B757_Symposium_(1999)

民航

B757_Symposium_(1999)

 

游客，如果您要查看本帖隐藏内容请回复

民航

Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
1 July 7, 1999
GE N E R A L
1. Why does the Operations Manual require the PNF to call out “Speedbrakes Up” or
“Speedbrakes Not Up” after landing touchdown? This does not conform to
philosophy of 757, 767 for an item that operates normally.
<ANSWER> The change to the Boeing Manuals came as a result of several years of
internal and industry discussions and technical analysis. The Human
Performance study we did in support of the Takeoff Safety Training Aid
along with an in-depth analysis of accident and incident data from both
rejected takeoffs and landings, revealed that many crews will not notice if
the speedbrake lever does not go UP, despite the Operations Manual
guidance for them to “verify . . . speedbrake lever UP” and “verify all
required actions have been completed and call out any omissions.” Our
Human Factors and Safety engineers encouraged us to build procedures
that more directly build good habit patterns in the crews. We have sought
to do this by verbalizing the speedbrake position on every landing and
RTO. This is not unlike other standard callouts we require crews to make
throughout the flight to increase crew awareness and coordination, e.g.,
“80 KNOTS”, “V1”, “60 KNOTS”.
2. Has Boeing considered configuration warning or some kind of EICAS message or
master warning to advise 757 crews that the speed brakes are extended after power
is applied, say in a go-around situation. Common practice is to have speed brakes
deployed (hard to know they are there because they are so smooth). After Cali
incident.
<ANSWER> The 757 currently has a warning system that provides an EICAS message
(“Speedbrakes EXT”) when the Captain’s radio altitude is between 800
feet and 15 feet and the speedbrake lever is beyond the ARMED detent.
There is no warning of speedbrake extension based on thrust lever
position.
The FAA has concluded that any new airplanes will incorporate an
automatic speedbrake retraction system design for situations demanding
maximum thrust and climb capability. The system design will include
appropriate flight deck indications (see excerpts of FAA evaluation report
(draft) below).
“FAA Conclusion:
The outcome of this evaluation will be used to address the following:
NTSB Safety Recommendation A-96-091: ‘Require that newly certified
transport-category aircraft include automatic speedbrake retraction during
windshear and ground proximity warning system escape maneuvers, or
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
2 July 7, 1999
other situations demanding maximum thrust and climb capability.’
Based on the findings of this evaluation, new design transport-category
airplanes certified under the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, should
have the automatic speedbrake retraction feature incorporated into the
design of the airplane and flight control system logic. Installing this
feature on existing airplane designs in production and in service, on the
other hand, will require careful consideration to ensure that modifying the
existing flight control system will not compromise the safety of operation
by negatively impacting handling characteristics, creating new failure
modes, or reducing the system reliability. This must be done by
evaluating the impact of incorporating the automatic speedbrake retraction
on each airplane type. For airplanes in which this feature is installed,
there should be a means in the cockpit to indicate to the pilot that the
speedbrakes have been automatically retracted, and that there is
disagreement between the spoiler handle position and the retracted
speedbrakes.”
The Boeing response is found in Appendix A to the FAA report; the
Summary and Conclusion sections in that Appendix are shown below.
“Summary
The risks and benefits of modifying speedbrake systems to provide
automatic in-flight retraction vary from airplane model to airplane model.
As a result, The Boeing Company will evaluate automatic in-flight
speedbrake retraction systems on a model by model basis.
Boeing Conclusions:
Automatic in-flight speedbrake retraction designs have several drawbacks
which can outweigh any potential benefits. Only on airplanes with a
minimal response to speedbrake configuration and thrust changes—either
naturally or through electronic compensation—shall this functionality be
implemented. In particular, on a new design there can be opportunities to
implement additional functionality with full consideration of failure
modes and interactions with other airplane systems.
Boeing will implement automatic in-flight retraction of speedbrakes only
on those airplanes where it is operationally beneficial to do so. The 717
will be the first new Boeing airplane to incorporate automatic in-flight
speedbrake retraction at high thrust settings.”
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
3 July 7, 1999
3. There were some questions regarding using VNAV for descents when flying nonprecision
approaches. The main issue was setting the missed approach altitude in
the MCP window after passing the final approach fix.
<ANSWER> The Boeing 757 Flight Crew Training Manual states:
“If VNAV is used for the final approach, use speed intervention. The
autopilot tracks the path in VNAV resulting in arrival at, or near, the
visual descent point by MDA. At MDA set missed approach altitude in
the MCP altitude and be prepared to land or go around at MDA.”
“If VNAV is not used for final approach, use V/S mode and select an
appropriate vertical speed. The selected vertical speed should have little
or no level flight segment at MDA.”
CFIT Education and Training Aid states on page 3.13: “CFIT accidents
have occurred during departures, but the overwhelming majority of
accidents occur during the descent, approach, and landing phases of the
flight. An enlightening analysis of 40 CFIT accidents and incidents was
accomplished for a 5-year period, 1986-1990. The airplanes’ lateral
positions in relation to the airport runway and the vertical profile were
plotted. One of the interesting things is that almost all the position plots
are on the runway centerline inside of 10 miles from the intended airport.
The vertical profiles are also significant. The flight paths are relatively
constant 3-deg paths - right into the ground! Most of the impacts are
between the outer marker and the runway.”
“Most CFIT accidents occur during nonprecision approaches, specifically
VOR and VOR/DME approaches. Inaccurate or poorly designed
approach procedures coupled with a variety of depictions can be part of
the problem.”
The primary reason Boeing recommends setting any intermediate altitudes
in the MCP window and/or the MDA is to prevent the airplane from
inadvertently descending below these altitudes.
Boeing has been actively participating in the Air Transport Association’s
FMS/RNAV Applications Task Force for several years, as well as other
industry groups working on this issue. Among the most significant issues
to be worked are: FMS data base problems, approach designs, alerting
requirements, human factors issues (traps), training issues, path deviation
requirements for a missed approach and airplane configuration issues.
When Boeing recommends a technique for operating, it must work for all
the delivered configurations of its airplanes, or we must very specifically
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
4 July 7, 1999
restrict operations to some well-defined configurations. It must also work
in the global airline environment.
Boeing is very supportive of the efforts by many in the industry to do
“constant angle approaches” or “precision-like” approaches, however, we
must ensure that the procedures we endorse are the safest possible for all
our customers.
When the industry efforts are complete, Boeing will issue its
recommendations. In the mean time, operators should feel free to submit
proposed procedures to Boeing for evaluation and potential “no technical
objections.”
4. (767) An operator notes during the Go-Around (GA) maneuver, when the airplane
is below 5 feet for more than 2 seconds the flight director is not available after
touchdown. Can Boeing please provide comment?
<ANSWER> 767 Operations Manual, Volume II, Section 07.20, provides the following
description:
“The GA mode is armed when the flaps are not up or G/S is captured.
Arming is not annunciated. GA remains armed for the A/P until 2 seconds
after 5 feet RA. However, for the A/T, GA remains armed until the
airplane is on the ground. Pushing either GA switch when GA is armed
engages the GA mode. The mode will remain engaged even though the
airplane touches down in executing the go-around. If the airplane is
floating within 5 feet RA for more than 2 seconds when the GA switch is
pushed, the A/P pitch mode will remain in FLARE and the A/T GA mode
will engage. If the airplane is on the ground, but has been below 5 feet
RA for less than 2 seconds when the GA switch is pushed, the A/P GA
pitch mode will engage, but the A/T mode will remain in IDLE. The GA
switches are interlocked with the thrust reversers to prevent GA mode
engagement during reverse thrust operation.”
5. (767-300) At high gross weights, VREF30 + 80 is greater than Flaps 1 limit speed.
Our experience in retracting flaps 1 to flaps up, starting at VREF30 + 60, is that the
aircraft does not accelerate. We have recommended flaps 1 to flaps up at VREF30
+ 70 wings level. Please comment.
