MEASURING CHANGE IN PILOTS’ CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF AUTOFLIGHT

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MEASURING CHANGE IN PILOTS’ CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF AUTOFLIGHT
Edwin Hutchins
University of California San Diego
La Jolla, California
Pilots transitioning to the Airbus A320 were observed in flight and interviewed at four sample points during their
first 18 months on the airplane. The interview data were analyzed by examining changes in both the relative
frequencies of automation terms and the similarity of pairs of terms over time. The results show that pilots master
selected modes before managed modes, and that even after 18 months of experience, their models of complex
managed modes are still changing.
Introduction
When an airline pilot transitions to a new airplane, he
or she must complete a rigorous training program. If
the airplane is highly automated, the pilot will receive
training in the use of the autoflight system. Autoflight
mode management is the process involved in
understanding the character and consequences of
autoflight modes, planning and selecting engagement,
disengagement and transitions between modes, and
anticipating automatic mode transitions made by the
autoflight system itself. It has long been known that
pilots are sometimes confused by the behavior of the
autoflight system (Weiner, 1993; Hutchins et al.
1999; Sarter and Woods 1992, 1994). Both an
industry-wide review of perceived human factors
problems of flight deck automation, Funk, et al.
(1999) and a special report by the FAA human
factors team (FAA 1996) concluded that the
complexity of automation and failures of pilot
understanding of automation were thought by
industry professionals to be major problems.
There is widespread agreement in the aviation
industry that pilots do not acquire a complete
understanding of the more advanced features of the
autoflight system in training. In fact, some airlines
do not attempt to teach highly automated lateral
navigation (LNAV) or vertical navigation (VNAV)
modes in training. It is left for the pilots to learn how
to use these functions while flying on the line.
Fortunately, it appears that pilots do continue to learn
about the more complex functions of modern stateof-
the-art airplanes long after they leave the training
center. Much of what pilots know about autoflight is
learned while flying in revenue service. Many pilots
say it takes about 12-18 months of flying in revenue
service to get comfortable with the automation. One
senior Boeing 767 captain estimated that he learned
approximately 60-70% of what he knows about
autoflight functions while flying on the line. A
typical account is that a pilot may go through three
stages of automation use: In the first six months of
experience the pilot is afraid of the automation and
therefore makes too little use of it. In the next six
months of flying the pilot gains confidence and tries
to use the automation to solve every problem, thereby
using the automation in inappropriate ways. Finally,
the pilot understands what the automation does and
what it does not do, and begins to use the automation
to make the job easier only when it is appropriate to
do so. While many pilots voice the beliefs contained
in this progression the evidence for it is entirely
anecdotal. What would a more systematic study
reveal about how pilots acquire expertise with
automation?
Observations from the jump seat suggest that what is
learned by pilots after they leave the training center
and enter revenue service includes conceptual
reorganization, tuning of skills, and reassurance that
what is known is sufficient to operate the airplane
safely in the real flight environment. The goal of this
research project was to discover how pilots'
understanding of flight deck automation develops
over the course of initial training and through early
stages of operating experience. We hoped to
document what was learned, when it was learned and
how it was learned. Presumably, what pilots actually
do is related to how they think about autoflight,
which is in turn related to what they know about
autoflight. We used primarily ethnographic methods
to determine how pilots conceive of autoflight mode
management (especially vertical mode management).
Methods
In this project we chose to following a small number
of pilots through the process of skill acquisition with
regard to autoflight systems in the Airbus A320
passenger aircraft. To accomplish this, we recruited
15 pilots as they entered initial training with a major
US-based airline and gathered data from them at
regular intervals as they made their way along the
initial portions of their careers flying the A320. We
attempted to arrange both an interview and a jump
seat observation session with each of the pilots at
each sampling point. We were successful in
conducting the interviews on schedule until our work
was interrupted in September of 20011. Due to
scheduling conflicts, we were able to arrange
jumpseat observations for only about half of the
scheduled sample points.
Interviews
The interview data consist of 46 interviews with 15
pilots. Interviews were scheduled at four points in
each pilot’s career on the Airbus A320.
1. Initial Interview: conducted in the first few days
of training. This interview sought information about
the pilot’s flying background and any preconceptions
the pilot had about the airplane. These interviews
contain discussions of attitudes toward automation in
general. All initial interviews were conducted by a
researcher face-to-face with the pilot, and all 15
pilots participated in an initial interview. These
interviews will be referred to collectively as the
Initial Interview Set (Init). Most of the subsequent
interviews were conducted by a researcher2 by
telephone.
