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发表于 2008-12-25 20:20:36 |只看该作者
(3) Sometimes used as a synonym for software life cycle.# |4 Q) ^ V4 g' D Software ) v+ R* ? N6 l' N7 I' WDocumentation% l5 d M* B j Technical data or information, including computer listings and printouts, in ) b& U+ h) K; h! K5 t) o( b5 r4 ehuman-readable form, that describe or specify the design or details, explain the % D3 w" r/ X$ r6 n5 {! ocapabilities, or provide operating instructions for using the software to obtain& y& I3 J# p7 Q& j, ?* v desired results from a software system. (See Documentation.) * ], Q$ x+ n( n! l' S2 m7 p, sSoftware s9 J6 U% H# S/ j7 C8 A Engineering 7 R+ I- ?4 h, {" K. n. z(1) A discipline whose objectives are to define, create, and apply a welldefined methodology that addresses a software life cycle of planning,8 A* a% p7 F4 u3 v development, and maintenance. + l' Y: r R0 p(2) The application of a systematic, disciplined, quantifiable approach to the/ \9 `- z: {4 \/ z development, operation, and maintenance of software, that is, the, o+ b4 N7 m. z' u6 G. i8 z& J application of engineering to software.6 i& Y: _, }9 G( `0 T Software Life $ }7 V2 q' N7 \1 N3 zCycle$ {' ]- w0 ^ m) h* I( J! Q+ A) D The period of time that begins when a software product is conceived and ends3 m. {. v% |0 F: z. ? when the software is no longer available for use. The software life cycle typically ( ^- I( X# R" D' @& Sincludes a concept phase, requirements phase, design phase, implementation 7 G3 e! T* g9 ?' sphase, test phase, operation and maintenance phase, and, sometimes, & F) v6 [7 H: `0 x! g8 Uretirement phase.+ T$ p: B! w' U# G( x) \ Software Support The sum of all activities that take place to ensure that implemented and fielded" c" |. @+ [: p software continues to fully support the operational mission of the system. 1 V# Q- M' Q& j, k4 f) |Software support includes pre-deployment software support and postdeployment software support." f2 v i8 E( J, N& H$ o Software Test , u( S( m6 M" d) ?Environment 7 Z6 [( [* H3 S6 J5 T8 Q4 t) |A set of automated tools, firmware devices, and hardware necessary to test 6 P5 c2 n6 L. X, N) z. j/ csoftware. The automated tools may include but are not limited to test tools such1 X4 o7 n) j5 D: | as simulation software, code analyzers, test case generators, path analyzers, - V& ?* r; D& g' s& retc. and may also include those tools used in the software engineering( ?5 K+ g! W v. q6 N0 g2 j environment. , g t9 \1 ]9 X; ^: v5 \, A9 ySOI (1) Silicon-on-Insulator. (1) See Space Object Identification.0 O( r% C* j" ~9 m5 C- k. { SOIF See System Operation and Integration Functions. 1 ?. w' K) z* a. _6 s& |& KSOJ Stand-Off Jammer. ^0 e+ z4 ^( c" C0 uMDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 S& B! F3 u% ~5 q! l9 C, Z2 c7 B6 N 270 # c3 |: s4 o9 K' U" m& M$ m7 HSoldier-Machine, [% |7 r/ o- W Interface: I" {0 l2 g7 E7 o; \& b Considerations through system analysis and psychophysiology of equipment/ A& [" W+ \0 l/ c designs and operational concepts, to ensure they are compatible with + n, M- ~ `6 ?$ `( o$ [" p4 u2 f' \capabilities and limitations of operators and maintainers.! Z! }2 q k; ~ f! K) C6 W Sole Source ' N! P. b: M: }/ N$ zAcquisition$ h7 _4 m8 L2 g) ~: {! b A contract for the purchase of supplies or services that is entered into a proposal * Q0 o3 d$ b: Q# m" }" r5 Tto be entered into by an agency after soliciting and negotiating only one source. # Y2 B* {, t' M' @) O+ o* gSOM System Object Model. , K0 o1 Q9 ~! Q8 M4 mSONET Synchronous Optical Network.5 k+ a: d$ h5 b SOO Statement of Objectives (See also SOW). 6 H/ D9 T, S) s j5 B9 {# C0 vSOP See Standard Operating Procedure. Y, h" [ K7 \+ h! [5 _ SORTIELOT Sortie Allotment message (JFACC term). 3 C% _ c. Q* p9 R9 kSORTS Status of Resources and Training System./ j5 I9 X A: {. H6 W SOS Silicon-on-Sapphire.0 U2 V0 v9 I% K/ L" ~ SOSUS Sound Surveillance System (USN term).) R7 @9 b! X# [+ m# q J; p5 u2 r Source Selection( R- a* ^* _7 b, X1 i) n Authority , F* [* x! m' u/ E- b9 }! ZThe official designated to direct the source selection process, approve the 7 p2 y+ V0 G( k* jselection plan, select the source(s), and announce contract award. ?, u1 c2 p) S, f! rSource Selection 9 U% }7 {, C4 Z, [Evaluation Board0 f- |. Z. o# ^& e$ o" N1 U A group of military and/or government civilian personnel, representing functional ' E6 m: W6 X$ b6 Sand technical disciplines. It is charged with evaluating proposals and developing& q6 I# U. K+ ?' |2 D- F summary facts and findings during source selection.5 e' u" U% _' L Source Selection) B. `/ l- _) m: | Plan (SSP)8 `6 @' d8 {# y w/ y& W4 ]9 K2 z A formal written document, which sets forth the source selection organization # J0 Z9 U* M9 `. |. Xand management chain for a specific acquisition. It provides a guide for/ Q, T! |" j' k( o8 | E n; k evaluators on how to conduct the evaluation, it details the criteria to be used to/ m3 h& E {. d- q9 O0 v evaluate the offers received in a competition procurement, and it establishes a ; Q1 Q/ t# N {, d. Xbasis upon which to distinguish between proposals and to make an award. The ( \" ^7 z6 ~6 I$ u+ SSSP is written by the Program Office and approved by the SSA.3 R: S2 r! b) i8 _5 S SOW Statement of Work. 5 y0 V9 f% R1 Z: w) xSP (1) Security Personnel. (2) Self –propelled. (3) Signal Processing.0 i |8 _! j) r SP-100 Space Power-100 kW. 1 c+ d g9 w8 ?. z: } Y8 x/ vSP/CR Software Problem/Change Request. $ n$ p: C8 l' h ?7 aSPACC Space Command Center.6 [( F% R u+ n- h8 a7 h* |% W$ p' H% O Space and+ F* J$ P* P2 J" y! A6 l Missile Tracking3 y L: Y$ ?$ c- T0 ^& W System (SMTS)- N' I5 d1 K' l3 ?% K Space-based satellite sensors for surveillance, tracking, and discrimination of * y9 w5 l1 v: u! qenemy objects during post-boost and midcourse phases. These sensors support5 P/ \% A- ?$ W ^5 j5 j ground-based interceptors for both theater and national defense.6 Z# R; l m) R/ ?7 `* W, | Space-Based / e/ I' v9 S/ m! ]Architecture; f9 n8 n0 F k0 u6 J J Study (SBAS) ! }3 h; K; C- PA 1989 study to review the space-based elements of the Phase I SDS, m; L% L5 }' O j: p+ v$ ?. o architecture, with emphasis on Space-Based Interceptor (SBI), Brilliant Pebbles2 [+ k" J( v) A, V- i0 d Z (BP), and the Space Surveillance and Tracking System (SSTS), to define and! }; s$ x$ Y, v1 A! ^3 g justify a recommended architecture for Phase I and beyond.( m8 f7 k( X" U& f/ l% r8 C: A5 E$ u( o MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 S" j! L' z0 k. }" @+ ?. G( t 271! c4 O v, ^% r0 H* P$ c Space Based( M8 J" J- v1 Z/ |( ~( z Infrared System & z8 ` n( u4 d. e(SBIRS) , G2 ~/ B3 u5 BSBIRS will be a consolidated system that will meet United States infrared space & N7 V1 Y2 g$ s0 qsurveillance needs through the next 2-3 decades. SBIRS is intended to be an% i S N; N6 A; T+ G integrated “system of systems” including multiple space constellations and an # }- `5 A9 h+ Revolving ground element. The baseline SBIRS architecture consists of four : d% J9 Z6 w, z- @4 N4 Q3 SGeosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) satellites; two sensors on Highly Elliptical3 u9 ?" Z* E) r9 e& U6 l Orbit (HEO) satellites; Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites; a ground system7 W5 l! G0 K I2 O' v! W$ z consisting of a CONUS-based Mission Control Station (MCS), a backup MCS, a; L2 y% N: n6 o( D$ e survivable MCS, and oversees relay ground stations and re-locatable terminals;! f; b. Q, q% `% X1 Y$ I6 j* i and associated communications links. The SBIRS is designed to meet the1 `. `! ^( N2 X missile defense, missile warning technical intelligence, and battle space; c& R. M( @+ b2 ~; z6 g; a characterization mission requirements identified in the JROC-validated SBIRS$ M- h& U3 O# c" q! i Operational Requirements Document. The SBIRS program will begin replacing0 T* f) t u, u. J0 F2 J the operational Defense Support Program (DSP) ground segment in 1999 and 9 D3 K# x0 B$ O* U6 W: jbegin replacing the DSP satellites in 2002., e+ E% H5 v& l" h8 g$ P Space-Based 4 M& a, v9 S( v' kInterceptor (SBI)# F7 J) ]$ P6 i; e r( O. E. W; q9 O OBSOLETE. A distributed set of low earth orbit satellites that may provide# j" D0 d3 r1 s& j launch detection and booster tracking, and that serve as kinetic or kinetic energy1 x4 |0 |1 |2 f& N) \' W interceptors of boosters, PBVs, and/or RVs. (USSPACECOM)7 c( H' [1 D5 w% O Space-Based. I) g* H, x9 y& T9 }& v' T Sensor . d8 g1 ^$ e6 U6 `; p) e% \+ x: R: zA system that provides global above-the-horizon surveillance to detect and track$ E" H' ^ V1 j PBVs, object clusters (RVs and penaids), and resolved midcourse objects, as$ R7 T4 ^2 c0 f& E+ ^, v" g" q5 ~$ Z well as below-the-horizon tasked hot spot detection of boost phase missiles9 ?2 h8 w' n' v when cued by a space-based weapon or a priori knowledge. It provides. b6 P2 A. J9 T# e# [ surveillance data for use in situation assessment, operational intelligence- c: I D t+ L" q+ `3 l2 m collection, and for cueing other sensor and weapon elements. During 8 z: J7 `7 H4 D9 Wmidcourse, sensors discriminate and track RVs and associated objects to support 6 @6 g8 Q0 g f9 \midcourse engagements. (USSPACECOM) ]5 n4 A3 Z+ v0 n3 { e Space-Based9 e/ z; t- F/ e$ v9 G Surveillance and - k: ^0 I5 [/ \$ O W1 D) z, s* rTracking System 9 S7 ~! I8 |2 f(SSTS)9 A& G9 _5 D+ O& N! V3 K/ W% O OBSOLETE. A satellite-borne electro-optic tracking and surveillance system in( L: P: n; P. O% z- x* s medium earth orbit. The satellites would track targets from medium earth orbits6 u" S8 i- r2 b against a cold space background and near the earth limb. Individual objects’ 3 g( S8 r* \6 t9 ], k9 \$ G+ Lstate vectors would be generated from correlated information from two or more 4 a9 U: c0 Y* b7 U# m; Msensors. (Predecessor to Brilliant Eyes (BE). ! W- q0 T) e' D/ ]* I3 Q$ `, vSpace Command - r$ r+ V4 ?4 S2 q5 tCenter (SPACC) 7 w+ @4 a) \* D1 G- C4 L- UA USSPACECOM center located on Peterson AFB, CO, in Building 147(1). It is/ e8 d- B7 @" v, k the primary command facility for USSPACECOM providing USCINCSPACE with% v: E' P5 k( _/ E4 C. ~/ o the information necessary to perform assigned missions.