<ANSWER> As long as flap limit speed is observed, the Boeing Flight Crew Training
Manual allows flap retraction to the next position when within 20 knots of
the maneuver speed for the next flap setting. Waiting until VREF30 + 70
to select flaps up is within the Boeing FCTM recommended guidelines.
6. For an air turn back at heavy gross weights, selecting flaps 0 to flaps 1, at what
airspeed should we select flaps 1?
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
5 July 7, 1999
<ANSWER> Since acceptable maneuver margin exists within 20 knots below the flap
maneuvering speed (reference the “Maneuver Margins to Stick Shaker,
767-200/767-300” figures in the Boeing Flight Crew Training Manual),
airplane speed can be reduced below the clean maneuvering speed
(VREF30 + 80 knots) when necessary to reduce airspeed in compliance
with the Flaps 1 placard speed. Depending upon the 757/767 variant type
and configuration, the Flaps 1 placard speed is 240, 245, or 250 knots.
7. What is the touch and go power setting for 757-200, PW2040?
<ANSWER> The Touch and Go Landing maneuver is described in the Flight Crew
Training Manual on page 4.57 and in Figure 4-18 (for 757-200 and -300,
all engine models).
The power setting is Go-around thrust.
Although the Touch and Go Landing training maneuver is for approach
and landing practice, it is desirable to approximate typical airplane
performance for takeoff rotation and initial climb pitch attitude. For this
reason, the instructor pilot may desire to use a power setting less than full
Go-around thrust as airplane gross weight changes (due to fuel burn) or
due to environmental factors (airport temperature and pressure altitude,
runway length remaining, etc.). In this case, no specific thrust setting is
stipulated.
8. In the Limitations section of the Operations Manual, will you make a statement on
requirements for memorization? Will you standardize this requirement with the
other airplane types/models? 747-400, 777, 737-300/500. What are your criteria for
memorization?
<ANSWER> Pilots are responsible for the limitations in the Airplane Flight Manual.
These can be addressed by placarding, “smart” gauges or indicators,
memorization or other means. Historically, there has been no overt
attempt to standardize the limitation sections in the Operations Manuals.
Due to this customer input, we are beginning discussions to address this
issue.
9. Boeing’s recall items require memorization of words like “disconnect”, “disengage”
and “off”. From a human factors point of view these should be simplified to “off”.
An example is the Mach-airspeed unreliable checklist.
<ANSWER> Boeing checklists are written to include the nomenclature which matches
the associated control or indicator. We believe it is imperative to have
one-to-one correlation between any given checklist step and the control or
indicator being manipulated.
10. Is it necessary to check the crew oxygen pressure each flight? Chapter 2 in the
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
6 July 7, 1999
AOM says “Test and Set” and the QRH only “Set.” If yes, which test should be
performed? Normal procedure, or the one in the supplementary procedures?
<ANSWER> The crew oxygen pressure system should be checked prior to each flight
per the Cockpit Preparation (Captain and First Officer) procedure. This
includes checking crew oxygen pressure.
The amplified normal procedure shown in Chapter 2 of the Operations
Manual lists the detailed steps required to test the crew oxygen system and
currently shows a “Test and Set” response. The QRH response is “Set.”
Boeing will revise chapter 2 to be consistent with the QRH response.
The Supplementary procedure tests the oxygen mask communication
system and is not required on each flight.
11. Please advise a contact for retrofit Master Changes at Boeing Airplane Services
(BAS).
<ANSWER> Operators may contact Mr. Nigel Lee of BAS regarding all new technical
consulting and retrofit Master Changes. Mr. Lee can be reached via
telephone: 425-865-7850, or email: nigel.j.lee@boeing.com.
12. Many 737 and 757 operators received approval from their National Authorities for
dispatch with an inoperative door/slide on single aisle airplanes. JAR-OPS 1,
however, does not allow for dispatch provisions beyond those identified in the
MMEL. With JAR-OPS 1, JAA operators may have difficulty obtaining door relief
for single aisle airplanes because the MMEL for Boeing single aisle airplanes does
not allow dispatch with an inoperative door (e.g. 757-300). It is requested that
Boeing rethink their position and pursue dispatch relief for an inoperative
door/slide on their single aisle airplanes.
<ANSWER> It should be recognized that the FAA authorizes relief for main cabin exits
on twin-aisle airplanes only. This relief is granted through FAA Policy
Letter 1. Boeing maintains that MMEL relief for a door/slide can be
justified for both twin and single aisle airplanes. Unfortunately, the FAA
has never granted relief for a single aisle airplane.
13. During the year Boeing responds to numerous customer questions. Can Boeing
provide these responses to all airlines?
<ANSWER> Boeing is considering developing a Frequently Asked Questions (Flight
Crew Operations) section as an addition to our FTS web site. To preserve
the privacy of our customers we have no plans to “copy” the thousands of
individual responses we send out on a yearly basis to all operators.
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
7 July 7, 1999
NO N NORMAL P R O C E D U R E S
14. During the ENGINE FAILURE AND SHUTDOWN checklist, you see “disengage
the autothrottle if engaged.” Does it mean that you have to switch off the MCP A/T
on the MCP together with the A/T disconnect switch on the Thrust Lever(s)?
<ANSWER> The current ENGINE FAILURE AND SHUTDOWN procedure states to
disengage the autothrottle if on and further explains (in bracketed
information): “Autothrottle use not recommended under engine
inoperative conditions.”
The autothrottles should be disengaged using the Autothrottle Disconnect
Switch on the thrust lever(s) and in order to preclude inadvertent
autothrottle re-engagement when the go-around switch is pushed, the
Autothrottle Arm switch on the MCP should be placed off.
15. (757/767) Has Boeing Flight Operations attempted the “AIRSPEED/MACH
UNRELIABLE” non-normal checklist in a simulator? Can the
“AIRSPEED/MACH UNRELIABLE” non-normal checklist be simplified?
<ANSWER> The “AIRSPEED/MACH UNRELIABLE” non-normal checklist was
developed as a direct result of the two 757 accidents involving unreliable
airspeed indications among the three airspeed indicators. Boeing Flight
Crew Operations was extensively involved in the creation and
coordination of this checklist and the simulator was used for testing.
Boeing has made every effort to minimize the impact of this checklist on
flight crew workload while adhering to Boeing operational philosophies
and government-mandated requirements. As with other checklists, Boeing
continues to review this checklist for technical accuracy and ease of use.
If Boeing determines, with operator input, that modifications are required,
Boeing will act accordingly.
16. (767) The Reverser Unlocked procedure does not allow extension of the Leading
Edge slats. Can this restriction against the use of Leading Edge slats be removed
from the procedure so that the procedure mirrors the 757 procedure?
<ANSWER> The 767 “REVERSER UNLOCKED” non-normal checklist cannot be
revised to delete the leading edge slat restriction. The 767 Reverser
Unlocked non-normal procedure restricts the use of the Leading Edge slats
because the turbulent airflow resulting from the open reverser cowl may
damage the Leading Edge slats during flight. During early 767-200 flight
test involving deployment of a thrust reverser in flight, the airplane
sustained damage to a leading edge slat panel when the reverser cowl was
deployed. Following this test, the procedure was modified to state that the
Leading Edge slats should not be extended.
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
8 July 7, 1999
17. Concerning the new LOSS OF THRUST ON BOTH ENGINES procedure, (a)
When do I transition from memory steps to read & do? (b)Why does not Boeing
just specify an EGT value? (c)How many times should we cycle the switch? (d) Are
the steps different for the Pratt engines? (e) When do I start waiting 30 seconds
before moving the Fuel Control switch?
<ANSWER> An Operations Manual Bulletin will be released this summer and should
answer many of the above questions. A Technical Bulletin will also
contain information regarding checklist implementation in the 757 and
767 fleets. This will include what pilots may see, when to transition to
“read and do”, engine differences, and training issues such as the APU
generator coming online (i.e., not an engine start), etc.