2. First line interview: conducted during the first
few months of experience flying on the line. In these
interviews pilots were asked to recall the most recent
leg on which they were pilot-flying. These interviews
will be referred to collectively as the First Line Set.
(1L) One pilot was placed on medical leave, so 14
pilots participated in 1L interviews.
3. Second line interview: conducted after
approximately one year of experience flying on the
1 All researcher access to the flight decks of commercial airliners
operating in the United States airspace was suspended before
airline operations resumed a few days after the September 11, 2001
attacks. This put an immediate end to our jump seat observations.
The terrorist attacks also had a profound effect on virtually all
active airline pilots. The nature of the attacks and the way that
airliners had been used as weapons led pilots to confront the
possibility of horrifying scenarios on their own airplanes. Pilots
found themselves asking, “What will I do if I get a call from the
back saying that a terrorist has a knife to the throat of my lead
flight attendant?” Two interviews with pilots were conducted as
scheduled in the weeks following the attacks. In both cases, the
participating pilots wanted, perhaps needed, to talk about the
consequences of the attacks on their work. It was difficult to focus
the interviews on the use of automation. These two interviews
produced data that is so different from the data collected earlier in
the study that we decided that it could not be used. These
interviews were not transcribed. During the following months,
anxieties remained high and we decided that the probability of
getting usable data from additional interviews was low. We
therefore ceased collecting interview data in October of 2001.
2 The initial interviews were conducted either by Edwin Hutchins
or Barbara Holder, each researcher doing about half of the initial
interviews. Holder conducted a majority of the subsequent
interviews, a few were conducted by Hutchins and Holder
together, and one was conducted by research assistant, Howard Au.
Both Holder and Au now work for Boeing.
line. These interviews used the same format as the
first line interview. (2L) One pilot was transferred
back to the B737, so 13 pilots participated in 2L
interviews.
4. Third line interview: conducted after
approximately eighteen months of flying on the line.
In these interviews, in addition to being asked to
recall the most recent leg on which they were pilotflying,
the pilots were asked to describe what they
would tell a pilot who is new to the airplane. (3L)
Six pilots did not reach 18 months experience prior to
9/11, so 7 pilots participated in 3L interviews.
All interviews were recorded on audiotape, and
transcribed by a research assistant3 who is a pilot
with knowledge of autoflight. The total interview
corpus comprises approximately 336,000 words.
Jump seat observations
We also observed pilots from the jump seat to
determine how pilots use the automation in flight.
Within the constraints of the sterile cockpit rule, the
jump seat provides an opportunity to talk with the
pilots while they fly and it provides a rich setting for
discussing things that are unclear to the pilot about
autoflight functioning. Field notes from the jump seat
observations complement the pilot’s descriptions in
the interviews. By comparing the two, we were able
to confirm that the interviews were reasonably good
representations of the practices the pilots actually
engaged in.
Conceptual Models of Autoflight Function
A content analysis of the interview data revealed that
pilots use a small set of simple conceptual models to
understand how the automation controls aircraft
behavior. These basic models are known to all
instrument rated pilots and are assumed by, but not
generally made explicit in, airline training. Pilot
models are also frequently organized around the
experience of the body in the physical environment
of the flight deck. Reducing thrust is typically
conceptualized as “pulling”, for example. This makes
sense because pilots grab and pull thrust levers aft in
order to manually reduce thrust. Such conceptual
models are called “embodied” (Gibbs, 2006). This
particular model covers not only the manual control
actions of the pilot, but is also extended to the
behavior of the autoflight system. Thus, the
autothrust system is said to “pull the thrust back”
even though the autoflight system itself does not pull
anything, and when this happens in the Airbus A320
3 All transcription was performed by Howard Au and checked by
Edwin Hutchins and Barbara Holder.
cockpit the thrust levers do not even move!
We have described the results of the content analysis
elsewhere (Holder and Hutchins, 2000; Hutchins and
Holder, 2001). We noted there that the number of
conceptual difficulties reported concerning the
descent phase of flight far outnumbers the number of
difficulties reported for all other phases of flight
combined. Managed descents are based on
engineering principles (e.g., an energy dissipation
schedule) that lie outside the realm of pilot concepts.