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发表于 2008-12-25 20:20:24 |只看该作者
SLAM Standoff Land Attack Missile.8 d- |' n! v9 _3 [. F; b SLAM-ER Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response (USN term)./ J; H7 d& e6 e. x! C/ F2 ? SLAR Side Looking Airborne Radar. % a7 v% E; n3 e! x. C: rSLAT Supersonic Low Altitude Target [missile].& a: i5 U# m$ H# k: L2 f2 i MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 S) w$ Y; t w5 M- F: I% l% v 267 4 A9 F4 h }' T [Slave A remote system or terminal whose functions are controlled by a central "master"+ F% Q& y0 Q0 G% I2 z system. It is similar in concept to a host system in that it responds to remotely+ z7 x+ Z& @ `" F+ w generated requests, but unlike a host system, is usually capable of performing a. p4 h8 \. }" E& y. c limited range of operations.! `& u! i. ^8 |) h, H: l, n$ u SLBD Sea Lite Beam Director. 9 H" F0 r, g1 A4 VSLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile. ( |/ O. Y; z; o9 C. s1 iSLC Space Launch Complex. 6 j" D- C4 A/ w2 ASLCM Sea-Launched Cruise Missile. + F1 @% [2 D( \! V# j, Q7 S& gSLD System Link Designator.2 v8 k% l( N5 a3 t+ r: `2 L Slew Time The time needed for a weapon/sensor/antenna to move from point to point. , g% K% E9 W# [5 w7 lSLIP Serial Line Internet Protocol.1 Z$ S) N- t8 E6 M SLKT Survivability, Lethality, and Key Technology. & N' y7 u/ P# S& B% \, h, NSLOC Sea Line of Communication. 6 H( {/ Y0 a4 n5 P/ CSLRX System Life-cycle Risk Expert. 4 }1 x" ^! r0 H5 j: O2 I xSLS See Shoot-Look-Shoot. ' V/ L# c; n% p1 C X- MSLT Strategic Laser Technology. % z3 G3 o6 d0 Q. lSLV (1) Space Launched Vehicle. (2) Satellite Launch Vehicle. , S& J; F) J3 V6 t4 I- o! {SM (1) Skunkworks Mission. (2) System Manager.+ ?/ I( F" M+ y) J7 j SM&R Source, Maintenance and Recoverability (ILS term).! ~3 |8 e1 r" A! x SM-2 Standard Missile-2. (U.S. Navy)5 _9 ~6 v" c$ U8 t/ J- e9 l SM-3 Standard Missile-3.0 Y( i" Q2 G! }" }* _ SM-ALC Sacramento Air Logistics Center (USAF term).$ E! o, \$ ?- q Small Optics Precision mirrors or refractors, less than 1 meter, and related technology, for ( v6 c# T0 q" C) z5 v1 vprecise pointing and tracking from/to relatively small vehicles separated by large ! Q# [* v5 F6 }- n$ }" Bdistances. + O! K; F4 s* a# ~Smart Checklist “Destroy, disrupt, damage or destroy” BMC3 tool for BMD warfighters. . J) }3 u3 c* O7 VSmart Munitions Munitions that “think for themselves” and have the self-contained ability to 8 _9 q4 _4 w1 ?% h/ A/ ssearch, detect, acquire and engage targets./ Z6 r$ O# g3 u# r SMAT Satellite and Missile Analysis Tool. 4 E( c- e2 A m1 O- ?SMATH Space Materials Advanced Technology for Hardness. ( q* I& D+ P: h9 j" d- @SMC Space and Missile System Center.4 d$ ?2 K; x( \3 g. |) f SMCo Standard Missile Company.9 C# T+ h+ K. \- y& a# q& x MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 S: X5 n# v: U. z# T 268 - ] I) j3 f: ^3 R( G) oSMCS Standard Monitoring and Control System (for US naval ships) (see ICS). + N4 ]4 H2 b, DSMD (1) Strategic Missile Defense. (2) OBSOLETE. Navy Sea-Based Midcourse7 I. V: I3 U( r2 r Defense. See AEGIS BMD. / |4 H- I3 j6 z8 YSME (1) Single Management Element. (2) Subject Matter Expert. . k: k8 \1 t `8 l) nSMERFS Statistical Modeling and Estimation of Reliability Functions for Software.% R, |$ k' m5 t8 z( ] SMES Super Conducting Magnetic Energy Storage. , Y& U! T [( YSMMW Submillimeter Wave.! k2 c) ^7 i2 S" Y$ [% Z2 n5 j SMP Soviet Military Power (US DoD publication). : e6 e" s8 f: A+ k" }SMR Code Source, Maintenance, and Recoverability Code (ILS term). ! J! z7 D2 z( d3 rSMS Standard Mobile Segment. # Q7 J8 Z7 M: P8 J! \( Y! TSMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (computer term)." X; w: | Q# v! v9 u" h SMTS Space and Missile Tracking System (formerly called Brilliant Eyes). $ o% X c, i% zSNC System Network Controller. 2 Q. U- _: m/ Y+ J- GSNDM Secretary of the Navy Decision Memorandum. 6 d+ O5 ]4 a/ X' B$ XSNDV Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle. * b Q$ M. e6 z0 O0 ASNF Strategic Nuclear Forces.! R7 I/ B$ j# |6 s SNI San Nicholas Island. Part of the PMTC.. O5 V# K3 ` {2 {# p8 I3 V# x' w SNIE Special National Intelligence Element. D# N l- E6 WSNIPE OBSOLETE. SDI System Network Processor Engine. + W u' \# }% Y$ NSNL Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, NM. 3 P7 }; Y3 e. X1 K- R4 f8 nSNR See Signal-to-Noise Ratio (Also called S/N).& b/ o4 F: _& e4 _' t/ i! j7 C& J SNRC Soreq [Israeli] Nuclear Research Center.: O9 A6 w, ?4 q$ g! }3 f1 H SOA (1) State-of-the-Art. (2) Speed of Advance. ' j+ z6 q- `1 p# Q8 sSOC Statement of Capability (Contracting term). 0 E, o4 S* h+ S! ?5 F0 X# ^$ mSOCOM Special Operations Command. , N, t: w6 `/ F7 @: s! X1 ^SOCS Subcommittee on Computer Security.7 H; M/ P* n% Z. o( L6 s SODD System and Operations Document. & T* P% j) R% N, N2 i+ lSODO Senior Offense/Defense Simulator.% S ]1 @& Q& d2 Z+ E SOF (1) See Strategic Offense Forces. (2) Special Operations Forces.: ?! n, m7 d3 h7 w* p MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 S4 h: }7 S1 e0 u1 r. Y0 p 269 $ q. @1 y' |; K' i \: JSOFA Status of Forces Agreement. ) \ j+ {% m4 W, |8 l3 lSoftware ) N* h; R. W% w& Y$ E2 t7 U/ _4 KArchitecture0 |9 O( L8 l# Z( T3 u# ~, R, o The implementation of solutions to the problems in the domain. It becomes a 8 @7 s4 E j* a+ s5 Qmodel for constructing applications and mapping requirements from the domain 2 Q, R/ u: y+ A6 O; emodel to reusable components. A generic architecture provides a high-level+ a7 p7 J! Z+ @" z6 P# g generic design for a family of related applications as well as a set of components4 \9 y8 [5 h0 v0 q0 I intended for any instance of that application. The generic design eliminates the; y5 u9 N9 s, O5 }4 V o4 o2 F! Z need to develop a high-level design for each application within the domain. As a2 V q! G( n" @" O8 J8 S result, domain developers use these representations as specifications for; |0 {% [3 l- k5 z# h$ ]+ N reusable components. 6 C$ S, B' e. R8 F% [! B% |Software) K; W: {' j9 v Development , Q6 {* \1 c9 u+ c# ?$ L! i( p4 `Cycle3 J d0 J1 @& T w1 K! p (1) The period of time that begins with the decision to develop a software $ c+ {, r, q3 @/ hproduct and ends when the product is delivered. This cycle typically % A4 g7 A z+ |7 k8 q; ]includes a requirements phase, design phase, implementation phase, 1 }; j% P$ E( D" k* _test phase, and sometimes, installation and checkout phase. Contrast : n, _; L% W6 xwith software life cycle.' `- M; y& e. d f- d+ E; f3 U# Y" a (2) The period of time that begins with the decision to develop a software! y$ Z/ g& b7 t5 t product and ends when the developer is no longer enhancing the " W2 ~* X% u0 q- i$ {, ?product.