W A R N I N G S Y S T E M S
18. Some EICAS status messages which result in a “no dispatch” scenario per the
MMEL have been upgraded to alert level EICAS messages on the 747-400 airplane.
Operators inquire if these status level messages which result in “no dispatch” can be
upgraded on the 757 and 767 airplanes as well.
<ANSWER> The 757 and 767 airplanes were certified such that after engine start, it is
not necessary to check status level EICAS messages as any message
having adverse effect on safe continuation of the flight, requiring crew
attention, will appear as an alert level message. To confirm this, Boeing
conducted an EICAS message audit approximately six years ago on the
757 and 767 in an effort to identify any status level message which should
be elevated. This audit indicated that it was not necessary to elevate any
of the 757/767 status level EICAS messages. If an operator feels there is a
status message that should be elevated, please send it to Boeing for
evaluation as we are glad to have airline perspective.
The introduction to the non-normal procedures section in volume 2 of the
Operations Manual also states: “After engine start and prior to takeoff,
the appropriate non-normal procedure is executed if an EICAS alert
message occurs. Upon completion of the procedure, the Dispatch
Deviations Guide or airline equivalent is consulted to determine if
Minimum Equipment List relief is available.”
P E R F O R M A N C E
19. Boeing should publish a MINIMUM landing distance required in the QRH for an
all flaps/slats-up landing since there is now a published procedure.
<ANSWER> The landing distance for all flaps and slats up will be provided in the
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
9 July 7, 1999
Performance Inflight section of the new format Operations Manual QRH.
20. The 767 AFM Landing Distance Charts do not indicate what braking level was used
to achieve the certified landing distance. Please advise what braking level was used
to develop the AFM landing distance charts. Our company documentation advises
wheel changes following six (6) consecutive landings. Please comment.
<ANSWER> The distances published in the 767 Airplane Flight Manual landing
distance charts are based on maximum manual braking effort. This
distance is increased by a factor of 1.67 for the dry runway and by an
additional 15% for the wet runway. Boeing criteria for removing brakes
from the airplane are contained in AMM 32-41-08/601, “Main Gear
Wheel Brakes - Inspection/Check”. The high-energy stop conditional
inspection is in AMM 05-51-14/201.
21. Takeoff performance calculations at Fort Lauderdale (FLL) show no improvement
for Packs off operations as compared to Packs on. Please provide an explanation
for this.
<ANSWER> In general, limiting gross weights do increase for packs off takeoffs versus
packs on. For Field Length limited conditions gross weight improvements
of approximately 1000 pounds are typical for the 767. Packs off takeoff
gross weights for Climb Limited cases may see improvements of
approximately 3000 pounds when compared to a packs on takeoff.
However, it is more difficult to quantify gross weight increases in obstacle
limited takeoffs because of the variability with airport/runway
characteristics. Specific airplane configuration and runway information
would be required to accurately address airplane performance concerns at
FLL.
22. (757/767) Airbus provides very good charts and guidance in their Operations
Manuals regarding contaminated runways. Does Boeing have any plans to revise or
include any new material regarding contaminated runway data for flight crew use?
<ANSWER> Yes, as part of the Boeing effort of converting the current 757 and 767
Operations Manuals into the new “Jeppesen-Size” format, the
contaminated runway information currently contained in Volume III will
be available in the Quick Reference Handbook to facilitate better
information access for the flight crew. In addition, performance
information regarding slippery runways will be added.
23. What is the rationale behind the difference (Takeoff vs. Landing) in Boeing
recommended wet runway crosswind guidelines? Why is the Takeoff guideline less
than the Landing?
<ANSWER> The maneuver used to establish the takeoff crosswind guidelines was
engine failure just prior to V1. The ability to control the engine
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
10 July 7, 1999
inoperative yawing moment prior to the initiation of the RTO maneuver is
much more demanding than the landing condition. Thus, the lower
recommended crosswind speeds for the takeoff case.
24. How will crews use the new 757-300 Overweight Landing Checklist and is landing
distance provided?
<ANSWER> The 757-300 Overweight Landing Checklist was developed to address a
heavyweight landing or go-around if landing at weights greater than the
airplane maximum certified landing weight. Its use requires pilots refer to
a “Landing Climb Limit Weight” table that is included in the new format
Quick Reference Handbook (QRH). (See also Overweight Landing
presentation.) Normal landing distance tables can still be used for flaps 30
landings. If the planned landing gross weight is greater than the Landing
Climb Limit weight table value (based on airport temperature and pressure
altitude), a flaps 20 landing should be made instead of flaps 25 or 30.
Actual landing distances for an overweight landing at flaps 20 can be
determined by using the Non-Normal Configuration Landing Distance
tables that are also included in the new format QRH. The existing Nonnormal
Configuration Landing Distance table (new for 757-300) does not
have a specific entry for “Flaps 20 Overweight Landing”. Until the table
is updated, any of the four entries for leading edge or trailing edge landing
malfunctions that also use VREF20 approach speed provide the same
landing distance corrections and are correct for a flaps 20 overweight
landing condition.
The 757-300 Overweight Landing Checklist and QRH tables referenced
above are planned for inclusion in all 757 and 767 model publications.
25. What is Boeing’s policy on autoland for overweight landings and can it be done in
an emergency?
<ANSWER> Boeing cannot recommend overweight autolands. Autopilots on Boeing
airplanes are not certified for automatic landings above maximum landing
weight. At higher than normal speeds and weights, the performance of
these systems may not be satisfactory and has not been thoroughly tested.
An automatic approach may be attempted, however the pilot should
disconnect the autopilot prior to flare height and accomplish a manual
landing.
In an emergency, should the pilot determine that an overweight autoland is
the safest course of action, the approach and landing should be closely
monitored by the pilot and the following factors considered:
- Touchdown may be beyond the normal touchdown zone; allow for
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
11 July 7, 1999
additional landing distance.
- Touchdown at higher than normal sink rates may result in exceeding
structural limits.
Plan for a go-around or manual landing if autoland performance is
unsatisfactory; automatic go-arounds can be initiated until just prior to
touchdown, and can be continued even if the airplane touches down after
initiation of the go-around.
26. (767) The certified flap setting for autoland are positions 25 and 30. Is flap position
20 a certified autoland flap setting? What is the maximum calculated glide path
angle to perform an autoland?
<ANSWER> Although flaps 20 has been demonstrated during autoland operations,
flaps 20 is not a certified autoland flap setting. The AFM published
glideslope angles are based upon the values used in the autoland statistical
analyses. The AFM publishes maximum and minimum glide slope angles
for automatic landing of 3.1 and 2.5 percent respectively for UK CAA
operators only.
27. (757/767) How does the extra speed of an improved climb takeoff affect the initial
climb profile during takeoff? Can the Flight Director be followed for both an
engine failure at V1 as well as engine failure after takeoff and already at V2+25?
Does the flight director pitch command bar recalculate for the engine out condition
such that obstacle clearance is assured?
<ANSWER> Obstacle clearance is accounted for in the Improved Climb Takeoff
Performance data in both the AFM and Operations Manual, Volume III,
Section 23.10. The revised V2 value obtained by adding the V2 speed
increment from the Improved Climb Takeoff Performance data accounts
for obstacle clearance. Therefore, it is very important to ensure the V2
value which includes the improved climb performance speed increment is
properly entered into the IAS/MACH Window of the Mode Control Panel
(MCP). With the proper V2 value entered into the MCP, the flight
director will provide proper pitch guidance during both two-engine takeoff
(targets V2+15, or current speed up to V2+25) and an engine-out takeoff
(targets V2 or current speed up to V2+15). The flight director pitch
command is, therefore, valid.
C A T E GOR Y I I / C A T E G O R Y I I I
28. (757/767) What is the performance penalty of using wing anti-ice during an
approach and the effect on Weight/Altitude/Temperature limit for Category II or
Category III approaches?
