systems level testing on CFMI systems rig<BR>- Focus on unconfirmed units<BR>- Allows monitoring of individual windings and EEC faults<BR>• HMU / Resolver Module Testing at Honeywell - South Bend<BR>- Cell 8 rig test temperature and FMV cycling - 11 units<BR>- Vibe testing for intermittent opens / shorts - 26 units<BR>- Thermal and moisture tests of resolvers to check for shorts - 13 units<BR>- Load testing for channel disagree faults - 2 units<BR>FMV Root Cause Investigation - Scope<BR>February 2002 WTT face to face CFMI / Boeing Proprietary Information - Unauthorized Disclosure, Use, or Export are Prohibited 6<BR>FMV Root Cause Investigation - Findings<BR>• Fault confirmation rate currently 42%<BR>- 74% resolver, 26% HMU-related<BR>• Fault tree analysis used to identify 70 possible failure contributors<BR>- 65 of these have been investigated<BR>• Design and process improvements incorporated for 11 of 12 failure<BR>modes identified to date<BR>- Implemented in new production and field return units following<BR>introduction<BR>42%<BR>58%<BR>74%<BR>26%<BR>Unconfirmed Confirmed Resolver<BR>HMU<BR>February 2002 WTT face to face CFMI / Boeing Proprietary Information - Unauthorized Disclosure, Use, or Export are Prohibited 7<BR>0<BR>2<BR>4<BR>6<BR>8<BR>10<BR>12<BR>14<BR>16<BR>Rotor Winging Open<BR>Lamination Damage/Binding<BR>Stator Termination Failure<BR>Sator Winding Open<BR>Insulation Resistance<BR>Rotor Termination Failure<BR>Resolver Position Adjusted<BR>Wire Chafing<BR>High Eng Play<BR>Bent Connector Pin<BR>Mis-pinned Connector<BR>FMV Extension Wobble<BR>End Play Stator Termination<BR>Rotor Opens in<BR>Winding and Near<BR>Termination<BR>Stator Winding<BR>Open<BR>Low Insulation<BR>Resistance<BR>Resolver Schematic<BR>Resolver Failure Pareto<BR>FMV Root Cause Investigation - Findings<BR>• Majority of resolver failures<BR>related to wiring issues<BR>- Quality and position<BR>adjustment lessor<BR>contributors<BR>• “Rotor winding open” to be<BR>addressed 2Q’02<BR>- Improved strain relief at<BR>termination<BR>- Wire gauge increase from 43<BR>to 42 …currently being tested<BR>Corrective Action in Process<BR>Corrective Action In Place<BR>No Corrective Action Defined<BR>February 2002 WTT face to face CFMI / Boeing Proprietary Information - Unauthorized Disclosure, Use, or Export are Prohibited 8<BR>• Corrective actions expected to address some but not all<BR>unconfirmed units (58%)<BR>- Non-resolver related problems suspected as majority of unconfirmed<BR>population……..linkage, system stackup<BR>• FMV linkage evaluations in process:<BR>- Resolver ball hangup due to potential geometric stackup issue<BR>- FVM extension wobble due to side loading of extension<BR>- High friction/clamping force on ball follower due to wear<BR>• Systems level analysis (Engine Control, HMU, wiring) being<BR>performed to insure compatibility<BR>- Potential cause for “out-of-range” faults<BR>- Plans for acquiring EEC NVM data to support investigation are being<BR>developed<BR>• Additional changes being considered for improved reliability:<BR>- Improved software accommodation logic<BR>- Larger diameter wires (>42 gage) in resolver and resolver housing<BR>change<BR>FMV Root Cause Investigation - Findings :victory: :victory: CFM56-7 HMU FMV / Resolvers
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