Boeing Flight Operations Symposium

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AIRPLANE GENERAL AIR SYSTEMS 1. An operator has received numerous complaints from passengers who “….do not feel good during cruise in the 737NG due to high cabin altitude.” The operator asks, why is the 737 cabin altitude scheduled to be at 8000’ at FL 370 when the system is capable of providing a lower cabin altitude at this flight level? The 737NG pressurization schedule is designed to meet FAR requirements as well as maximize cabin structure service life. The pressurization system uses a variable cabin pressure differential schedule based on airplane cruise altitude to meet these design requirements. At cruise altitudes at or below FL 280, the max differential is 7.45 PSI. which will result in a cabin altitude of 8000’ at FL 280. At cruise altitudes above FL 280 but below FL 370, the max differential is 7.80 PSI. which will result in a cabin altitude of 8000’ at FL 370. At cruise altitudes above FL 370, the max differential is 8.35 PSI. which will result in a cabin altitude of 8000’ at FL 410. This functionality is different from other Boeing models which generally use a fixed max differential schedule thus can maintain lower cabin altitudes cruise altitudes below the maximum certified altitude. 2. On airplanes with an Aspirated TAT Probe, the probe will not be aspirated when accomplishing the Unpressurized Takeoff and Landing Supplementary Procedure. Are the FMC N1 values for takeoff thrust still valid in this case or should the pilot manually enter the outside air temperature? The FMC values for takeoff thrust should still be valid for an unpressurized takeoff when using the appropriate procedure. A review of the design specifications for the Aspirated TAT Probe reveals the following probable error estimates when the probe is operated with an adequate bleed air supply: a) for a day with moderate to high solar heating, no local wind relative to the probe and a 20º C static temperature, a maximum error of +1.5º C can be expected, b) for a worst case desert condition of 55º C static temperature, a maximum error of +2.9º C can be expected. Since the flight crew is expected to reconfigure the airplanes for the unpressurized takeoff just prior to departure in order to maximize passenger comfort during the taxi phase, we would not expect the TAT errors to reach the estimates detailed above. In all cases, we recommend that the crew compare the probe derived TAT value with reported temperature and make a manual entry if a discrepancy exists. ANTI-ICE, RAIN 3. An operator has encountered a situation where the CDS engine TAI annunciations indicate malfunctioning valves while the COWL VALVE OPEN lights on the Engine Anti-Ice Panel indicate normal system operation. The MEL/DDG does not allow dispatch into icing conditions for this failure mode. Can the MEL/DDG be changed to allow dispatch in this configuration? Boeing Flight Operations Engineering has undertaken an action to investigate a change to the 737 MEL/DDG that would allow dispatch relief for the scenario proposed in this question. If the investigation justifies MMEL relief for the CDS engine TAI annunciation, Boeing will develop an MMEL proposal and submit it to the FAA for consideration during the first quarter of 2001. 4. Wing icing issue - is there an effort to look at the fuel burn limitations to allow fuel to be burned out of the wing tanks with more than 1000 lb. fuel in center tank to reduce the icing problem? This was considered during the initial development of various options to deal with nonenvironmental wing icing. This solution would result in increased design and fatigue loads for the wing and aft body as well as effective gross weight reductions and reduced fatigue life for Boeing Flight Operations Symposium October 24 – October 26, 2000 Seattle, Washington 737 Caucus Summary Report 2 January 15, 2001 the 737NG fleet. Therefore, a change to 737 fuel burn limitations is no longer under consideration. 5. 737NG Operations Manual bulletin titled WINDOW OVERHEAT does not include Service Bulletin resolution. Does something exist? A vendor Service Bulletin (SB), Koito 83000-30-040, has been issued. Boeing has released a revision to all customers' OMBs with service bulletin information included. 