<ANSWER> The performance numbers can be obtained from the “Landing
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
12 July 7, 1999
Performance Climb Limit” charts and tables in the Boeing-published 757
or 767 Operations Manual, Volume III, Section 23.10: “Flight Planning”.
As can be seen from these tables and charts, there are no specific Category
II or Category III dependencies.
29. (757/767) Regarding Category IIIa and Category IIIb approaches: Once the
aircraft is in the landing configuration and ASA “LAND 2” or “LAND 3” is
displayed and an engine is lost after glideslope capture (inside the outer marker),
how does Boeing recommend proceeding?
<ANSWER> If an engine fails after glideslope capture (inside the outer marker), the
approach can be continued down to Category IIIa minima, with manual
control of the autothrottles. Category IIIb requires both engines be
operative at the alert height (200-feet RA), allowing continuation of the
autoland with manual throttles for an engine failure below the alert height.
There is an “Engine Out Autoland” option available that allows making a
planned Category II or Category IIIa autoland with one engine inoperative
prior to the approach.
30. (757/767) Regarding Category II / Category III training program: I would like
Boeing to help assist my airline in launching a Category II and Category III training
program on the B757/B767 aircraft. Can Boeing supply training documents and/or
other support in my efforts to initiate Category II and Category III programs?
<ANSWER> FlightSafety Boeing Training International (FSBTI) has recently received
FAA course approval for Category II and Category IIIa training programs
for the 737 New Generation (NG) airplanes. FSBTI is currently pursuing
FAA course approval for the 777 airplane. Regarding specific 757 and
767 Category II and Category III training program status, contact:
Capt. Duane Martin, Manager
FlightSafety Boeing Training International
757/767 Fleet Training
P.O. Box 3707, MC 20-87
Seattle, Washington 98124-2207
U. S. A.
(206) 662-7500 (office)
(206) 662-7575 (facsimile)
31. (767-300) What is the Minimum Approach Break-off Height (MABH) of the 767-
300 for Category IIIb approach with DH (JAR-OPS 1 Requirement)?
<ANSWER> The MABH value should be available from a European JAA operator’s
AFM. If you are unable to directly obtain the needed information from a
JAA operator, please contact Boeing at the following address for further
assistance:
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
13 July 7, 1999
Mr. John Ackland
Manager, Automatic Flight Control Systems
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group
P.O. Box 3707, MC 02-99
Seattle, Washington 98124-2207
U. S. A.
425-294-0730 (office)
32. (767) What are the autoland wind limitations and how do they apply to CAT I, II,
and III weather minima?
<ANSWER> The 767 Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) limits the crosswind to 25 knots
when “landing weather minima are predicated on autoland operations.”
This limitation means that if weather minima are such that autoland is
required, the maximum crosswind is limited to 25 knots. The AFM has no
additional limitations on crosswinds. This wind limitation is imposed so
that the Autopilot/Flight Director System (AFDS) will meet the
certification requirements for autoland landing dispersion. If autoland
operation is being performed in weather conditions better than those for
which autoland is required, and the winds exceed the AFM limitation, the
pilot should monitor autoland system performance and be prepared to
disconnect the autopilot and complete the landing manually if
performance is not satisfactory.
The AFM and Boeing Flight Crew Training Manual contain other useful
information on crosswinds including crosswind guidelines. The AFM
Normal Procedures section lists maximum demonstrated wind conditions
for the AFDS. These are the maximum wind values that were encountered
during certification flight testing and are not considered to be limiting.
The maximum crosswind demonstrated during takeoff and landing
certification is provided in AFM Section 4.1. This wind value is also not
considered limiting on a dry runway with all engines operating.
The Flight Crew Training Manual states the following:
“The AFDS performance has been satisfactorily demonstrated with and
without yaw dampers at flaps 25 and 30 using Vref + 5 knots as final
approach speed. Autoland approaches with headwinds of 34 knots,
tailwinds of 25 knots, and crosswinds of 25 knots were satisfactorily
demonstrated. Rollout performance was demonstrated on both wet and
dry runways.”
Boeing has also published landing crosswind guidelines in the July 1996
Airliner magazine. Supprimé : Checklists
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
14 July 7, 1999
A I R C O N D I T I O N I N G , P R E S S U R I ZA T I O N A N D
P N E U M A T I C S
33. Will the Hamilton Standard humidifier be offered on the 767-400? Will it be
offered on previous 767 models on retrofit basis?
<ANSWER> It is our intent to offer the Hamilton Standard humidifier on the 767-400
and as a Master Change retrofit for the 767-200 and 767-300 airplanes.
AUTOM A T I C F L I G H T
34. London Heathrow airport departure requires noise abatement takeoff up to 4000ft
AGL with a very tight turn requirement after takeoff. We can use flight level
change or VNAV with a restriction programmed in the climb page. Which one do
you recommend?
<ANSWER> Consider leaving the flaps extended to an appropriate setting, which
allows the airplane to fly at a slower speed, therefore reducing the turn
radius of the airplane. Flight level change would be the easiest way to
accomplish this task.
E L E C T R I C A L
35. Has Boeing considered providing further information on equipment or devices that
are inoperative as a result of AC bus(es) OFF? [provide detailed list of what is lost
in the QRH]
<ANSWER> Boeing has no plans at this time to develop an ac bus inop system matrix
in the AC BUS(ES) OFF checklist for loss of both AC buses. The
information currently available in the operations manual will be available
for airlines to add additional system information to their individual
checklists to further identify resulting inoperative systems. Note that if
one ac bus fails, EICAS provides information on equipment that is
inoperative.
36. Is Boeing aware that with the left AC bus inoperative, the flap indicator does not
work and the QRH procedure does not address it? Will Boeing add this
information to the QRH?
<ANSWER> For HMG equipped airplanes, the flap indicator is powered by the left AC
transfer bus. The left AC transfer bus:
(a) is not powered with a Left AC bus failure
(b) is powered by the Hydraulic Motor Generator when there is a loss of
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
15 July 7, 1999
both left and right AC buses in flight.
The new format Operations Manual will include the Flap indicator in the
inoperative items for left AC bus failure.
37. (767) Apparently there is electrical load shedding that occurs during fuel jettison.
What is the reason for this load shedding and why is there no mention of this
activity in the 767 Operations Manual?
<ANSWER> There is load shedding during fuel jettison operation. Electrical load
shedding must take into account that the requirement to jettison fuel may
occur following loss of one generator. The loads shed during fuel jettison
to ensure that the electrical system can meet bus load requirements with
one generator inoperative during fuel jettison. Fuel jettison sheds various
passenger entertainment loads and the number 3 flight deck window heat.
In addition, the equipment cooling system automatically reverts to the
override mode due to load shedding of the equipment cooling fans. The
EICAS alert messages associated with these systems annunciate during
fuel jettison operation. 767 Operations Manual, Volume II, Section 06.20
for airplanes equipped with the fuel jettison system provides information
on equipment cooling system operation during fuel jettison. 767
Operations Manual, Volume II, Section 17.20 explains the window heat
message display during fuel jettison operation. Once fuel jettison system
operation is secured, all systems which were load shed will automatically
return to normal operation and their associated EICAS alert messages will
disappear.
E T O P S
38. Some operators received ETOPS approval for 138 min ETOPS and then 180
minutes. Certain equipment failures limit the use of 180 minute ETOPS, yet the
MEL then restricts operations to 120 minutes. Why not 138 minutes?
<ANSWER> FAA ETOPS Policy letter EPL 95-1 “138-Minute ETOPS Operational
Approval Criteria” established an additional ETOPS diversion authority of
138 minutes between the existing 120 and 180 minutes diversion
authorities outlined in FAA Advisory Circular 120-42A. Policy letter
EPL 95-1 indicates that 138-Minute ETOPS authority is an extension of
120-Minute ETOPS and Minimum Equipment List (MEL) applicability
will be in the “beyond 120 minute” category.