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SIMM Second In-line Memory Module." o9 O+ k `# M- j& _! O5 u5 y Simple Security( k# f5 \7 o5 L; `& N1 F J Condition9 D" K% ~4 m0 k! | A Bell-LaPadula security model rule allowing a subject read access to an object+ v8 w8 T. z4 V; X: S only if the security level of the subject dominates the security level of the object. " d: \) f. h; CSIMS Security Information Management System. 2 c) W. p$ R# O/ ^- q* o/ z: J) FSimulation A simulation is a method for implementing a model. It is the process of, ^7 q7 i( {. T5 B( Y M8 c5 p conducting experiments with a model for the purpose of understanding the 8 t8 v: x: z1 R, M: ibehavior of the system modeled under selected conditions or of evaluating$ Q: I7 m( ]* ~ f6 g various strategies for the operation of the system within the limits imposed by* i K; O# Z1 B8 f% g5 A developmental or operational criteria. Simulation may include the use of analog 0 j2 ]( z6 J+ \ J8 Y* X* o, W* {- |or digital devices, laboratory models, or “test bed” sites. Simulations are usually# O% K5 k' t: K% _8 | programmed for solution on a computer; however, in the broadest sense, military& k( V2 m1 }3 M) v exercises and wargames are also simulations. 5 O6 T6 f, @, V0 V! U5 W( i' ?Simulator A generic term used to describe a family of equipment used to represent threat/ Q' U) x. B6 C- V weapon systems in development testing, operational testing, and training. A9 \$ f# {0 p" m# z9 ^ threat simulator has one or more characteristics which, when detected by human7 E& m/ g: V: p$ X9 K senses or man-made sensors, provide the appearance of an actual threat& @* N m% p4 q. d weapon system with a prescribed degree of fidelity. : ~& a8 U( h+ s, hSINCGARS Single-Channel and Airborne Radio System., j$ U) f6 o0 g; a; T Single Integrated ) {4 c2 m2 Z2 GOperational Plan- |4 N. S" i* ?% s7 t4 t (SIOP)8 q g9 Z* _8 U, Z& M; f1 _7 k6 ^ Plan by which the nuclear strategic offensive forces will retaliate when directed ( M: @: N; }& Y5 J0 {/ bby the NCA. ; r# _9 }1 m) ^* Q2 \5 R- W$ q0 `Single-Level& F8 I2 b' _% v$ O( h; o Device$ _ H/ e& _$ N3 n/ J A device that is used to process data of a single security level at any one time. $ B# _! |2 L& H1 z4 L, vSince the device need not be trusted to separate data of different security % b9 H) M+ k7 {5 h5 llevels, sensitivity labels do not have to be stored with the data being processed.' O n4 ? P" X* [ Singlet A space vehicle, such as a Brilliant Pebble, which contains only one intercept. x3 ^, `; z: Q9 b: V& j vehicle. 9 A% E. F6 \* s3 G) |% I0 Q4 T) o1 ySIOP See Single Integrated Operational Plan.: K4 W% d7 L2 T; `- m7 e( p SIP SINCGARS Improvement Program (US Army term). 8 D d) [1 O- ZSIPM Service Integration Program Manager., {$ q' F3 Z; E/ c# @% ~ MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 S # H" h {5 m9 m) F; J. y" f266 ! Z6 d% m* [: F7 t a3 Q! ]' sSIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sweden).8 F* @' Y) v4 }+ ^8 X SIPRNET (1) Secret Internet Protocol Router Network. (2) Secure Information Protocol Net.$ h( p. v0 v* L7 p" D SIPT (1) System Integrated Product Team. (2) Services Integrated Product Team. 7 F0 w3 y7 R, s2 {- L4 BSIR Signal Interface Ratio.+ ?/ _, Q6 Z' P/ P; V: m SIRE Space Infrared Experiment.1 }% |. _+ n3 j( t SIRMR Senior Information Resources Management Representative. + |2 z Y! e u3 |SIRRM Standardized Infrared Radiation Model. % m/ q1 s% ]7 I8 f& sSIRST System Shipboard Infrared Search and Track System (USN term).: }7 J( L& ~% p, X+ ] SIS Special Compartmented Information Isolation Segment. - z1 c# b" x# S J5 W4 E* x# KSISS Subcommittee on Information Systems Security. 7 R0 w( O9 k) P' LSIT System Integration Test.7 Z3 _+ v' W7 Z& C Situation# @8 U. K- R" J( L- K Assessment 8 m7 I; d5 k, O+ vThe determination of the extent to which observed event(s) constitute a threat 6 T- ~. V& O9 e) X8 _ l(e.g., isolated event, mass attack, etc.), using the attack characterization" X( t; m. D& L5 M1 _ information.: F8 q- {4 Y$ U SIWS School of Information Warfare and Strategy. 4 x$ ?8 N( ]4 N0 m0 N VSix Year Defense ; T# g) P7 Y9 o+ F4 A/ {Program (SYDP) / X" d$ r5 q8 }! b, FThe official DoD document, which summarizes forces and resources associated: `1 I& I( g9 ]0 P9 l# c with programs approved by SECDEF. Its three parts are the organizations 9 W o4 j- U6 |affected, appropriations accounts (RDT&E, operations & maintenance, etc.), and # o' j. }3 C: ~0 `: ^1 E$ ?the 10 major force programs (strategic forces, airlift/sealift, R&D, etc.). R&D is 6 t0 w7 Z; h0 w& ~0 gProgram 6. Under the annual PPBS cycle, SYDP is published normally three , }/ D0 t+ x0 U8 f' Wtimes: October, January and May. The primary data element in SYDP 9 n% o8 z4 y4 l T5 Hrepresenting aggregation of organizational entities and related resources is the # I& A& @: R* r# v$ j7 ^% i! Bprogram element. 4 t. ?5 X7 s+ }" p- A1 ]Size of Threat+ G0 V0 U' I5 {% [" f Corridor* C1 U- w d1 Z l# ? @ (LxWxAltitude) A volume of space in which a particular group of RVs would 6 @6 h+ K$ B. M" ~occupy, defined by launch location and designated target area. . Z: r, x9 [) j2 q2 m" v( }; G- ]SKKP (Former) Soviet system of outer space monitoring. ' Q2 [6 T: p1 r) T: JSkunkworks A separate program management operation established to operate outside the a4 u4 I+ E/ N. I) X- |. p1 N/ w normal process, either to expedite development or because of high security + P0 B/ f# f/ P4 [2 i5 }9 _% Pclassification.) \/ B% R& z$ S SL Sea Level.

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发表于 2008-12-25 20:20:02 |只看该作者
SESE Software Engineering Support Environment.. U5 ?& _- I% \ SET System Evaluation Threat. N' l3 h8 q, V4 z$ {SETA Scientific, Engineering, and Technical Assistance.4 N4 _. u2 r1 K6 R# `- x SETAC Systems Engineering and Technical Assistance Contractor. 5 d" x$ _7 O# i5 ISETP Solar Electric Aircraft Test Platform. 5 x5 x5 C1 Q6 J3 ZSEW Space Electronics Warfare.% @ |* W' S4 x SEWC Space and Electronic Warfare Coordinator. 7 W7 {# h5 g5 l1 s1 B+ m* M* DSEWS Satellite Early Warning System. G* Z& c7 y: c SF Standard Form.3 C* N. [: R! _- u7 D2 Z SFC Space Forecast Center. 4 h+ w2 F \8 n- V0 y, GSFS Shoot-Fail-Shoot.7 H- O( ^' Y; f9 q4 E+ B SG (1) Steering Group ; m3 b! }# C3 `: Y3 P$ A(2) Silicon Graphics ! j) q0 K X* ^, aSGEMP System/Source Generated Electromagnetic Pulse.* W) y1 u8 l# ~0 j' C o SGLS Space/Ground Link Subsystem. 7 S0 Y" W$ }* g& _( M0 A% vSHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.$ v% |" ^1 \2 F5 l0 R+ v SHF Super High Frequency.% O$ l# m0 `" O4 d& X1 k SHIELD (1) System High Energy Laser Demonstration. 9 m/ W" P1 z3 U( o7 U( f' z, e9 A(2) Silicon Hybrid Extrinsic Long-Wavelength Detection./ l& v9 @$ X4 R T4 ^ Shielding Any material or obstruction, which absorbs (or attenuates) radiation and thus 1 l9 b9 }$ V. _! Itends to protect personnel or materials from the effects of a nuclear explosion. A) d- |. b1 w* T4 O2 P moderately thick layer of any opaque material will provide satisfactory shielding 7 X6 w* a1 H6 G$ W! t2 G) ^ M0 qfrom thermal radiation, but a considerable thickness of material of high density6 v6 M V* u. L1 [; j1 r! V& B may be needed for nuclear radiation shielding. Electrically continuous housing7 b! g& B7 m: L6 O5 f2 w+ k for a facility, area, or component, attenuates impinging electric and magnetic! W1 {, S9 `) C, G fields. , t* y/ g; ]8 E* v1 ESHIPALT Ship Alteration.3 X" [. i! L% K2 I/ R7 a5 D# ] Shoot-Back The technique of defending a space asset by shooting at an attacker.. {. Z9 E2 ^ u' w I MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 S # A" M; \2 R. V( [" a) R3 G2647 `- t3 Y( n- ]' d Shoot-Look-Shoot 4 ? o4 J6 Y7 c: F# l3 y(SLS) * [6 j3 N2 u7 WA tactic used to achieve Defense Engagement Options (DEOs), such as assured / l- _' x/ x$ [" ] Q4 i+ `3 Vkill by shooting at the target, looking to see if it was killed, and shooting again, if4 D3 a1 W1 R: W) |% e6 @ y+ E necessary, to achieve the kill. % D; s9 N0 H2 @2 B( |1 iSHORAD Short-Range Air Defense. ^, R5 s3 B, S( r% X* ]1 nShort Range Air * P/ G( D& k# B9 T( nLaunch Target% |! U. F3 \+ d' ] X6 A Single-stage, air-launched, solid propellant theater target with threat . e0 J% ?3 B0 v! b8 E/ {$ y, zrepresentative reentry vehicle./ H7 t* J1 D: T Short Range3 G' S+ c+ s; Z/ Z& q Ballistic Missile % Y5 g3 [1 `3 k* x6 N0 _(SRBM)# o9 l3 l9 m# Q6 }8 B o& n A ballistic missile with a range capability of 30 km to 1,000 km. (USSPACECOM) # x$ @1 `0 ?. g0 UShort Wavelength" t4 r/ l. ^! c) G" y3 u Infrared (SWIR) / N8 ~" J3 d1 p! X e5 {Thermal radiation emitted by a source in the electromagnetic spectrum. B7 [' n( R* | encompassing infrared wavelengths of 0.75 to 3 microns.! u8 W7 H$ ^6 X' W9 z! G9 Z( ? SHOTL Simulated Hot Launch (missile engineering term). & p/ f( a. |9 d! z7 D0 @; ]shp Shaft Horsepower. _5 ?. r8 e4 ` s' O& {- Z2 BShrouded RVs Reentry vehicles enclosed in a material designed to shield its thermal and other R( y \# J$ ]' zcharacteristics. + u$ C* a3 x" ~( W8 ?( ySI Special Intelligence. . o: F0 N* y4 }/ \, M1 k$ n2 d% eSI&I Systems Integration and Interoperability.& H# {/ Q0 _2 e SIC (1) Silicon Carbide.: [: A: B. T E$ @$ l (2) Standard Industrial Classification.% T# ~- S e' ]5 N2 F; N SICPS Standard Integrated Command Post Shelter.3 Z! P {/ A: D B) Y' I6 J SIDAC Single Integrated Damage Assessment Capability. $ U% c& g0 Y" ESIDD System Interface Description Document (US Army term)./ b" }) F7 D) l* E+ l Sidelobes Residual EMR surrounding the main beam, which is of weaker power than the 0 p0 `% e0 t6 w% R8 ^$ kmain beam. 1 z9 E: @9 z+ R6 Z+ d# |: gSIDPERS Standard Installation Division Personnel System (US Army term). 8 U' L# | M! }6 ]* jSIDS Secondary Imagery Dissemination System. 5 W2 h8 p3 a+ N6 T/ USIE SATKA Integrated Experiment.! M: ?. Q; J) \2 ^0 D8 E, R SIF (1) System Integration Facility. (2) Selective Identification Feature! O% W7 a9 \8 S0 ^. [ SIGINT Signal Intelligence. X2 `; l; Q9 USignals Security : L7 k; I6 b" v+ {(SIGSEC) ! u9 Z4 S# f2 \$ MThe overall program for communication and electronic security. 8 A) A" b2 s2 ESignal-to-Noise 8 @9 v2 B' o8 s, F5 `( ^Ratio (S/N) (SNR)# ~( L& j9 ^( A& \/ h" Q! L$ n) { Relative power of the signal to the noise in a channel; usually measured in + Q( U) }2 }3 ~decibels. # J- U4 @* E. E9 pMDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 S - ?: Q W1 @7 S2 s) N265) S! y G$ q& p/ V" ?$ F4 Z( o% e- x, o Signature (1) Distinctive type of radiation emitted or reflected by a target, which can be . F4 Q8 i/ J4 [0 r" `used to identify that target." L: b( A0 J3 ` e (2) The characteristic pattern of a target displayed by detection and ! }/ d" \9 ?4 iidentification equipment.. L) r: o7 B5 e( E( g Signature : T. m0 J' b. g& y, O2 Y4 x. r, _Histories 9 W+ a$ K- {% V5 JA list of observed target signature characteristic parameter values as a function9 ^- r7 w" E+ ?% ^ of missile flight time used for target discrimination and kill assessment. ^* a& O+ u( g SIGSEC Signals Security. : h9 P5 ~4 v" E0 f" {SIIPT System Integration Integrated Product Team (THAAD Program term)." F& b6 Z! D1 _( I6 _5 R! z, Z' Y SIL Systems Integration Laboratory; Sunnyvale, CA.# z/ C5 J' O4 a8 N1 J4 F% c$ O4 \ SIM Simulation.