6. Is Boeing looking at alternatives to hydrophobic coatings since the current formulation does not last? Current Boeing production airplanes are no longer capable of supporting a rain repellant system, i.e. some RAINBOE replacement. We are not looking at alternatives to hydrophobic coatings. We realize that the current coating is not providing satisfactory service life and will continue to investigate improved technology for hydrophobic coatings. During 2001 we expect to test candidate coatings that may perform better and last longer than the current coatings. The windshield wipers are and will remain the certified rain removal system on 737 airplanes. AUTOMATIC FLIGHT 7. On the 737, TOGA can only be activated below 2000’ AGL. Can this be changed to match functionality of other Boeing models? Boeing is investigating a change to Flight Control Computer logic to make the TOGA function on 737 NG airplanes work as on the other Boeing models. Software will be available for lab testing in November 2000. After lab test, the software will be installed and tested on a flight test airplane. Pending the outcome of this testing, the change will be available concurrent with 737- 900 certification in early 2001. The updated FCC software will be available for retrofit through a Service Bulletin. There are no plans to implement this change in 737 “classic” airplanes at this time. Customers desiring this change in their “classic” fleets should make their request through the appropriate customer service organization. COMMUNICATIONS 8. Is Boeing looking at alternative Radio Tuning Panels (RTPs) which are capable of keypad entry of VHF frequency? Boeing is looking at keypad tuning; however, there are no firm commitments at this time. Customers are encouraged to make their desires for this type of equipment known through their Boeing representatives in the Sales and Fleet Support areas. ELECTRICAL 9. On NG aircraft (-700), our crews are reporting that the battery discharge light illuminates in flight during an APU start with AC buses powered. What part does the battery play in starting the APU by the AC power source? Will the APU start if the battery is low or dead in flight with all AC buses powered? The BAT DISCHARGE light should not illuminate during an in flight APU start with AC busses on line. With AC busses on line, the APU Electronic Control Unit (ECU) will use AC power to start the APU. The logic requirements for illuminating the BAT DISCHSARGE light is as follows: Boeing Flight Operations Symposium October 24 – October 26, 2000 Seattle, Washington 737 Caucus Summary Report 3 January 15, 2001 If battery current is: - greater than 5 amps for 95 seconds or, - greater than 10 amps for 25 seconds or, - greater than 100 amps for 1.2 seconds. Light will reset if current is below threshold for 1 second. The APU ECU uses battery power and will operate normally at battery levels as low as 16 volts. If the battery is severely depleted, it is conceivable that the APU would not start even though AC power is available. The APU Start Power Unit contains an AC-DC converter which converts AC power into DC power for APU starting. The APU start system defaults to DC power automatically if there is 1) No AC power available, 2) a failure of the AC-DC converter in the Start Power Unit, or 3) if the APU Start Converter circuit breaker is open. ENGINES/APU 10. What is the Boeing recommendation about adjusting thrust due to an engine overtemperature during takeoff? If an engine EGT overtemperature occurs on takeoff, the takeoff should be aborted in accordance with standard Rejected Takeoff Decision guidance found on page 2.38 of the Boeing 737 Flight Crew Training Manual. If the takeoff is continued, engine thrust should not be adjusted until the airplane reaches a safe altitude (minimum 400 feet) after takeoff. If engine thrust is adjusted during takeoff to reduce an overtemperature, takeoff performance can be impacted because amount of runway used to reach V1 is increased. If the takeoff is subsequently aborted at V1, the runway distance remaining to stop may be insufficient. If the takeoff is continued, first segment climb performance may not meet predicted values. FIRE PROTECTION 11. Why is there no “Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport” step in the ENGINE FIRE/OVERHEAT DETECTOR FAULT non-normal checklist? In developing this procedure, we determined that the probability of both loops failing (one loop failing if dispatching under the MEL) and an engine fire subsequently occurring to be very low. Consequently, certification standards do not require an immediate landing if this condition occurs. 