Pilots do not normally use engineering concepts to
understand autoflight. This is not surprising given
that these concepts are not well represented in
training materials and cannot be inferred from the
behavior of the system without significant
background preparation. What pilots do seem to learn
on the line is when they can expect the automation to
help them and how they can shape their operations to
minimize automation surprises. In this paper I
explore the utility of some quantitative analyses of
the interview corpus as indices of change in pilots’
conceptual understandings as they acquire experience
in the Airbus A320.
Quantitative Measures of Conceptual Change
To explore what simple statistical methods could
reveal about changes in the pilots’ conceptual
structure concerning autoflight across the interviews,
two types of quantitative analysis were performed: a
term frequency analysis and a term co-occurrence
analysis. A subset of 22 autoflight-related terms was
chosen for examination. In choosing the terms, we
sought a range of terms that included the most
important technical terms (e.g., idle, managed),
operational terms (e.g., climb, restriction) and
informal pilot jargon (e.g., box).
Term frequency analysis
Terms that occur frequently in interviews are likely
to be more salient conceptually than terms that occur
rarely, and changes in the relative frequencies of
various terms is an indication of changing conceptual
structure. We therefore computed the relative
frequency of each automation term in each interview
set. To ensure that we were not measuring the
behavior of the interviewers, we performed the
frequency analysis separately for interviewer and
pilot portions of the transcripts.
Term frequency analysis results: The frequency
analysis suggests some interesting changes in
conceptual structure. For example, consider the use
of the word ‘computer’. This word accounts for
more than a third of all autoflight related word
instances in the initial interview set. The fact that the
Airbus airplanes are highly computerized is THE
salient fact for the pilots as they arrive at the training
center. When we spoke to the pilots after they had
completed training and had been flying the airplane,
the use of this term dropped to about one instance in
twenty of autoflight related words. Once they are on
the airplane, the specifics of what the computers do
become salient, and the presence of the computer is
assumed rather than remarked.
The term speed follows a pattern of use that is almost
exactly the inverse of the pattern for computer.
Speed accounts for less than 5% of the instances of
autoflight related words in the initial interview set. In
1L, speed accounts for 22% and in 2L for 26% of the
autoflight related word instances. Once they are
flying the airplane, the pilots’ discourse concerning
autoflight is dominated by the term speed. The
frequency analysis does not reveal what it is about
speed that makes it so important to the pilots. That
requires a different method. The content analysis of
the interviews (Hutchins and Holder, 2001) showed
that pilots entering training for the airbus airplane are
not yet aware of the conceptual challenges associated
with the management of speed in this airplane. Pilots
do not have a clear idea of what the autoflight system
does in the first days of training. Once they begin
flying the airplane, however, a model begins to form.
It appears that in the first year on the airplane, the
concepts associated with the simpler vertical modes
are more salient than the concepts associated with the
most highly automated vertical modes.
The following words have higher relative frequencies
in the first or second line interview than they have in
the last line interview: speed, descent, climb, open,
vertical, selected, select, restriction. All of these
terms decrease in salience in the period between one
year and eighteen months on the line. The terms
open, selected, and select are unambiguously
associated with the conceptually simple “selected”
guidance modes. It is widely believed in the industry
that pilots use these modes most often early in their
line flying. In fact, many airlines, including the one
under study here, provide simulator training on the
simple modes only. It is assumed that the more
complex managed modes will be learned in line
operations. It is known that pilots make some use of
managed modes early in their line flying, but they
might not discuss them at length in the interviews
because they are not well understood. Like the term
speed, descent is rarely mentioned in the initial
interview, but peaks in the second line interview at a
relative frequency of 17% (second only to speed).
Speed and vertical are special terms because together
they compose the name of one of the simple vertical
guidance modes, vertical speed. These terms also
appear in the early line interviews with high relative
frequency.
The following terms have higher relative frequency
in the last line interview than they have in the first
two line interviews: managed, mode, thrust, idle,
autothrust, FMA, path, constraint, and target. The
increasing salience of these terms in the last line
interview indicates that between twelve and 18
months on the line, the managed modes, especially,
the idle thrust descent on a path defined by
constraints and speed targets, become more salient
concepts for the pilots. The relative frequency of the
term managed increases with each successive phase
of experience, reaching a maximum in 3L. Mode and
thrust have similar profiles, but with less pronounced
growth. It is probable that the third line interview has
captured this learning process in progress. The fact
that many of these terms, while increasing in relative
frequency, still have low relative frequencies
suggests that these concepts are still growing in
importance.