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发表于 2008-12-25 20:19:51 |只看该作者
Selected * j& [/ [. s1 @8 xAcquisition # N+ f0 [6 i) [4 | {Reports (SAR) f! P& x0 @3 I" e" X6 X Standard, comprehensive, summary status reports on major defense acquisition6 G9 ^, w; F# q programs (ACAT I) required for periodic submission to Congress. # u! d' D) ]4 OSelective, 0 y) B- e k/ bAdaptive Defense$ R! r/ p# c5 E- O Selective, adaptive defense assigns interceptors to RVs based upon defended/ \* m5 A9 t6 W9 i; G5 v asset values, the number of arriving RVs and time to impact. : k0 Z7 A, w7 A0 e4 D& H5 L1 w, sSelective Kill Assigns interceptors to targets on the basis of missile type, launch area, impact$ P9 ~4 [+ C5 N8 X) |; ^ area, time of launch/arrival, or predicted threat utility (e.g., SS-18 or its follow-on). j6 E2 u2 m; G1 {4 c" C( w Selectivity Refers to choosing a subset of targets either for attack or defense. (See3 [. n9 p, L9 f Preferential Defense and Preferential Offense.); z% j; F( i; y: c* R SEMA Special Electronics Mission Aircraft. - i* @8 s. f; |" j) ^Semi-Active' x; @5 z" I7 n0 ~ @* T Homing 3 \% N" c' L& l2 Q# t% o# RGuidance+ f& p: n" J2 `9 u; y } A system of homing guidance wherein the receiver in a missile utilizes radiations; M4 {+ R0 }5 z from a target, which has been illuminated by an outside source.3 E+ p; c8 Z( x {% O4 \% T Semi-Active8 Q' w9 J5 _1 D* O! U0 u$ s Sensor) w& `+ q; z' c& m' R' Z D One that does not generate radiation itself, but that detects radiation reflected 4 P8 ~6 w4 E) n# ~% I7 {0 r2 M+ wby targets when they are illuminated by other BMD components. Such devices ! v8 ^' v8 l, V% N3 f0 G' Bare used for tracking and identification and can operate without revealing their , F0 k9 s1 [5 b$ Yown locations.0 y/ n1 y; U; p$ f- w1 e SEMP Systems Engineering Management Plan.9 V$ V$ ` Q& y/ t4 A SEMS System Engineering Management Schedule.# `* v( _, ` O1 N9 b/ f, p- g' L MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 S7 ^$ ~6 ]9 ^, o 262 7 Y4 w/ j$ o& c% m i9 ESenior! }. K: Y- y0 C/ |' w! Q Q Procurement / ^7 e: X- U2 ~- _& f3 i* z7 UExecutive (SPE)3 {5 ?' ^( [0 u4 A0 M8 y The senior official responsible for management direction of the Service 7 v( ~. H9 P1 r& cprocurement system, including implementation of unique procurement policies, 4 x5 T$ ^7 {% F$ o+ _& Vregulations, and standards. The Senior Procurement Executive for all non- 6 n+ s9 H# U) ~9 ^' |6 s' oService DoD Components is the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and4 D L: D+ V$ u4 Y: e! J" k/ \ Technology, who has delegated many of these functions to the Heads of ( y& G! ^- B' V( J1 ]Defense Agencies including the Director, MDA.7 @+ ]* y# |9 F% g/ w, F SENSCOM Sentinel System Command. 0 Y7 @' B. v, a, i! nSensor Data Measurement information. For a passive sensor it is usually irradiance time, and, k5 [2 L! w. w LOS. For an active sensor it may include range, Doppler, cross section, etc., as3 R; `- p) u! Y2 f' o/ B3 c$ A well.- [, Y& g# I" n' U Sentinel ABM system designed for light area defense against a low-level ballistic missile 9 V+ _ n3 `; J& g* [attack on the United States. Developed into the Safeguard system in late- c# @1 G1 R3 K6 W 1960's. ' p* U6 `7 `. ]0 ?5 sSEO Survivability Enhancement Option.( w& N9 k) f9 G# V( M; Z3 L) i4 x SEP Signal Entrance Panel. / K9 a( [6 i# sSeparation) R* S' ?4 T. Y' w# f# K Hardware $ L0 F+ _+ i. y% A, ~9 \Objects expelled during payload separation sequence. + {8 l& n# @2 h9 a2 E$ d. pSEPG Software Engineering Process Group. * Z/ q; m) j* j1 rSEPRD System Element Production Readiness Demonstration. % Y6 h% U$ ^7 U }: jSEQ Sequence, or Staff Equivalent.; ^4 Q6 y: ^) x" s( k0 d Sequestration The reduction or cancellation of new budget authority; un-obligated balances,9 A- |2 p& W% I! d( o9 ^- q( o new loan guarantee commitments or limitations; new direct loan obligations, w+ Y$ X, {" y1 [6 L5 t* k- X commitments, or limitations; spending authority; and obligation limitations. As. D+ I+ J0 N0 C T( ? delineated in the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, sequestration is necessary if # k n2 B' B+ qlegislation is enacted that would cause spending in any appropriations category % [" F, Z* c" Q3 n& Cto exceed a specified cap.1 c* c$ ?+ {; a+ W. q4 H+ j' M SERB Software Engineering Review Board.9 W( @7 W* X/ b6 R% G& f/ J% w! }7 [# U SERD Support Equipment Recommendation Data (ILS term).9 `" n+ P9 M7 Q* K SERG System Engineering Review Group. + m; m# G8 |# F7 f6 SService5 S3 Q: _9 k! q+ v4 N9 n% w( l Acquisition; ?+ x+ J1 k. L- d Executive (SAE)7 B; k( R6 e% E9 l5 G* J0 o& n See definition of DoD Component Acquisition Executive. 0 h( t5 O( j0 ^8 L p, WService BMD - m' C) E( A- x7 O* gProgram , L& ?" F9 o8 a; T8 I1 [$ p, I. NExecutive Officer 0 r$ Q9 {6 I! Q( h" T4 P2 r(PEO) % J( X' a4 B- c/ M/ UA senior official responsible for execution of Service PMAs and for providing# p( z3 Y7 |4 d/ U* C0 i guidance and Service-related direction to subordinate Program Managers. The 6 g7 V! {! @/ q) t3 ^- uPEO will also serve as a deputy to the GM. (Consistent with PEO authorities and0 o. m+ \& ^4 f3 H* h responsibilities documented in DoDD 5000.1 and DoDI 5000.2.)( |* G z# w0 }! |4 v1 y Service & P; U0 a. X# c# Z% b# jComponent 5 D# D7 O( q V: JCommand B/ Z9 v2 P* Y6 j/ E) iA command consisting of the Service component commander and all those4 O: M7 Y# k* O4 r+ J2 Z) ~ individuals, units, detachments, organizations and installations under the c2 h4 C" X5 K/ c# o8 dcommand that have been assigned to the unified command. 0 S6 V( K3 h! K6 gMDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 S! }8 s9 ~6 F, v- \. H- I! s 263 ( d4 _: g2 ? I( h. @( s0 a6 R+ nService Life $ D& [$ g9 e9 m* JExtension / K4 ^* d' S5 u) ZProgram (SLEP) 6 Q$ @2 t3 J( Z; }( AModification(s) to fielded systems undertaken to extend the life of the system ' r' ~' h8 o( ~: p3 O# j: r7 B/ T) Ybeyond what was previously planned. " ~$ s# G. U' V# s; N* l2 LService Test A test of an item, system, or technique conducted under simulated or actual 6 M( e" a8 m' p1 ^( noperational conditions to determine whether the specific military requirements or * W9 \8 S [& M5 }$ S6 X& Jcharacteristics are satisfied. + l, s' L- ^0 c& Y5 i8 T4 `SES Seeker Experimental System.