F I R E P R O T E C T I O N
39. Several operators have experienced faults resulting in cabin smoke emitting from
the Supplemental Door Heating system. Why is no information provided in the
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
16 July 7, 1999
Operations Manual relating to the installation of this heating system and its power
source?
<ANSWER> Due to recent events involving overheating of the Supplemental Door
Heating System's heater blankets, especially at the aft wing, Type-I
Emergency Escape Doors, Boeing will be issuing an 767 All-Operator's
Letter providing information on the Heater Blankets. This information
will include types of installed supplemental heating devices on the 767
including their locations and controls.
40. Can Boeing state when/if we can expect the new AFOLTS card to the forward cargo
smoke detection system? This was earlier scheduled for Jan 1999 but there has not
been any further information yet.
<ANSWER> AFOLTS cards are used for fire detection on engine, APU, and cargo fire
systems. The new AFOLTS card is currently being installed on 757-200’s
and 757-300’s in production. It is two-way interchangeable on all engine
and APU systems, and on 757-200 cargo fire systems. Previous AFOLTS
cards cannot be installed on the 757-300 and 767-400 cargo fire systems.
The 767-200 and 767-300 are expected to be incorporated by the end of
first quarter 2000.
41. (757) A dispatch with one engine loop inoperative, followed by a second loop failure
(Rolls Royce engine) resulted in a fire warning. Which action will stop the fire
warnings and why? Does not two fire loop faults result in no fire warning?
<ANSWER> A second loop fault on the Rolls Royce engine fire detection system will
result in a fire warning. If a fire warning occurs, the crew is expected to
accomplish the ENGINE FIRE checklist, regardless of MEL status, and is
the appropriate response to an engine fire warning. The fire bell or horn
will be silenced by pushing either master warning/caution reset switch
(bell) or pulling the appropriate fire switch (bell and horn). The affected
fire warning lights and fuel control switch fire lights will remain
illuminated as long as the fire signal exists.
42. Has Boeing contemplated changing electric smoke non-normals to provide for some
bus isolation? This is a question asked frequently by our ETOPS crews.
<ANSWER> Boeing is reviewing the ELECTRICAL SMOKE OR FIRE checklist and
will publish information that discusses the Boeing philosophy concerning
use of troubleshooting checklist procedures for electrical smoke or fire.
43. (Several operators) would like Boeing to review the current smoke and fire nonnormal
procedures for possible revision with special attention given to electrical
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
17 July 7, 1999
smoke and fire of unknown origin. Just turning off the utility buses and landing at
the nearest suitable airport is inadequate. In addition, operators are interested in
more direction from Boeing in regard to a “descend and decide” philosophy.
Boeing should provide additional technical information on the location of “fire
sources” in the cabin (overhead, walls, floors etc.) to assist with fighting the fire
rather than just pulling circuit breakers.
<ANSWER> The Boeing Flight Crew Operations group and Engineering groups are
currently reviewing the 757 and 767 smoke and fire non-normal
procedures. If necessary, a bulletin will be issued after engineering
analysis is complete.
F L I G H T C O N T R O L S
44. (767) Why is flap asymmetry protection not provided by a skewed position of the
flap indicator pointers when flaps are selected greater than position 20?
<ANSWER> As is stated in the 767 Operations Manual, Volume II, section 13.20,
leading edge slat and trailing edge flap asymmetry protection is not
available when using the alternate flaps system. Even though asymmetry
EICAS fault alerting is available while using the alternate system, the
automatic shutoff feature inherent to the normal slat and flap operation is
not available if a subsequent asymmetry occurs while using the alternate
system. The system’s design precludes the flap indicator pointers from
providing skewed positions during an asymmetry beyond flap position 20.
The flap indicator is not a reliable indication of an asymmetry and should
not be used as an indication of an asymmetry. The associated EICAS
caution-level alert accompanied by the associated amber LEADING
EDGE or TRAILING EDGE light is the appropriate method of
determining a failure has been sensed.
45. (757/767) Regarding a 757 “TE FLAP ASYM” EICAS alert with flap position less
than 1: According to the recently revised TE FLAP ASYM checklist, if a LE SLAT
ASYM alert occurs after the LE alternate flap switch is pushed, why is the LE
alternate switch not reset as a first step in the new ALL FLAP/SLAT UP LANDING
checklist?
<ANSWER> Unlike the 767, the 757 airplane has full asymmetry protection when using
the alternate flap system. Per the TE FLAP ASYM checklist, after the LE
alternate flap switch is pushed, if a subsequent LE SLAT ASYM or LE
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
18 July 7, 1999
SLAT DISAGREE condition occurs, asymmetry protection is still
provided. Therefore, if either condition subsequently occurs while using
the alternate system, slat movement is automatically shut off and latched.
There is no need to reset the LE alternate switch.
46. The 757 trailing edge flap anomaly checklist Operations Manual Bulletin that was
issued last year is still in effect. Are there any fixes in the works to repair this
problem?
<ANSWER> This bulletin was last revised Dec 96, and its original issue date was Dec
94. The bulletin is still in effect and Boeing is currently working on a
service bulletin to correct this problem.
47. (757) In regard to pitch control on landing, please provide information about
manual versus automatic speedbrake extension and the effect of airspeed and
touchdown pitch attitude.
<ANSWER> This discussion will include (a) normal landings, (b) factors that can affect
pitch changes such as airspeed/pitch attitude on landing, automatic versus
manual speedbrake deployment, and (c) recommended landing techniques.
Normal Landing. Landings may be made using normal or automatic
speedbrake deployment. Boeing recommends arming the speedbrake for
automatic deployment. Speedbrake deployment (manual or auto) has
negligible effects, on airplane pitching moment, during normal landings
when using “correct speeds and pitch attitudes.”
Spoiler deployment. On touchdown, some nose down pitching moment
occurs as the center of rotation shifts from the airplane center of gravity to
the main landing gear. Some nose-up pitching moment is also normal
with spoiler deployment because the center of lift shifts forward. This
effect of the spoilers is slight at normal touchdown pitch attitudes (VREF
or faster), but is increased at higher touchdown pitch attitudes (speeds less
than VREF). This pitch up is easily corrected if additional factors are not
also contributing to pitch up. Flight Data Recorder reviews of in-service
landing tailstrike events indicate that manual spoiler deployment was not a
factor in any event. Landing tailstrikes occurred when touchdowns were
made at high pitch attitudes, when nose-up pitch commands were made
prior to or after touchdown, or when improper configurations were used
for landing (in-air speedbrakes deployed during final and flare).
Spoiler panel delay. When spoilers are armed for automatic deployment,
spoiler panels 2, 3,10, and 11 are delayed 1.25 seconds “after touchdown”.
This delay reduces the initial effect of spoiler pitch-up moment. If the
speedbrakes are manually extended in the 757-200, there may be partial or
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
19 July 7, 1999
no delay of spoiler panels 2, 3, 10, and 11 depending on how quickly
pilots extend the speedbrakes.
Autobrakes. Application of autobrakes causes a nose down pitch and is a
function of weight on the main gear. At higher angles of attack (near tail
strike attitude), the airplane may be floating with less load on the gear and
hence less nose down moment due to braking. If a pilot holds control
column back pressure in anticipation of a nose down moment due to
braking, with the airplane at a high touch down attitude, the chance of a
tail strike is greatly increased. If main gear oleos have not compressed
prior to spoiler deployment, the quick deployment of spoilers can cause
rapid full compression of the oleos. Rapid compression of the main gear
may cause the crew to incorrectly perceive that the aircraft is pitching up.
The anticipation of potential tailstrike due to higher than normal pitch
attitude in the flare and a possible perceived pitch-up due to sudden loss of
lift with spoiler deployment, may cause crews to initiate rapid pitch down
commands. This in combination with the pitch-down due to braking could
result in severe nose landing gear letdown. For all but extreme cases,
control column movement forward of neutral should not be required.