The frequency data indicates that when pilots have a
year of experience in the airplane, they talk more
about the simple “selected” modes than about the
more complex “managed” modes. At eighteen
months, talk about the selected modes still dominates,
but words that are associated with the managed
modes increase in frequency.
Term co-occurrence analysis
The relative frequencies of terms gives us an
indication of how the importance of various
autoflight concepts changes with experience on the
airplane, but it says nothing at all about the
organization of the concepts. Co-occurrence of terms
provides a simplified representation of conceptual
structure. Change in conceptual organization can be
tracked by representing the changing relations among
terms. Two analyses of the co-occurrence of terms
were performed. First, we examined each automation
related term and looked at the other terms (whether
related to automation or not) that tended to co-occur
most frequently with that term. Second, we
computed term/term similarity metrics.
To build the word-word co-occurrence matrix, a
window 21 words wide is passed over the pilot
conversational turns in the interview transcripts. The
‘target’ word is in the center of the window; the
‘context’ of the target word extends ten words to the
right and left. The window is weighted linearly,
meaning that words adjacent to the target word
receive the highest co-occurrence score (in our case,
10), and those at the ends of the window receive the
lowest co-occurrence score (1), with a linear
progression between these two. The result is a
symmetric matrix. The rows and columns are
represented by all of the words used in the interviews
at a particular stage of training. That is, four separate
matrices are constructed: one for each of the four sets
of interviews. Each cell in a matrix contains the cooccurrence
value for two words. Initially, the matrix
is filled with zeros. Each time two words co-occur in
the same context window, their co-occurrence score
is increased.
Each row (or column) in the matrix represents the cooccurrence
scores of a particular word, and can be
thought of as a vector in a high-dimensional space.
Now consider the automation terms. We use the
cosine metric to measure the angle between every
pair of automation term vectors. By this measure a
word will be judged semantically similar to another
word not only if the two have repeatedly occurred in
close proximity to one another, but also if they
appeared in similar contexts: that is, if the two words
occurred in close proximity to a similar set of words.
As an example, consider gem and jewel. These two
words tend to show up in similar contexts, and are
usually substitutable for one another. As such, even
though they do not frequently co-occur, they will be
judged very similar by the cosine metric.
Since the cosine is a measure of relatedness, for any
particular autoflight term, we can take the sum of
cosines across the other autoflight terms as a measure
of the centrality of the term. It turns out that the terms
that increase in salience across the interview sets (as
measured by relative frequency) also increase in
centrality.
Plot of variables on axis 1 and axis 2 / Stress : 0.2079
managed
selected
mode
guidance
thrust
speed
pitch
constraint restriction
computer
box
vertical
lateral
open
descent
climb
idle
fma
autothrust
select
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
-0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
-- axis 1 -->
-- axis 2 -->
Plot of variables on axis 1 and axis 2 / Stress : 0.1910
managed
selected
mode
guidance
path
thrust
speed
pitch
restriction
computer
box
vertical
lateral
open
descent
climb
idle
fma
autothrust
select
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
-0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
-- axis 1 -->
-- axis 2 -->
Figure 1. Initial Interview (Init) Figure 2. First Line Interview (1L)
Plot of variables on axis 1 and axis 2 / Stress : 0 .1842
managed
sele cted
mode
g uidan ce
p ath
thrust
speed
pitch
t arget
constra in t
restriction
computer
box
vertical
la teral
open
descent clim b idle
fma
autothrust
select
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
-1.5 -1 -0 .5 0 0.5 1
-- axis 1 -->
-- axis 2 -->
Plot of variables on axis 1 and axis 2 / Stress : 0.1619
select
fma autothrust
idle
climb
descent
open
lateral
vertical
box
computer
restriction
constraint
target
pitch
speed
thrust
path
guidance
mode
selected
managed
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
-0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6
-- axis 1 -->
-- axis 2 -->
Figure 3. Second Line Interview (2L) Figure 4. Third Line Interview (3L)
Finally, we plot the terms in 2-dimensional space
using a multidimensional scaling algorithm. Figures 1
through 4 combine these measures in a single display.