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发表于 2008-12-25 20:19:42 |只看该作者
SDS-CC Strategic Defense System - Command Center.; S/ C ^+ h" ~ C8 B. l* u SDSD Strategic Defense System Description.2 v3 i+ n" Y+ m% { SDS-OC Strategic Defense System - Operations Center. ; J/ e4 @3 ~% y2 S% wSE Systems Engineering. + ]! O6 }/ D) ?, `SE&I Systems Engineering and Integration.5 G, _8 Y) f, ]% H7 V) V SE-CPAT Systems Engineering – Critical Process Assessment Tool (AFMC term). 7 R, K- b# Y5 y9 O, x; USEA [Military] Service Executing Agent. 0 e' w( s" N; e H1 ?- c. kSEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses.4 _$ o. p4 x5 q8 |) f SEALS Sea Air Land (Special Operations forces (USN). " L. r0 H( S. v" FSearch, Active Illuminate an assigned volume of space with electromagnetic energy and collect 2 @% X- a8 P/ |( M7 u% X! Jreflected radiation.4 z: m( P# \+ W! F MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 S. y; t3 Y! l3 h4 i* x 260+ P; U8 G) d& F( I) X$ R Search, Passive Collect radiation from an assigned volume of space. 5 f% @: |7 `4 J+ ?, |# CSEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. % Z: k/ F% D! cSECC Survivable and Enduring Command Center. , w0 z& [5 r( P: }4 kSECDEF Secretary of Defense (For Message Use Only). 0 v8 G" f5 Z$ i, k- h! E5 SSECNAV Secretary of the Navy. 8 }) n7 g1 G3 _SECNAVINST Secretary of the Navy Instruction.1 N5 y$ p' I6 ]( w Second Strike: m) j' @) W ]# Z% | p Capability ! V: d2 x8 N' V* @3 J6 B @" ~The ability to survive a first strike with sufficient resources to deliver an affective 9 i0 \" e& m% O! Jcounterblow (generally associated with nuclear weapons). 7 v+ @/ I/ V/ }* p% PSecondary6 R! D; h6 V- [ Station3 S7 B5 p3 i# S# _& _& @, Y$ f3 d A station that has been selected to receive a transmission from the primary % t X) a' s4 P( \7 ? Tstation. The assignment of secondary status is temporary, under control of the( D0 ~( i5 a* ]4 ^* A primary station, and continues for the duration of a transmission. , p: v1 P$ b8 J& JSecurity( Z. K' l# t, g; d7 t Architecture $ t" i$ U- f, o; x; \The portion of the baseline SDS architecture that is responsible for preserving- M% M' z7 Y! ^5 y7 u$ W/ T the confidentiality, integrity, and assured service of any of the sensitive, systemvalued functions and information elements (assets).! E% I: V) @; f$ K# `" F3 d Security Criteria The set of requirements that should be met so the security system can provide a" [( D& Q2 }2 p( J; L maximum degree of effective deterrence at the lowest cost.4 \ J9 `, G# l Security Level The combination of hierarchical classification and a set of non-hierarchical0 ]9 g _/ k1 x categories that represents the sensitivity of information./ V& g7 k6 _8 q5 {3 {3 J Security Policy The set of laws, rules, and practices that regulate how an organization manages,; i9 ~$ N: k. V) ^ protects, and distributes sensitive information.7 U* @4 ~9 k# M; a+ S Security Policy. C5 T, ~, l& p8 ?% H" d/ y0 Y Model: R `% h9 j9 [7 K An informal presentation of a formal security policy model." n: V0 C% f7 J4 X Security Program The implementation of formal security policies and procedures established by * C! S( ^7 r" S, J, }8 hDoD and other departmental publications to secure vital components of weapon6 {9 e, V! a) ^, _$ p* S systems and essential direct support systems from enemy hostile operations and% u0 a( L* a- h$ q, P: p; @ other forms of ground attack. ; t: F0 }: c8 }1 W0 [6 |Security # A6 G1 n$ |9 x0 ]3 aRelevant Event 5 \+ W c+ f, Q6 QAny event that attempts to change the security state of the system. Also, any * ?- \% |2 A& L& H( fevent that attempts to violate the security policy of the system. , v9 g0 Q3 v& M, l8 h" c- `Security# K" N' G6 Y5 j6 j! y Subsystem8 ^- \, U7 u: h& j5 I Q* m0 ~0 u: u; m Z That part of a weapon or defense system, which is added specifically for the : m$ ^; l4 Y% |0 X6 g# S( }" pperformance of security, functions and not categorized as components of other$ A; R+ h' A( @% h( Z( j6 F subsystems. 0 T1 Z# ], H) |# k8 cSecurity System The aggregate of all mechanical and electronic equipment countermeasures in a: I& U$ h+ P8 R5 Z: E$ o system which contributes to its security from intelligence gathering and ) R4 k* ?+ F0 s$ W5 g: w, Wclandestine or overt attack, including organized system function and procedures, % [0 N1 q u, }as well as the security subsystem. " ]9 H7 B" g. y2 a# ~Security Testing A process used to determine that the security features of a system are 4 K- {' [0 }3 X, Wimplemented as designed and that they are adequate for a proposed application - g9 `3 Y& Y5 S& O# Z- V7 Uenvironment. - F9 z( h0 m% N5 m$ zSED Software Engineering Division. ; |6 S" O, B' o6 G! X& b+ zMDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 S ( F& m, H9 }/ P2612 d& ~6 l9 O/ N2 u' o SEDD Systems Engineering Development Data Base. " i- V, C/ s5 `( X% ISEDS System Engineering Detailed Schedule s0 j. S. S0 B# j) }2 B. jSEE Software Engineering Environment. * \. F% O" F0 x4 k" MSEED Support for East European Democracy (P.L.101-179; 22 USC 5421). 5 h& F$ T1 p! L/ m* @SEER (1) Sensor Equipment Evaluation and Review. 5 N/ t4 R! i r& S/ G9 L(2) Sensor Experimental Evaluation Review. 1 h8 f, A* \3 w- q; g; }SEFC Space Environment Forecast Center. 7 c0 D& m- X# ^/ z: q1 cSegment A grouping of elements that are closely related and often physically interface. It ! x6 @. i- x) ]3 z' I% Y: econsists of CIs produced by several contractors and integrated by one.# @0 g% d- _' R6 K; [! w! ]* e SEI Software Engineering Institute. 0 H' l+ I2 P z% N% s$ D2 q8 LSEIC Systems Engineering and Integration Contractor.8 _6 j7 M8 |' N SEIC PP Systems Engineering Integration Contractor Program Plan." T& E0 q1 Q6 m1 I SEIPT Systems Engineering Integrated Product Team.6 H* A& T7 H3 H9 e/ \ SEIT Systems Engineering Integration and Test.

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发表于 2008-12-25 20:19:31 |只看该作者
SBS Stimulated Brillouin Scattering. 6 V. |; _7 _0 G d/ Y7 D8 ?7 @ D6 tSBSim Space-Based Simulator. ) |# ^7 ^) D( b3 M: q4 L# L" P8 ZSBSS Space-Based Surveillance System.5 F$ x. k _" V( C, m SBV Sensor Space-Based Visible Sensor. ' n5 J. S6 H7 X" B; LSBWAS Space-Based Warning System. * |8 H1 [* C1 s OSBWS Space Based Warning System.) G* u8 {* F' v l6 g0 x SBX Sea-based X-band Radar – A moveable platform for the BMDS test bed * @! B" R( M2 K- dSC (1) System Center. (2) System Concept. (3) Simulation Center. (4) System4 d& K2 ~7 b1 N9 U Controller. 3 c/ p! f5 c1 n4 Y! Z2 J, l; gSC/BM System Concepts/Battle Management.1 P9 R, g% ]) X* G# |" o' K Scaling Law A mathematical relationship, which permits the effects of a nuclear (or atomic); V. \1 q( b* R) y explosion of given energy yield to be determined as a function of distance from 9 n8 P0 o7 K' }$ Xthe explosion (or from ground zero), provided the corresponding effect is known" H9 d- a9 W4 g' f1 s9 R. j$ q* t1 {( Z3 f8 @ as a function of distance for a reference explosion (e.g., of 1-kiloton energy 6 d: P2 E$ ~- W( y+ oyield). ; \1 R+ s- K+ tScan In an electro-magnetic or acoustic search, one complete rotation of the antenna. 2 R% N! D3 l8 T2 V/ Z2 P* r2 v1 {1 ^! ]Scan Type The path made in space by a point on the radar beam; for example, circular, ) M+ M$ n: w9 k+ Z8 Rhelical, conical, spiral, or sector. " q$ j5 a4 r! L! y$ n/ N( |4 LSCARLET Solar Concentrator Arrays with Refractive Linear Element Technology. D/ I7 n% y8 N% W4 |1 p0 k Scattering The diversion of radiation, including radio, radar, thermal, and nuclear, from its* ?5 \. J1 Z/ } original path as a result of interactions (or collisions) with atoms, molecules, or% x; E# C J/ Q# p larger particles in the atmosphere or other medium between the source of the + C/ Q8 w' i: v2 w( rradiations (e.g., a nuclear explosion) and a point at some distance away. As a 3 s1 I* z1 F, p" [# W9 }3 Mresult of scattering, radiation (especially gamma rays and neutrons) will be: e ]* Q% c! |9 r% R( K9 ~0 L received at such a point from many directions instead of only from the direction' b. K4 s# ?: l: u) V: v% o1 a) v. e of the source. 2 Y2 Y' o4 L' |3 l4 l% O+ XSCB Strategic Defense System Control Board. ( T6 S/ n* a6 [: dSCC (1) Standing Consultative Commission (Treaty negotiation related term).3 @, r( Y. j0 M$ ~3 T5 i (2) Space Control Center.& V3 |( m* W4 q7 O- L6 A MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 S( \& }6 {8 K) k& r* ~* q 258 % O' {( d {9 s# q2 y4 pSCCB System Configuration Control Board. : ]! _4 e# s! p! n3 p' TSCDL Surveillance Control Data Link.6 y8 a5 G) r# W% F; q SCE Submunition Chemical Experiment. + b! Z3 t0 G4 U# ~& U iSCF Satellite Control Facility. 7 i7 y @' x3 O5 y! q7 A5 |SCG Security Classification Guide.5 L% v& y- a# N. p3 h% m SCI Special Compartmented Information (Security term).! F ?4 O7 h' V5 ~ SCIF Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (Security term). % A0 m- }2 n) I4 y2 S7 gSCIT Systems Concept Integrated Technology. " B8 U8 O3 C- r uSCMP Software Configuration Management Board.2 ~/ b+ k! s- M# S+ V o M' I# q SCN (1) Specification Change Notice. (2) Ship Construction and Conversion (Navy). 4 c% X2 p) I8 W(3) Space Communications Network.