Recommended Landing Techniques
Flaps. Use Flaps 30 when possible. In 757-200, a flaps 25 landing
reduces tailstrike margins approximately 2 degrees.
Airspeed. It is important that the landing begin from a stabilized approach
on speed, in trim and on glide path. The airspeed at touchdown should be
no less that VREF. When using autothrottles, approach airspeed is VREF
+ 5 knots. If the autothrottles are disengaged, or are planned to be
disengaged prior to landing, the minimum approach airspeed is VREF +
wind correction (5 knots minimum).
The recommended method to compute the approach wind speed correction
is to add one half of the tower reported steady headwind component plus
the full gust increment above the steady wind to VREF. The total wind
additive should not exceed 20 knots. The gust correction should be
maintained to touchdown while the steady headwind correction may be
bled off as the airplane approaches touchdown. When the wind is reported
calm or light and variable, VREF + 5 knots is the recommended approach
airspeed.
Avoid over-rotating during the landing flare. Do not increase pitch
attitude after touchdown and do not trim the stabilizer during flare or after
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
20 July 7, 1999
touchdown. Such actions increase the potential for a tailstrike. Do not
allow the airplane to float; or extend the flare by increasing the pitch
attitude in an attempt to achieve a perfectly smooth touchdown - - fly the
airplane onto the runway.
After main gear touchdown, smoothly fly the nose gear onto the runway
by relaxing aft control column pressure. Control column movement
forward of neutral should not be required. Pitch rates sufficient to cause
airplane structural damage can occur if large nose down control column
movement is made prior to nose gear touchdown.
(Much of the above information is found in the current Boeing Flight
Crew Training Manual, pages 1.8, 4.38, and 4.44.)
48. (757/767) What effect does applying reverse thrust before deploying speedbrakes
have?
<ANSWER> By not deploying speedbrakes immediately upon touchdown, the total
landing rollout distance may be increased. The intent of deploying
speedbrakes before deploying the thrust reversers is to immediately reduce
wing lift and force “weight on wheels.” By forcing “weight on wheels”,
efficient wheel braking action is maximized. Unlike the UK CAA, the
FAA certification criteria does not allow stopping credit for use of thrust
reversers. However, the sooner that “weight on wheels” is established, the
sooner, the thrust reversers can deploy to assist in increased deceleration.
F L I G H T I N S TRUMEN T S
49. While manually flying the flight director during flap retraction on departure, the
pitch command bar does not appear to track as precisely as the 737-300. If you
follow it, the acceleration seems to be too low. Please comment.
<ANSWER> Acceleration rate is dependent upon airplane gross weight and
atmospheric conditions. Acceleration rate is also dependent upon the
engaged pitch mode during the acceleration phase of climb, for example
VNAV or FL CH. The programmed autoflight system control laws vary
for each airplane model, so comparisons between any two airplane models
may not be valid.
FUEL
50. (767) Is it true that Jet-B and JP-4 fuel, so called “wide-cut” fuels, will be
prohibited on airplanes with the new center tank fuel pump assembly, the
“diffuserless” pump, installed? What about the new re-designed center wing tank
fuel pump with the “cast diffuser”?
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
21 July 7, 1999
<ANSWER> Currently, there is a complete Jet-B and JP-4 fuel prohibition on any 767
with the “diffuserless” pump installed. The FAA has agreed to allow a
“center tank only” prohibition for the 767-400ER using the “cast diffuser”
pumps. Boeing will work with the FAA to get a “center tank only”
restriction applied to the “diffuserless” pump configuration and 767-
200/300’s delivered with the “cast diffuser”. With main tank capacity
retained, operators should have sufficient flexibility in selecting diversion
alternates, even if those alternates only have JP-4 or Jet-B fuel available.
51. Will the new “diffuserless” or “cast diffuser” pumps be installed on the first 767-400
airplane? Will there be a Service Bulletin to allow removal of the diffuser on
existing pumps?
<ANSWER> It is our intent to have the new “cast diffuser” pumps installed on the first
767-400.
Service Bulletin 767-28-0052, which will allow modification to the
“diffuserless” pump design, was approved by the FAA on May 11, 1999.
Once the “cast diffuser” pumps are available operators may choose to
replace their current center wing tank fuel pumps or the “diffuserless”
pumps with new “cast diffuser” pumps. However, please note that part
interchangability is not downward compatible; a cast diffuser pump may
not be replaced with a current design or “diffuserless” pump.
52. FAA Airworthiness Directive 97-19-15 does not allow operation of 767 center tank
fuel pumps with less than 1000 lbs of fuel, and requires at least 5000 lbs of fuel in
the center tank at dispatch if the center pumps will be used in flight. Will Service
Bulletin 767-28-0052, which modifies existing fuel pumps to the “diffuserless”
design, be considered terminating action for FAA Airworthiness Directive 97-19-15?
<ANSWER> The FAA has advised Boeing that installation of the diffuserless center
tank override pumps or override/jettison pumps in accordance with Boeing
Service Bulletin 767-28-0052 is approved as an Alternate Method of
Compliance with paragraph (a) of AD 97-19-15, with provisions for Jet-B
and JP-4 fuel restrictions.
53. 757 fuel pumps are not the subject of FAA AD 97-19-15 which restricts the
operation of center tank fuel pumps in 767 airplanes. How do the 757 fuel pumps
differ from those installed on the 767?
<ANSWER> The 757 fuel pump does not have a diffuser. The 767 center tank override
and override/jettison pump is unique to that installation. The pump is a
bottom mounted unit and has a screw-type impeller (radial flow) as
opposed to axial flow in other models. The long impeller creates this
particular diffuser configuration for the 767 installation. The 767 is the
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
22 July 7, 1999
only airplane with a steel diffuser.
54. (767) Can you confirm which recent 767 airplane deliveries have the “wide-cut”
fuel restriction?
<ANSWER> Airplane cumulative line number 738 and on have the new “diffuserless”
center tank fuel pumps installed; line number 738 was delivered in early
March, 1999. Note that airplanes with the “diffuserless” center wing tank
installed have an Airplane Flight Manual limitation which prohibits the
use of JP-4 or Jet B fuel.
55. (767) Will the limitation regarding the use of wide-cut fuels be removed or revised?
<ANSWER> Boeing is working with the FAA to get a “center tank only” restriction
applied to the “diffuserless” pump configuration and 767-200/300’s
delivered with the “cast diffuser”.
56. When does Boeing expect a final fix to the center tank fuel pump AD requirements?
(767-200/300)
<ANSWER> It is Boeing’s plan to propose the “cast diffuser” design as terminating
action to FAA Airworthiness Directive 97-19-15. Please note, however,
that although the cast diffuser may be accepted as terminating action by
the FAA, the use of Jet-B and JP-4 fuel will be prohibited.
57. Why does Boeing consider it to be normal to have a difference/error between the
fuel totalizer and calculated fuel up to 800 KG? [800 kg is too large because you
may be in FMC holding when you should not and should have declared min fuel
when you did not, i.e. 3200 kg is not legal and 4000 kg is legal]
<ANSWER> The fuel quantity indicating system (FQIS) is accurate on the ground to
within
+/- 1 % of full tank capacity regardless of how much fuel is remaining in
the tank. For a typical 757, this is approximately 147 lbs/67 kg (1% of
2,176 gal x 6.75 lbs/gal) for each main tank. Inflight tolerances are
different. The design specification for the 757/767 FQIS requires the
following errors not be exceeded inflight:
Tank Inflight Tank Quantity
757-200 Example
(Cruise Attitude)
Mains: Between full & 1/3 full: +/- 2
% 588 lbs/267 kg (2% of 2176
gal x 6.75 lbs/gal x 2 tanks)
Between 1/3 full & empty: +/- 0.75 % 220 lbs/100 kg (0.75% of
2176
gal x 6.75 lbs/gal x 2 tanks)
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
23 July 7, 1999
Center: From empty to full: +/- 2
% 934 lbs/424 kg (2% of 6924
gal x 6.75 lbs/gal)
Note that the mains are designed to be more accurate at low quantities.