Each figure represents one of the interview corpora.
The terms are arranged such that the distances among
terms reflect their similarities. The colors of the
terms indicate their centrality as measured by sum of
cosines measure for the third line interview. Warm
colors indicate central terms, while cool colors
indicate peripheral terms. We chose to use the
centrality measure from the third line interview so
that it would be easy to identify terms that are
outliers in early interview data but will become
central later. The font size of the term indicates the
salience of the term (as measured by relative
frequency in each interview set). The four composite
representations in order show the emergence of an
understanding of the conceptual relations of the
autoflight terms.
Term co-occurrence results Notice the shift in color
distribution across the figures. Terms that will be
central in 3L (depicted in red font, e.g., speed,
descent, managed) are spread about in the plot for the
initial interview, while terms that will be peripheral
in 3L (e.g., computer and pitch) are central in that
plot. Coding centrality this way makes shifts in
conceptual salience visually apparent.
Between the initial interview and the first line
interview, speed has become the highest frequency
term and is also the most central. Once pilots start
flying the A320, they quickly discover that speed
demands their attention. The simplest mode for
climbs in the A320 is called open climb, and the
terms open and climb, while not central, are located
close together in 1L. In the first line interview,
thrust, path and idle which will eventually be
essential parts of the model are still far from central.
In the second line interview speed, climb, descent,
open, managed, and idle occupy central positions in
the model. Path and FMA are still far from central,
and idle is far from thrust and mode. The distinction
between selected and managed modes is becoming
clear, and the importance of idle thrust in descents is
beginning to emerge. By the third line interview
managed, speed, descent, idle, thrust, and mode have
been consolidated as a central cluster. This seems to
reflect an emerging understanding of the combination
of features that characterize the most complex of
automated modes, DES. One element of the model
for DES mode is still missing, however: the
computed descent path which when flown at idle
thrust will produce the desired speed profile.
Two pairs of terms merit additional comments. In the
first and second line interviews speed and vertical cooccur
more often than they do in the last line
interview. This is evidence that the vertical speed
mode is more salient in the early line interviews than
it is in the last line interview. This fits the notion that
early in line experience pilots are most interested in
the simple modes and only gain conceptual
understanding of the more complex modes after a
year or more of experience. The other pair of terms
is restriction and constraint. Restriction is an
operational term used by pilots and controllers to
describe elements of the flight path. Constraint is an
engineering term, which subsumes the entities
referred to by pilots as restrictions. In the Airbus
pilot handbook chapter on the Flight Management
System, the word constraint occurs 86 times, and the
word restriction appears only once. Thus, constraint
is the clear choice in Airbus terminology. Between
the 2L and 3L interviews, the rate of use of constraint
increases while the rate of use of restriction falls. For
the pilots, restriction is more central than constraint
at every stage, but even in the last interview set,
neither term has much salience or centrality. Because
constraints are essential to the definition of the path
on which managed descents are flown, this fact
indicates that the pilots’ conceptual understandings of
DES mode is still incomplete after 18 months of
experience on the line.
Discussion
The quantitative analysis provides clear evidence that
a great deal of learning takes place after pilots leave
training. The pilots appear to understand the basic
vertical navigation modes by the time they have
completed a year flying the airplane, but they are
probably still in the process of acquiring an
understanding of the more complex managed modes
even after they have logged 18 months in the
airplane. The quantitative analysis does not reveal
the sources of conceptual troubles, but it does provide
strong evidence that conceptual change continues for
at least 18 months of line flying and it reveals the
order in which conceptual elements are added to the
conceptual model of the most complex modes. The
quantitative analyses reveal patterns that were not
apparent in the qualitative analysis. For example,
while the qualitative analysis revealed that pilots used
relatively simple conceptual models throughout the
learning process, the quantitative date show that
terms associated with the simpler autoflight modes
actually peak and then decline in the first 18 months
of flying experience. The term co-occurrence data
show that over the same period, pilots form a
complex, but still incomplete model of the most
highly automated vertical navigation mode, DES.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Howard Au for transcription and coding
assistance, Robert Liebscher for data analysis, and
Barbara Holder for help with all aspects of the
project. The work was funded by NASA AMES
Research Center NAG 2-1313. Stephen Casner was
the technical monitor. Most of all I thank the pilots
who have so generously contributed their time and
wisdom to this project.
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