# M) t. H) j b' { SCOMP Secure Communications Processor. : x" V' m% c5 vSCOPA Survivable Concentrating Photovoltaic Array.5 i% w1 i8 p4 ~+ O( o SCORE Scientific Cooperative Research Exchange (US-UK). A science exchange to & L; b# y: H. `6 D7 n6 e8 Xinvestigate theater missile defense related issues., _/ z: L5 @' U! Y$ r/ o0 [ SCP System Concept Paper. + N& S6 @+ Z7 u7 R$ r6 }6 d/ aSCR Special Contract Requirement. : V8 C% y7 A+ h! x: gSCSI Small Computer Systems Interface.5 ^ Q; M" W+ c1 B SCT Single Channel Transponder. / S3 p2 e+ x6 E. l) ~) y6 _SCUD Surface-to-Surface Missile System. # y% l3 f3 b6 ` {9 Y) bScudCAP Scud-Combat Air Patrol.. T( i" }! C3 C SD Strategic Defense Command (Army term) (See also SDC). 2 ~2 e5 p+ x+ n4 i2 tSDB System Design Board.9 r$ i! Y7 s1 O; m2 a- ^ SDC Strategic Defense Command (USA term).- }) a1 S2 q7 `: n7 g0 r8 o SDCC Strategic Defense Command Center. : S+ ]! T( H+ V8 qSDCE Software Development Capability Evaluation (AFMC term)." B+ ?$ a& {7 ]9 \& @. c5 f SDCV Shuttle Derived Cargo Vehicle. ' A, \: J9 u) n! h) JSDD System Description Document. ' o m- Y7 D- W3 X' Z) mSDF Self Defense Force. % A9 T9 m) |, W; OSDI OBSOLETE. Strategic Defense Initiative. a. v6 Q$ O; Z7 Q- O. ZMDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 S1 u9 D( e7 S9 R2 g5 b& q 259+ l. ?, j% b' Y SDIAE OBSOLETE. SDI Acquisition Executive. (Re-titled BMD Acquisition Executive5 M d/ c2 m8 M) [, P& q- G* n7 y (BMDAE).) 2 A0 b4 @& U. k: u7 m, sSDIARC OBSOLETE. Strategic Defense Initiative Acquisition Review Council. - X$ ?7 t4 ~* x8 ?; X4 @( y: iSDII OBSOLETE. SDI Institute.- n9 g1 Q$ q r/ Q" ^ SDIO OBSOLETE. Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. (Predecessor % ]! ^1 ?6 S. i* h8 Borganization to Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (MDA).)1 ^- o# Y% V. B SDIO/PP Strategic Defense Initiative Organization/Program Planning. 2 r' f5 @3 C. I! o' X9 }/ jSDIP OBSOLETE. Strategic Defense Initiative Program. (Predecessor program to+ D. q( f7 G9 G, g& f' T' A Ballistic Missile Defense Program.)" n0 Y% ?0 C! s: n1 | SDISM OBSOLETE. SDI Simulation.3 \: J" M S8 s9 a! O2 p6 p6 y- z) e SDL Software Development Library. 4 ]3 G0 ~. l% o5 M1 z$ DSDLC Synchronous Data Link Control (TelComm/Computer term).* M2 B7 d" y& q* U SDLS Satellite Data Link Standard(s). o F7 i3 Q5 ~ F1 O+ Q! u SDN System Design Notebook.6 ?' X7 U7 [8 K/ f' N3 Y! V SDP Software Development Plan. v& L5 z- {9 U( C: o SDR System Design Review." z4 J: ^) D S" \7 B' c' c SDRU System Design Review Update. ! f) R! ^& S. VSDS Strategic Defense System. . L! X2 g/ {+ z' m/ t6 a# T2 { }SDS Element A stand-alone system (e.g., a weapon or satellite), which is the smallest entity! M% Z! @: _. {7 L. F" j! E/ F capable of performing a designated function with, specified results within the% R) }0 U+ X+ c' X9 C+ h Strategic Defense System.

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发表于 2008-12-25 20:19:20 |只看该作者
SAMOPA Single Accelerator Master Oscillator-Power Amplifier.4 ?" |( t9 t6 A SAMOS Satellite and Missile Observation System. $ J, E M" e; e9 {1 R0 |SAMP (1) Single Acquisition Management Plan. 5 Z1 I/ J7 z% ]& n- a(2) Security Accreditation Management Plan. 4 J* ]$ Q9 C7 ]2 {SAMP/T Sol-Air Moyenne Portee/Terre (Surface-Air Medium Portable/Terrestrial – French-# Y/ D/ S5 I+ M Italian missile). G P3 T: `2 r" J9 DMDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 S' K: ]) H# v$ }8 m, D- T$ j( ]6 T* d 255; z& `) [3 p+ f6 j6 f SAMS Spacecraft Assembly, Maintenance and Servicing Study.. B% D+ [+ k. [$ C( v+ e SAMTEC OBSOLETE. Space and Missile Systems Test Center, Vandenberg AFB, CA. : r6 n6 w3 H, ~: c- k* _. hSAMTO OBSOLETE. Space and Missile Test Organization, Vandenberg AFB, CA. ! [" s" r, _7 ?8 {8 l' y1 xSAO Security Assistance Organization. 3 ^) P" G# U( d* ?- n4 u4 |5 T. WSAP Special Access Program. * w1 |8 E7 W% V0 H; X) @, T: W& dSAR (1) Synthetic Aperture Radar. $ x* U( A1 Y) s2 W6 Z. ^(2) Selected Acquisition Report. * w% u0 O: C9 }* Z ^(3) Special Access Required.7 Z- X% I8 V* x, Q- A) K+ } (4) Search and Rescue.& @. y. x% K6 {$ m( w y0 o SARDA [Assistant] Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition.4 X. p# t2 b3 u, x2 Q SAS (1) Shoot-Assess-Shoot. (2) System Architecture Study (SDI).- J% ~* P2 r) _6 Y# a4 F6 V SASC Senate Arms Service Committee. (US). + J3 B8 Z+ w6 i! q& Z5 BSASET Software Architecture Sizing and Estimating Tool.2 }; O/ q8 y9 V( L0 X SASS Space Assets Support System.+ k& H" w/ k$ `! P/ Y e SAT Surveillance, Acquisition and Tracking.# |! `0 E( e" S7 J SATAN Security Administrator’s Tool for Analyzing Networks.0 X& f8 \- `8 m9 ]' M5 [ SATCOM Satellite Communications.' w- [, T3 w0 M7 j8 n+ d& c' I) r Satellite and / N6 i+ @8 K( }- bMissile+ q0 S! m: M% i) b0 w# Q0 j Surveillance 3 ~1 N+ I' | u" M3 S% JThe systematic observation of aerospace for the purpose of detecting, tracking," {* v: P4 ~7 O8 | and characterizing objects, events, and phenomena associated with satellites ! e5 t* C% I7 o: p. e1 t0 Cand in-flight missiles, both friendly and enemy. 6 O) o7 W* b# A& a; | R; g! ySatellite3 Y1 a0 t, x$ ?9 X2 n. u Reconnaissance % `8 j0 N9 g" J6 k- z3 DIntelligence gathered through collection systems involved in assessing the6 {2 l! B) @" E: |+ j capabilities, methods of operation, signal intercept, photo reconnaissance, and 1 V9 A# q# }; y$ R2 mother intelligence indications and warnings that will provide information for SDS; t- ]/ O4 S9 x; H: U3 R+ e4 ~6 A assets. 1 m" ]9 ^$ ?( N8 O! p% ^SATKA Surveillance, Acquisition, Tracking, and Kill Assessment. * I5 @3 ~9 W$ V8 M# v/ ?+ N: {SATP Space Applications Technology Program., W2 i5 o7 w" _7 i) |- H9 I SATRAK Satellite Tracking. 4 G& z6 d4 _& u2 g# [) FSATURN Name of NASA rocket booster.6 n3 e1 H2 S/ _4 T; I SATVUL Satellite Vulnerability.. N8 p5 Q$ |8 _ SAW (1) Surface Acoustic Wave. (2) Satellite Attack Warning.% V; k( u/ p- D5 i2 ~ SAW/V Satellite Attack Warning and Verification. 6 m. \ I7 N3 D3 \5 L% h: o( lSAWAFE Satellite Attack Warning and Assessment Flight Experiment.& e% F0 f. \+ Z% j5 A) @ SBA (1) Space-Based Assets. (2) Small Business Administration.7 k# s2 j5 H/ ^1 ~5 {' F8 z MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 S) a1 a% N" ^3 y9 a/ j3 G 256( P# R: U9 t, U( T/ t8 ^ ^4 {2 ? SBAMS Space-Based Anti-Missile System.6 g, ^2 o0 H/ J9 N6 U# y SBAS (1) Space-Based Architecture Study. (2) Space-Based Acquisition System. 1 V3 K' E$ d6 ESBCL Space-Based Chemical Laser.! p4 F) o0 C) c* R SBD Site BMC3 Demonstration. 5 ^0 r6 R) C! |SBE (1) Space Based Element. (2) Synthetic Battlefield Environment. 1 ^- j: D8 `4 fSBES Space-Based Experimental System.& m+ f2 U5 A( @* I SBEV Space-Based Experimental Version. ( _4 W" H+ P( C9 Z! T$ F! U9 n& ASBFEL Space-Based Free Electron Laser./ X! U. I' ~) a k6 b2 h* N- m+ } SBHE Space-Based Hypervelocity Gun Experiment.( W& f$ S& ^$ P& O" Z3 V; V: m SBHRG Space-Based Hypervelocity Rail Gun. 5 W% B c. Z! P2 } _) x& GSBI (1) Space-Based Interceptor. (Replaced by Brilliant Pebbles (BP).) (2) Special6 _5 n D$ f7 B' x" E, t Background Investigation.6 e: m7 R9 ]1 {/ O B% s SBI-CV OBSOLETE. Space-Based Interceptor - Carrier Vehicle.% S8 \ B; j6 O W& F SBIR (1) Space-Based Infrared. (2) Small Business Innovative Research.5 ^" h8 B J! I4 }' J, f+ ] SBIRS Space Based Infrared System.7 G3 ?9 t' e3 e* K" X9 u4 N, U7 {: _ SBIRS GEO SBIRS Geosynchronous Earth Orbit satellites.4 [3 {6 D# J8 G8 N+ t- J! @4 e7 W SBIRS HEO SBIRS Infrared sensors hosted on satellites in Highly Elliptical Orbits. # p' k- [5 R2 D. u" k; }# \' u9 CSBIRS High SBIRS high altitude component consisting of four SBIRS GEO satellites and' o! J2 \, w5 ]" `; y+ F# ^) m infrared sensors on two HEO satellites.+ }9 \- P9 C1 D/ M SBIRS LEO SBIRS Low Earth Orbit Satellites.2 D% ~( b* g( p- S# O% E9 x SBIRS Low SBIRS low altitude component consisting of SBIRS LEO satellites. The SBIRS 7 W% m9 V8 b1 v% X1 U. Z, gLow component will be designed to provide precision midcourse tracking and3 C4 i4 ^; j& N) {/ z% o8 r discrimination data to support early interceptor commit, in-flight target updates,! c [. ^* `" F7 s: |# X and target object maps for a National Missile Defense architecture. The SBIRS, f7 E5 W! p6 @5 C8 x Low component will also support the other mission areas of the SBIR system. 9 }2 u+ ?9 U/ k# Y. x(Evolution of the Space and Missile Tracking System). % Q/ A. j) m: bSBIS (1) Space-Based Imaging Satellite. (2) Space-Based Interceptor System./ u7 t: P$ a3 q' u% @1 m; I9 c0 ^8 ^ SBKEW Space-Based Kinetic Energy Weapon.9 n, s4 M: Y+ g: ?' C SBKKV OBSOLETE. Space-Based Kinetic Kill Vehicle. ( v2 K5 R- ]- ~8 A+ X" J0 s3 s1 q7 JSBKV Space-Based Kill Vehicle./ L5 n( j$ m- R SBL Space-Based Laser. 9 y; N0 ~* Q" `" m9 M) w* _SBLRD Space-Based Laser Readiness Demonstrator.. E0 t, e' D( s# g4 [1 y MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 S " _$ \3 W% [* ^257 8 L' f6 \+ g, R6 N! YSBM (1) Space-Based Battle Manager. (2) Strategic Ballistic Missile./ c' H2 D" x, b" P5 C/ J4 f+ q SBNPB Space-Based Neutral Particle Beam. 4 K$ Q1 n+ G \( h) r. H) k; `SBNPBW Space-Based Neutral Particle Beam Weapon.! K( k {$ {$ z% [0 Y SBPB Space-Based Particle Beam.) l3 j) M* O9 h0 m- R5 ` SBR Space-Based Radar.3 Q$ I, @; h& y y9 G( {9 {+ A* b6 } SBRF Space-Based Radio Frequency.