This results in the following potential FQIS errors inflight:
Total fuel remaining Max Error Total Fuel Remaining Max
Error
0-9790 lb 220 lb 0-4,441 kg 100 kg
9800-29,380 lb 588 lb 4,445-13327 kg 267 kg
29,390-76110 lb 1522 lb 1,3331-34,523 kg 690 kg
FMC Calculated fuel. After engine start on ground, the FMC initializes
itself with the FQIS total fuel quantity. Thereafter, the FMC subtracts the
total fuel burned by the engines (as determined by the engine flow meters,
excluding the APU) and displays an independent "calculated" total fuel
quantity. The fuel used indicating system is a separate and independent
system accurate to within +/- 1% of the fuel used readings. For example,
if a total of 50,000 lbs of fuel used is indicated, the system error should
not exceed 500 lbs.
When using the fuel used indicating system to cross check the FQIS, you
must consider the combined effect of errors in each system. In the
extreme case, the example systems above may have a combined error of
over 2,000 lbs/900 kg but still be within allowable limits for each system.
Normally, however, smaller fuel quantity errors can be expected because
individual tank FQIS errors tend to cancel one another and the fuel used
system is generally better than 1%. In addition, review of airline data
indicated the systems do not consistently err in the same direction.
I C E A N D R A I N P R O T E C T I O N
58. Will the new wing anti-ice procedure apply for 757-200/767 as well or is it only for
757-300?
<ANSWER> We are considering its applicability to other variations and models as well
as waiting to see if the FAA takes any action in this direction. This was a
primary subject of the FAA Icing Workshop in Washington, D.C. in
February 1998. So far, no action has resulted. In the meantime, the
current 757-200 and 767 Operations Manuals authorize operating the
system as either de-ice or anti-ice system.
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
24 July 7, 1999
59. (757) With the revised wing anti-ice procedures from the 757-300 certification
effort, can you select wing anti-icing ON after takeoff, before flaps are fully
retracted?
<ANSWER> Yes, as long as the airplane is airborne, wing anti-ice is available to the
leading edge devices capable of being heated. The same is true for the
767.
60. Is there a reason to use the same temperature/moisture criteria used for engine antiice
for turning wing anti-ice on?
<ANSWER> No. As stated in the AFM question below, the conditions which
determine when the wing anti-ice system should be operated have not
changed. Nothing is gained by turning the wing system on when turning
engines on.
61. What are the approach weight penalties related to operations in icing conditions?
<ANSWER> The weight penalties are found in the landing performance climb limit
chart in Volume 3 of the Operations Manual. There is a penalty for the
use of engine anti-ice, and for the use of engine and wing anti-ice. There
is also a weight penalty which must be applied to account for ice on the
unprotected surfaces of the airplane under the circumstances given on the
chart. There is no speed or field length penalty.
62. Is the ice accretion penalty because of runback?
<ANSWER> No. The penalty is because of unprotected empennage and slats.
63. Will AFM language be changed?
<ANSWER> The conditions which determine when the wing anti-ice system should be
operated have not changed. However, due primarily to a change in
philosophy on the part of the certification authorities it is now required to
be operated as anti-ice rather than de-ice on the 757-300.
The new AFM and Operations Manual language for the -300 is as follows:
OPERATION IN ICING CONDITIONS
The wing anti-ice system should be turned on at the first indication of
icing as indicated by ice accumulation on the cockpit front window
frames, windshield center post, windshield wiper post, or side windows.
The wing anti-ice system should remain on until the airplane has exited
icing conditions.
64. Have there been any reports of large runback ice accumulation?
<ANSWER> No. No reports. The wing anti-ice system is designed to be evaporative
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
25 July 7, 1999
under most conditions. However, calculations show that there are some
combinations of bleed air and impingement where a small amount of
runback may occur.
65. During a recent approach into Brussels, our check airman insisted on flaps20 with
anti-ice on. When selecting flaps 25 and 30, the airplane got into oscillations. We
saw runback on leading edge of flaps and thought that was the reason for
oscillations. We then selected flaps 20. Is Boeing familiar with cases where anti-ice
operates continuously with runback on the leading edge of flaps?
<ANSWER> Runback is water which does not evaporate from the leading edges and
runs back and freezes further aft. It is doubtful that the ice described
could be caused by water running back from leading edges. It would be
more likely due to direct impingement on the extended flap. Boeing is
working with the operator in question to obtain detailed information
regarding this event.
66. Is there any history of runback ice incidents on the 767?
<ANSWER> There is no history of runback incidents on either the 757 or 767.
67. Did any of the reports of Flaps 30 buffet in icing conditions include lateral
oscillations or were the reported oscillations just in pitch?
<ANSWER> Only oscillations in pitch were reported.
68. How about an alternate fuel burn procedure to have 757 wings down to 13,500
(pounds) when tankering fuel to prevent ice from forming on top of wings on
ground during turnaround flight using tankering with center tank fuel remaining.
<ANSWER> The Airplane Flight Manual states:
“** 2,000 pounds (907 kilograms) of fuel may be loaded in the center tank
with less than full wing tanks, provided the weight of fuel in the center
tank plus actual Zero Fuel Weight does not exceed Maximum Zero Fuel
Weight, and balance limits are observed. Fuel must be used in accordance
with FUEL USAGE II.”
L A N D I N G G E A R
69. What is the reason the gear down dispatch speed for a ferry flight is based on
VREF30+70 when all other flaps up maneuvering speeds are based on VREF30+80?
<ANSWER> The recommended Gear Down Maneuvering speed is VREF30+70 since
that is the recommended Gear Down Severe Turbulent Air Penetration
speed. For gear down operations, VREF30 +70 is the preferred speed
when in severe turbulence because it provides preferred margins from the
opposing stall/buffet versus wing structural load limits.
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
26 July 7, 1999
N A V I G A T I O N
70. (757/767) Is Boeing considering releasing a revised or new Operations Manual
Bulletin (OMB) regarding FMC holding pattern anomalies? A bulletin was released
in April 1998, but it does not adequately address the anomaly where the racetrack
pattern displayed on the EHSI is correct, but the LNAV flight path for teardrop and
parallel entries may exceed FAA protected airspace in some instances.
<ANSWER> Boeing analysis has shown that the displayed racetrack pattern on the
EHSI and the flight path for all entries into the holding pattern (standard,
teardrop, and parallel) remain within ICAO protected airspace as defined
by the respective altitude templates. However, the analysis also confirmed
that the LNAV flight path for the teardrop and parallel entries may exceed
FAA protected airspace in some cases.
Boeing has discussed this anomaly with the FAA and ICAO and
confirmed that there is a difference in protected holding airspace between
the two agencies. We are currently investigating these differences further
with these agencies in an effort to harmonize.
We have discussed this issue extensively within Boeing and have
concluded that it is not necessary to issue an OMB. This condition has a
low probability of occurrence, and the EHSI map does not display
misleading data. Consequently, we do not believe there is significant
justification to issue an OMB. This issue may, however, be addressed as
part of a future FMC enhancement.
71. (757/767) Does Boeing intend to issue an Operations Manual Bulletin (OMB)
regarding the FMC Holding in ICAO Airspeed issue?
<ANSWER> We have discussed this issue extensively within Boeing and have
concluded that it is not necessary to issue an OMB. This condition has a
low probability of occurrence, and the map does not display misleading
data. Consequently, we do not believe there is significant justification to
issue an OMB. This issue may, however, be addressed as part of a future
FMC enhancement.
72. Has Boeing developed a retrofit plan for Pegasus and Multi Mode Receiver (MMR)
for older 767 airplanes?
