THE HANDLING OF THRUST LEVERS DURING LANDING WITH A DEACTIVATED THRUST REVERSER
**** Hidden Message ***** SAFETY REGULATION GROUP<BR>FLIGHT OPERATIONS<BR>DIVISION COMMUNICATION<BR>32/2007<BR>Applicability: All Operators of Airbus A318/319/320/321<BR>THE HANDLING OF THRUST LEVERS DURING LANDING WITH A DEACTIVATED THRUST REVERSER<BR>FOR AIRBUS A318/319/320/321 AEROPLANES<BR>1 Introduction<BR>1.1 The CAA has been advised by the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) of an operational procedure which is<BR>thought to incur an unacceptable risk, namely the handling of thrust levers during landing with a thrust<BR>reverser deactivated. This FODCOM is issued to advise operators of the manufacturer’s recommended<BR>operational procedure to select idle thrust on both engines during a landing conducted with one<BR>deactivated thrust reverser. The term ‘A320’ is used in the following paragraphs to refer to A318, A319,<BR>A320 and A321 aeroplanes.<BR>2 Background<BR>2.1 There have been at least three similar accidents/incidents that have occurred because the flight crew<BR>failed to retard both thrust levers to the IDLE detent for the flare and landing when the A320 aircraft<BR>were dispatched with one thrust reverser deactivated as allowed by the Minimum Equipment List<BR>(MEL). The thrust lever corresponding to the engine with the deactivated thrust reverser was left in the<BR>CLIMB detent during the flare and touchdown. MAX REVERSE thrust lever position was selected on<BR>the engine with the operative thrust reverser. In each instance, the auto thrust system remained<BR>engaged in the speed mode until selection of reverse on one engine disconnected the auto thrust<BR>system, and the thrust system reverted to the manual mode. This resulted in the thrust increasing within<BR>the range of the CLIMB limit thrust setting in order to maintain the selected speed. When the auto thrust<BR>disconnected, the thrust remained at the last commanded thrust level per the lockout feature. Ground<BR>spoilers did not deploy and autobrakes, if selected, did not activate. The most recent accident resulted<BR>in 199 fatalities.<BR>2.2 The A320 auto thrust system utilizes six detents: TOGA, FLEX/MCT, CLIMB, IDLE, REV IDLE, and<BR>MAX REVERSE, to establish the maximum full authority digital engine control (FADEC) computed<BR>thrust for the ambient conditions. The thrust levers do not move automatically but are manually placed<BR>in one of the detents by the pilot. The A320 design requires that both thrust levers be retarded to the<BR>IDLE detent by the pilot on landing to disconnect the auto thrust system, to initiate the system logic for<BR>the deployment of ground spoilers and the activation of autobrakes, and to avoid an undesired increase<BR>in thrust during the landing roll. In the case of dispatch with one thrust reverser deactivated, the Master<BR>Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) and the recent Airbus Accident Information Telex (TAM JJ3054<BR>AIT 4, August 2, 2007) each call for the pilot to set both thrust levers to idle for the flare and after<BR>touchdown during thrust reversers application, select BOTH thrust levers. In all cases, the systemdesigned<BR>logic requires that both thrust levers be retarded to the IDLE detent for flare and landing.<BR>Pilots should follow operator specific procedures for the selection of reverse thrust.<BR>2.3 The MMEL operational procedure was amended in 2006 to require both levers to be set to maximum<BR>reverse at touchdown when operating with one thrust reverser deactivated. The intent of the revised<BR>procedure is to mandate a symmetrical selection of the thrust reverser levers when one reverser out of<BR>two is inoperative. The procedure requires MAX REV selection in accordance with the Airbus Standard<BR>Operating Procedure (SOP) (see FCOM 3.03.22P5). An Airbus review of the published MMEL<BR>operational procedure 02-78-30-01 is planned by the next revision to take into account long runway, no<BR>contamination configurations. The planned wording that is to be introduced will be as follows: "During<BR>thrust reversers application, select BOTH thrust levers". (This new wording is already contained in<BR>A330/A340 MMEL.) The revised procedure was introduced to standardise and harmonise with the<BR>normal operating techniques when both reversers are serviceable, thereby minimising normal and<BR>MMEL dispatch procedural differences. Operators may wish to incorporate the guidance resulting from<BR>the Airbus review in advance of the MMEL amendment, since the requirement to set MAX reverse in all<BR>FLIGHT OPERATIONS DIVISION COMMUNICATION - 32/2007<BR>2<BR>circumstances adds no safety value in less limiting circumstances. The level of symmetrical reverse<BR>selection may be decided according to prevailing conditions.<BR>2.4 The standardised procedure contained in the MMEL requires an additional 55 metres to be added to<BR>the scheduled landing distance required, which is caused by the slightly increased N1 of the engine<BR>with deactivated thrust reverse. In practice, this increase in landing distance may not be observed since<BR>it may be more than cancelled out by the reverse thrust selected on the engine with the serviceable<BR>reverser, but this effect cannot be acknowledged in the calculation of landing distance required as<BR>credit for the use of reverse thrust during landing is not permitted. The MMEL operational procedures<BR>also contain the instruction that reverse thrust must not be selected when both thrust reversers are<BR>inoperative.<BR>3 Applicability<BR>3.1 The information contained above is applicable to those aircraft dispatched in accordance with the<BR>MMEL for Airbus A318/319/320/321 item 78-30.<BR>4 Recommendation<BR>4.1 Operators should take note of, and ensure that all affected personnel are familiar with, the<BR>content of this FODCOM and of the relevant section of the MMEL. Operations manuals should<BR>be amended to reflect current Airbus procedures in this respect.<BR>5 Queries<BR>5.1 Any queries as a result of this FODCOM should be addressed to Head of Flight Operations Policy<BR>Department at the following e-mail address: FOP.Admin@caa.co.uk.<BR>15 November 2007<BR>Recipients of new FODCOMs are asked to ensure that these are copied to their 'in house' or contracted<BR>maintenance organisation, to relevant outside contractors, and to all members of their staff who could<BR>have an interest in the information or who need to take appropriate action in response to this<BR>Communication.<BR>Review FOI(A) February 2010 看看 学习的哦 谢谢谢谢
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