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RSA Russian Space Agency.3 l8 {4 o9 ?2 W) w" x RSI Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability. # G/ B5 C! R7 R$ n J) @! i( K& a$ hRSIP Radar System Improvement Program. & l; s9 O4 r9 L1 y$ _RSO Resident Space Object.8 G. w& m2 D, o% v" Q3 m RSOI Reception, Staging, Operation and force Integration (Joint Forces term).) k5 m2 M& q, o RSRE Royal Signal and Radar Establishment (UK).* [( E ?4 ?* `- @ Q5 U7 y2 A RST Radar System Test (THAAD-GBR)7 P- t9 {/ {; h! S RSTA Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition.9 X+ k. J- `7 ]) G) z, B5 X RSTER Radar Surveillance Technology Experimental Radar (UHF).+ u2 [ x8 s) ~- P* k RSU Remote Switching Unit.0 e2 l& l/ d9 W RSV Re-supply vehicle.2 _( i& \: s/ v c RT (1) Relocation Time (ILS term). (2) Repair Task Distribution (ILS term)./ K! ~' P7 {. b: i RTC Report to Congress.; `7 C$ {: F2 i7 G0 K5 v RTCA Real Time Casualty Assessment (US Army term). V- N# z( o" r# d' f3 E RTD Radar Technology Demonstration.0 ^6 f3 X, Q# P. w$ \6 j MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 R , B3 ~$ l! N* Y7 |# u252" k- u8 f% `5 N( [) [ RTF Release To Fleet (USN term). 5 r5 A4 u2 X$ E+ t) uRTG Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator.8 q. l8 P) u: [- w1 M \ RTIM Radar Technology Identification Methodology. - M! F. s1 {. Q6 @1 q1 L: oRTO Responsible Test Organization. ( ? d2 I0 H* M6 S% y CRTOV Real Time Operational Verification.* e3 f0 P7 ~9 F9 i# n" j% k RTOVF Real Time Operational Verification Facility (US Army term).& \2 l5 Y/ V/ f, a" k4 b; c/ ? RTS (1) Request To Send (Telecomm/Computer term). (2) Remote Tracking Station.8 m3 e; C2 q6 m2 X. Y* x! {( |1 b RTWP Real Time Wave form Processor (Advanced Technology Demonstration Radar 6 d7 _# C n3 Dterm).# G! p' b: k5 c: N Rules of7 k: V J9 ^' k& n9 Q3 \ Engagement : H8 l$ d9 v- k0 B! M(ROE)' c8 V# @. ]* d) \" L' v Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the, i$ {5 [& {5 V4 g circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or& Y. m9 A# K# O: V7 G- V2 R- x continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. ) l) ^& \& O6 T8 o: q, S! E- JRUPS Resource User ID and Password System. 1 B. j, s ^1 z) Y# E; GRUSI Royal United Services Institute (UK).8 I. n8 w5 r1 y* j RV See Reentry Vehicle. 0 k; S8 x: l9 p; ~' | U# f: {RV Complex A reentry vehicle and its associated objects.& P$ q9 _7 [& O, ] RV Temperature The temperature of the heat given off by the RV that allows sensors to acquire- ]) f+ g5 a( O/ m) {4 | them.* M+ t* _- M: _% v W RVAO Reentry Vehicle Associated Objects. 7 { c- J* [' V/ ?! y2 }, eRvw Review. ; k/ D5 m: }! ?- MRW (1) Radiological Weapon. (2) Rotary Wing.! K3 ^0 D+ @9 H# l; s2 X* n+ w RWPD Real Time Waveform Processing Demonstration.0 \& b+ l2 n4 c# ~ RWR Radar Warning Receiver. ' t# @3 e. b" w: ^, uRWS Remote Workstation. , l& e3 n5 a0 L: aRX (1) Receive. (2) Receiver. F3 T2 h: Z1 i4 E3 v2 ^; \MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 S; }* m# S& T, z# I- v) v. J 253 ; K, Y' o7 y) M- p1 BS Start.2 e3 T* c; a2 L# Y8 u S&A Safe and Arm. & K/ W q, W5 Z4 g: O; kS&T Science and Technology.0 K0 B9 u& \# S S&TI Scientific and Technical Intelligence. , O0 Z$ B5 X' W/ a. H; |S&TNF Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces. 4 W8 |% t* J I( r3 OS/N (1) Signal-to-Noise Ratio (Also called SNR). (2) Serial Number. . J& i% K3 [. eS/NF Secret/No Foreign Security Marking. 8 K/ r9 I r/ u. e$ {4 E n" ]& \S/O Survivability/Operability. 6 H5 F: H5 o' y: KS/SU/AC Systems/System Upgrade/Advanced Concept.0 i8 A1 h+ p- ~, z8 A' x! e7 ~ S/T Search/Track./ J P$ }. [6 }4 W S/V Survivability and Vulnerability. : V3 P L: J* D* |S/W Software. P. R0 R: g/ M. X2 ^" ?, { S2 Synchronized and Synergized.+ ~3 j: I# j8 L6 V$ w `: S S3 E Space-Based KEW System Simulator/Emulator., i( i; o# Z9 Z SA (1) Situation Awareness 9 I3 Z3 x" Z% g X, l! o5 N0 g3 G(2) Secretary of the Army.; |' _% A6 n. C2 D' F7 ]- f# U& k SA&I System Architecture and Integration.0 [* }) E! B/ L SA-N Surface-to-Air, Naval. : s- G& C; D, B3 ISA/BM OBSOLETE. Systems Analysis/Battle Management. 0 f. ]$ S# N% \SA/PDL Strategic Defense Ada Process Description Language. 5 q- \1 A: H& H2 _5 k/ W" y- WSAAWC Sector Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator (USMC). - p: f) {6 D0 q* J# JSAAWF Sector Anti-Air Warfare Facility (USF term). g! g) _3 N" B" ?SABRS Space and Atmospheric Burst Reporting System.' y: ? n* `$ u. z. d6 T8 ?% E* t SAC (1) OBSOLETE. Strategic Air Command (see USSTRATCOM). - T0 _ C; f; Q+ s(2) Senate Appropriations Committee (US). , K) f/ U) V. |- m" d/ a sSACCS SAC Control System. 3 o( R/ Y1 f- J) Z' t- ^3 X* X. c5 KSACEUR Supreme Allied Command, Europe.2 b& H4 Z" _( T/ T1 P8 q6 N SACLANT Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic. 6 G5 o1 R1 L, w9 C; ?( cSACMA Suppliers of Advanced Composite Materials Association. . z4 I- c# h" I* [4 e8 ISADA Standard Advanced Dewar Assembly.) K& I+ x: q0 f) d% h0 e MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 S$ A2 F, E7 d; H; w# W. r8 e% M 254 3 Q+ z5 v- E. H2 k' jSADBU Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (of OSD). 2 i& ?/ ?' l- p+ hSADM System Acquisition Decision Memorandum (Army). t5 T" k; p; R1 n8 y7 X1 tSADO Senior Operations Duty Officer (JFACC term). 2 }4 c4 z: K0 v- B2 iSAE Service Acquisition Executive.- r$ B: V9 @% d' @3 B& O SAFEGUARD A U.S. midcourse and terminal phase defense for ICBMs, deployed in 1975 and- D5 S: t# E, m; B( C3 c deactivated in 1976 due to its limited cost effectiveness.0 d' u! W0 L" ]8 `! [. y SAFSCOM OBSOLETE. SAFEGUARD System Command.! d2 F1 O- h; U/ V& J, ^ SAG Senior Advisory Group. ) S6 L' ?- e3 I9 z! _# z& e) L6 USAGE Semi-Automatic Ground Environment {Air Defense System}.' }8 B& X3 n( T SAH Semi-active homing.! u% ~/ c& f- J6 }% H: X- o SAIC Scientific Applications International Corporation./ t2 T& U+ J. ?' y Saint A satellite inspector system designed to demonstrate the feasibility of % F. N; g2 K: F# eintercepting, inspecting, and reporting on the characteristics of satellites in orbit.8 a/ T+ F+ F1 M' K a) Y SAINT (1) Satellite Interceptor. (2) Shared Adaptive Internet Technology. / v% H9 h$ z' ~+ c D' c( aSAIP Semi-Automated Imagery Processing. % [' L4 _" ~- `SAKT System Architecture and Key Tradeoffs (SDIO term). 3 } n% l8 L" CSAL Strategic Arms Limitation. 7 @( ?' m6 G' s) r+ WSALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.3 m1 Z; ~3 Z0 O7 o/ |* d Salvage Fusing The means by which a warhead detonates when an interceptor structurally 9 H( \4 I3 X+ U5 ?0 Q" nattacks it. Generally used as a device for disruption of the defense.& `) \$ D4 Y$ o* W; o SAM Surface-to-Air Missile.- M6 z$ k* g' s) O G. q SAM-D Surface to-Air Missile, Model D (now PATRIOT). + M. ^/ R7 g6 @( M0 ~* SSAMD Security Assistance Management Division. $ k* E" O4 M% v( B2 v/ BSAMM Software Acquisition Maturity Matrix.* q. w- t$ X- c SAMMES Space Active Modular Materials Experiment.