<ANSWER> Pegasus is available for retrofit on the 767-200/300 through a Master
Change request. MMR retrofit is also available for the 767-200/300
through a Master Change request.
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
27 July 7, 1999
F L I G H T T E C H N I C A L P U B L I C A T I O N S
73. Do Boeing Operations Manuals reflect JAR-OPS requirements?
<ANSWER> JAR-OPS 1 requires each operator to compile an Operations Manual.
This manual has a much larger scope than the airplane Operations Manual
provided by Boeing.
The manual required by JAR-OPS 1 is really an airline Operations
Manual similar to the Airline Operations Spec required by the FAA. As
stated in JAR-OPS 1 , “The Operations Manual must contain all
instruction and information necessary for operations personnel to perform
their duties.” The manual must include the information provided in the
Boeing Operations Manual, but also requires information from the MEL,
Configuration Deviation List, Weight and Balance Manual, Loading
Manual, Navigation Charts, specific airline operating policies/procedures
and company training programs and training records.
In compiling this comprehensive JAR-OPS 1 Operations Manual, it is not
necessary that the operator re-construct all of this documentation. JAROPS
1 allows an operator to “take advantage of the contents of other
relevant documents.” It specifically states that “Material produced by the
operator ... may be substituted by applicable parts of the AFM or, ... by an
Operations Manual produced by the manufacturer of the aeroplane.” The
airline may “...copy the material and include it directly in the relevant part
of the Manual, or... a statement to the effect that a specific manual (or
parts thereof) may be used instead of the specified part of the Operations
Manual.”
JAR-OPS 1 does not require a re-format of the Boeing documents. In fact,
the Boeing documents are already divided and formatted to help provide
relevant parts of the JAR-OPS 1 Operations Manual data to appropriate
crew members. We recommend that you continue to use Boeing
documentation and simply reference it as part of your JAR-OPS 1
Operations Manual.
74. Can the 757 and 767 Operations Manuals be combined into one “757/767”
Operations Manual? Also, can Boeing provide an FMC manual?
<ANSWER> Boeing is evaluating offerability and schedule implications to combine an
operator’s 757 and 767 Operations Manuals into one publication. Once
Boeing has completed this evaluation and has determined the status of
offerability, all 757 and 767 operators will be notified. Regarding an
FMC manual, Boeing does not publish a unique FMC manual. However,
in the upcoming revised Operations Manual “Jeppesen-Size” format, the
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
28 July 7, 1999
new “Flight Management, Navigation” chapter reorganizes FMC
operational descriptions into phase of flight, which may better meet your
needs. Honeywell is the manufacturer of the 757/767 FMC and does
produce a unique FMC manual. Contact Honeywell directly for
assistance.
75. Please identify the pages which have been added/changed/deleted from an FAAapproved
AFM to produce a CAA AFM.
<ANSWER> The following identifies major differences which may be seen between an
FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual and a CAA Approved Airplane
Flight Manual. Please note that these items are typical differences for
Boeing model airplanes, and should not be considered representative of
any individual operator’s airplane. Actual requirements vary from model
to model and operators should contact Boeing to discuss details associated
with their specific airplanes.
The differences are organized by Airplane Flight Manual section.
GENERAL
Preface and Principal Dimension pages are provided in the CAA manual.
References to the Federal Aviation Regulation's are replaced with
references to British Civil Airworthiness Requirements throughout the
CAA Manual.
LIMITATIONS
The Minimum Inflight Weight limitation is removed from the CAA
manual.
The CAA manual requires the limits shown on the “Normal Cruise
Altitude Limits Due to Buffet” chart to be observed.
The CAA manual includes maximum precipitation depth allowance for
takeoff to Operational limits.
The CAA manual includes a statement which identifies maximum number
of occupants.
The CAA manual includes a requirement to verify standby power and
hydraulic generator status prior to flight.
A bird strike protection speed limitation is included in the CAA manual.
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
29 July 7, 1999
The CAA manual includes a statement which allows maximum operating
limit speeds to be exceeded for crew or airworthiness training.
VMO/MMO is usually reduced by .02M in the CAA Airplane Flight Manual.
The CAA manual includes a requirement to restrain galley carts.
The CAA AFM includes a limitation which requires the cabin
pressurization system to be operable at takeoff when cargo is carried in
lower cargo compartment.
The CAA manual includes a requirement to verify that the Forward Lower
Lobe door is closed and locked.
Precision approach and landing limitations are included in the CAA
manual.
The CAA manual includes the automatic landing procedures and
additional autopilot-flight director limitations.
The CAA manual does not include a TCAS limitation.
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
Cargo fire suppression system capability is included in the CARGO FIRE
emergency procedure.
NORMAL PROCEDURES
In the CAA manual the automatic landing procedures are moved to the
Limitations section.
The CAA AFM cross references the Limitations section for engine antiice
operation.
Engine start procedures are included in the CAA manual.
The CAA manual does not include a TCAS procedure.
NON-NORMAL PROCEDURES
The CAA manual includes a procedure for inoperative Airspeed Indicator.
Information is included in the CAA AFM for operation on Standby
Electrical Power and Hydraulic Driven Generator.
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
30 July 7, 1999
PERFORMANCE
CAA performance includes data for wet and icy runways, and runways
covered with precipitation.
CAA airplane performance may include differences in:
Takeoff Climb Limits
Takeoff Speeds
VMCG Limited Takeoff (rather than V1(MCG)
Obstacle Clearance performance
The CAA manual may include the following additional information:
Initial Climb Speed, V4.
High Altitude Maneuver Limits.
Takeoff Flight Path Turns.
Discontinued Approach Climb.
Balked Landing Climb.
Maximum Landing Weight Climb Limits for Low and Normal Visibility.
Landing Speeds for One Engine Inoperative.
Approach Minimum Control Speed.
Series and Renewal - gross performance information for routine flight test
purposes.
76. (757/767) When is a combined FCTM manual going to be available?
<ANSWER> Fourth Quarter 1999.
77. (757/767) Concerning the new Operations Manual “Jeppesen-Size” format, please
provide a listing of reasons for making changes. It would be of great help to
understand not only what is being changed, but also to have explained why
something has changed. Can this be done because Revision Bars are not enough?
<ANSWER> Boeing will make every attempt to highlight and publish the reasons for
the changes. Boeing will try to identify other changes resulting from
going from old format to new format. We will include the revision record
and justification in the front of each manual.
Boeing Flight Operations Symposium
March 30 - April 1, 1999
Seattle, Washington
757/767 Caucus Summary Report
31 July 7, 1999
78. (757/767) Why is the QRH thicker in the new format than it was in the current
format?
<ANSWER> The main reason is due to the inclusion of more performance data than
was previously included. Most of this performance information was
contained in the old format Operations Manual, Volume III. The
checklists were reformatted to enhance flight crew use. Examples of
enhancements include incorporation of a new “Unannunciated Checklists”
section, content expansion of all “crew awareness” checklists,
incorporation of “Condition:” statements to better clarify appropriate use
of the checklists.
79. Operators are interested in receiving applicable performance data as early as
possible before actual airplane delivery. Some operators use a “real-time” airplane
performance system which requires lead time for testing prior to production use.
<ANSWER> Boeing makes every effort to provide performance packages to operators
with sufficient lead time to meet their performance data requirements.
80. Are the distances in the non-normal landing distance charts, which will be placed in
the new reduced format Operations Manual, factored or unfactored?
<ANSWER> The distances shown on the non-normal landing distances charts are
unfactored (actual landing distances not adjusted per FAR 121.195).
81. (757/767) Are there plans to reduce the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) and Fault
Reporting Manual (FRM) to the new “Jeppesen-Size” format?
<ANSWER> The AFM and FRM are not currently planned for re-issuance into the
“Jeppesen-Size” format.
Supprimé : <#>The distances
shown on the non-normal landing
distances charts are unfactored.¶

robbertmd

是英文还是中文的丫