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RF (1) Radio Frequency. (2) Response Force. 2 @+ H( ?, h. ~+ P* MRFFEL Radio Frequency Linac.# v& B$ k) A" [- E RFI (1) Request for Issue. (2) Request for Information. (3) Radio Frequency+ w- e" r/ {( g# A) V% _ Interference. + Y8 o' |' y; N; v4 `5 [5 ~RFL Radio Frequency Linac.1 @! ?2 y9 N' G RFLINAC Radio Frequency Linear Accelerator.7 z; L C: S) d5 I" V T RFOG Resonant Fiber Optic Gyro.0 x% U3 ?' E5 L% t* ^$ R RFP Request for Proposal. + A$ l3 D& L2 g/ L0 P; T8 `: [- qRFQ Radio Frequency Quadrupole (Accelerator). 7 }; \" {: U. ~) {! V6 R) IRG (1) Rail Gun. (2) Review Group.5 Z1 T D5 W% s B' D, ~+ c RGB Red, Green, Blue (Video Engineering term). ; T- k6 p, ]9 S( K; ORH Radiation Hardened.' h, K; c! B8 ^: F6 { m0 i1 l" _, ~9 f RH Electronics Radiation Hardened Electronics. 6 V4 ]0 |0 w& r: K( Z: rRHD Radiation Hardened Electronics.% v; S* }& t4 Y- {3 E m6 o. o! D2 U MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 R0 a' |1 o V1 E% |7 l- E# B 2499 G- ?# g r. o: ?* X9 k' b- Q RHETT II (1) Russian Half Effect Thruster Technology Program.* n" t4 h4 ^7 m% G; b& j) ^ (2) Russian Hall Electric Thruster Test.* k4 n8 T3 P; F) L/ L. ~ Ri Inherent Reliability.8 c( i. z6 z$ Q& j1 `* ~; U+ S+ |& w RIA Range Insensitive Axes. 1 {' i& \0 O5 h; a) \RIBIT Reverse Illuminated Blocked Impurity Transducer. 0 R+ ?+ F+ X0 r. X2 P+ O! W4 eRICBM Retro Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. + u' F$ L+ X9 ~2 G$ h, vRIIA Royal Institute of International Affairs (UK).% l* S6 a0 h0 W1 z$ a" J, Q RIL Repair Items List (ILS term). : q |; r! O3 q$ V3 M, e' W4 H: h/ ARINT Unintentional Radiation Intelligence. ) Z0 a& W% r2 J' BRIS Radar Instruction Set Computer.) c% N$ P* P5 ^2 h+ s: C RISC Reduced Instruction Set Computers.! {" `0 v) s" E, E+ D RISCAE RISC Ada Environment.) Y3 X" }, K8 ` Risk Approval* [& F/ _) s' z Authority (RAA)1 l% o$ Y/ s6 T* f- l1 I An individual designated by the Director, MDA who makes risk acceptance* O; F, E2 v- C: G% s* H decisions. The RAA evaluates trade-offs between threats and such factors as% ], Y% ] g: M8 g% f& D3 c cost, security, survivability, and safety to achieve a functionally operational,3 }4 b/ M; k0 g( Y% j/ d affordable, and secure system.% a7 y, u3 |; U' _$ i$ P$ B5 V Risk Assessment The process of subjectively determining the probability that a specific interplay of 4 \& W" q# u$ `% Cperformance, schedule, and cost as an objective, will or will not be attained2 u' b, \* G1 g" Y* Q7 m along the planned course of action. (Defense Systems Management College) 7 [+ g1 [ b7 F/ U* A5 _. ^RISTA Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition. - t4 H% D0 M7 G% q: {RIU Range Interface Unit.1 M! X2 G1 I9 q& O Rivet Joint RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft. ! `3 Y8 |: g( v- _ F( e2 F4 }RIVET JOINT Name of USAF Reconnaissance project. F0 ~6 _5 F& L5 O( R" q2 URIW Reliability Incentive Warranty.8 k% p5 }8 u R' p1 z- V; P RL Rome Laboratory, Griffiss Business and Technology Park, NY. (Formerly called4 K6 V! I9 M# X Rome Air Development Center.) + W' s! j9 F2 z+ {1 {5 v2 W$ I3 VRLA Repair of Level Analysis (ILS term). $ t! N8 L! A! z4 j: G" M6 D& HRLG Ring Laser Gyro.+ Q0 ^) r# _6 W) q& Y0 c7 @) V% Q RLRIU Routing Logic Radio Interface Unit (PATRIOT).5 ^- K3 e2 N6 A/ U0 Z' _3 N RLRIU-U Routing Logic Radio Interface Unit – Upgrade (USA term).8 A+ r0 Z, \) @+ W/ L Rm Mission Reliability (ILS term).8 U9 F n) M$ [1 n5 F: @ RM Radioman (USN term)., |: t0 D& ?4 g4 t4 Q. b7 S MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 R! j% f. X9 R. ]3 {4 T0 J) g/ F4 x l 250& q8 F% _! T& r# O RMA (1) Reliability, Maintainability and Availability (see RAM) (ILS term).# C( ?) k& u X9 t4 P (2) Revolution in Military Affairs (OSD term).$ x3 @' d! C+ O, k) g RMCET Resource Management Concurrent Engineering Team. 1 r, n5 e) k1 a: w% V- S6 LRME (1) Relay Mirror Experiment (a satellite launched February 1990 and which ( z) _! g1 C# G9 greentered the atmosphere in May 1993). (2) Remote Multiplexer Encoder. o# V9 B, Q) [; K% b/ k9 PRMI Republic of the Marshall Islands.# G# h- ?/ O( Y+ e4 c- z+ l RMO Reflectivity.* B2 K, n! `0 C: b" u+ \4 P7 M RMP Risk Management Plan.6 C+ }/ g. h8 X* b RMS (1) Remote Manipulator System. (2) Root Mean Square.* N- W, l0 C' T) u0 Q; N RNAS REL NAV Analytic Simulator (JTIDS term). ( j8 L* g t! a4 X: }" C* sRNLAF Royal Netherlands Air Force. $ |) T9 v- J5 y5 _, H, T! W: V( rRNLN Royal Netherlands Navy.1 i% k" G5 f ?8 T# g6 o ROB Remote Operating Base. ! d j: [( k/ O! d* l) B# iROBS Rapid Optical Beam Steering (system). + l/ d5 h3 z4 S, S. }2 oRobust Used in describing a system; indicates its ability to endure and perform its9 p" G: @, N. [7 g2 s) y mission against a responsive threat. Also used to indicate system ability to! p- l1 Z# ~8 H' R4 | survive under direct attack.% `( H4 n7 z0 C( S g N/ ^( v H Robustness (1) The ability to produce correct results despite input errors. . A9 h0 }5 B4 o% `( B5 C8 Y(2) The existence of coordinated, multiple capabilities that perform the same& V& ~- }8 d2 X; a9 W) Q broad task/mission. Provides the BMD warfighter with sufficient flexibility 8 E+ n3 p( Y, ?! Jto negate the specified threat with application of a variable mix of ground; {% a* Y. I* c0 k4 e% a( N1 a and space-based systems. (USSPACECOM) 0 z1 y5 S) ]; i B; PROC (1) Regional Operations Center. (2) Required Operational Capability. 0 ]% T" d8 q6 b6 Z) I5 WROCC Regional Operations Control Center. . F/ T$ r4 W g9 VROD Record of Decision. 9 _" v3 v# Y, R/ SROE Rules of Engagement." Y6 ^# O/ | Q( j. n1 l+ x ROF Rate of Fire 3 g+ r% i8 K x/ b* u7 ?ROI Return on Investment.2 j5 X) c( {1 a- X D3 F ROK Republic of Korea. # N4 r' r- o+ }( ^ROM Rough Order of Magnitude & V" S- H- Z5 DROOM Real-time Object-Oriented Methodology. 4 a, m4 y5 s. y+ D7 x zRORSAT Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite. ! _8 t7 r7 b3 ]+ P) C- x7 { E+ pROV Remotely Operated Vehicle.+ F, z5 x- N: b6 O MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 R" Q3 b7 o; H# |9 N 251 ! G: j/ e( J: M5 zROW Rest-of-World. 5 Z4 N; z H. A$ \3 j/ iRP (1) Repetitive Pulse. (2) Readiness Posture. , ~6 `# n; V7 z7 y$ cRP&C Resource Planning and Coordination.( m' }( ^# ] J RPAC Resource Performance Analysis Center. 6 q. Z, S% |2 Z6 iRPIE Real Property Installed Equipment.3 {) o" t4 w' d) F- r4 q rpm Revolutions per minute.6 X: ]+ D+ O8 `8 V RPV Remotely Piloted Vehicle.. m4 a8 d+ }- L+ S* X4 |+ k Rqmt Requirement. ) H) t; z3 e: hRQMTS Requirements.. N/ @8 a `+ ], I5 I4 W% L RQn Review Question (AFMC term). ; t8 O2 r X5 R* ZRRDI Range Resolved Doppler Imagining * x- f/ [( b& ~* X4 x) \RRFD Risk Reduction Flight Demonstration.! u; |2 [ {0 O' s, i# {' @" p/ L ? RRG Requirements Review Group. + r; @ r$ m+ C7 P' X5 w. i' x! YRS Radar Set (PATRIOT).

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