12. The detection of an individual fire loop failure during an engine OVRHT/FIRE test is different on the classic and the NG (737-700). On the NG, is the “Fault” not a part of the OVHRT/FIRE test as it is on the classic? What indication will you get on the NG during an OVRHT/FIRE test if one loop is bad? What would be the indication on the classic? If both NG and classic systems were selected to the good loop, would the tests be normal? The 737 classic and 737 NG fire detection systems are basically the same. During a fire detection test, Master Caution, OVHT/DET, FAULT and APU DET INOP lights illuminate. If the FAULT light does not illuminate, one of the two detector loops is inoperative. Following Supplementary procedure SP.8.1, a single loop is selected and the test is repeated. Flight Deck indications of an inoperative loop are the same. Boeing Flight Operations Symposium October 24 – October 26, 2000 Seattle, Washington 737 Caucus Summary Report 4 January 15, 2001 13. Why are OXYGEN MASKS…, SMOKE GOGGLES… and CREW COMMUNICATIONS… “recall” steps in the ELECTRICAL SMOKE/FUMES OR FIRE checklist and “reference” steps in the AIR CONDITIONING SMOKE/FUMES checklist? The FAR Part 25 Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) procedure for Electrical Smoke specifies the above steps are Recall. The AFM does not include a procedure for Air Conditioning Smoke. When Boeing developed the Air Conditioning Smoke procedure, we did not specify these same steps as Recall. We are in the process of requesting the FAA change the 737 Electrical Smoke procedure steps of Oxygen Mask, Smoke Goggles and Communications from Recall to Reference. If approved, the 737 would be consistent with other Boeing models. FLIGHT CONTROLS 14. Flap placard limit speeds for the 737NG variants are different. Why does the operations manual description for the Flap Load Relief system only show one set of exceedance airspeed trigger values regardless of model variant? Although the flap placard limit speeds are different for each 737NG variant, the structural limit speed for the flaps is equal to the placard speeds (175k – F30, 162k – F40) for the heaviest variant (737-800/900). The Flap Load Relief trigger speeds (176k – F30, 163k – F40) are set to allow all variants to fly to the structural limit speed without system activation. Setting lower flap placard speeds for the –600 and –700 variants allows for greater service life of flap components due to the larger margins to the structural design speed. 15. If the RPR fails to transition to normal pressure during approach, should the flight crew continue the approach and is there sufficient rudder control to handle crosswind landings and/or engine failure conditions? Yes, Boeing recommends continuing to a landing. The Flight Controls system A low pressure light will come at 700 feet during the descent if this condition exists. On the 737-300/400/500, standby rudder automatically begins to operate. This action replaces system A pressure with standby system pressure and thereby returns hydraulic pressure to the rudder to normal levels. On the 737-100/200/200A, sufficient hydraulic pressure is available to maintain directional control during crosswinds or engine out during a go-around even if the RPR remains in low pressure. 16. Will Boeing provide a cockpit indication of Rudder Pressure Reducer (RPR) failure to transition to low flow at the appropriate altitude until the rudder enhancement kits become available? System certification safety requirements confirm that it is not necessary to provide flight deck annunciation of RPR or RPL failures to high pressure. Therefore, Boeing currently has no plans to change the annunciation configuration of the RPR or RPL . 17. After the 737 rudder enhancement is complete, will there be a requirement to increase block maneuvering speeds when dispatching with the RPR (rudder pressure reducer) inoperati ve for any of the 737 variants? Will there be a flight deck indication of RPL failure to transition to low flow after takeoff? Design features of the revised rudder system have not progressed enough to answer these questions. Information about the features of the rudder system and the effect on flight crew procedures will be provided in the future. Boeing Flight Operations Symposium October 24 – October 26, 2000 Seattle, Washington 737 Caucus Summary Report 5 January 15, 2001 18. Has Boeing looked at rudder failure service history for operations below 1000 feet? ETEB has stated that all Category I failures occur in this region, and Boeing has stipulated that the probability is low due to the limited exposure time. How will Boeing address this concern? Yes, Boeing has analyzed rudder system failure history for all phases of flight. The RPR does not and was not intended to change the hazard assessment for a full rudder input close to the ground. The scenario cited above is certified as being extremely improbable due to the extremely limited exposure window and is therefore considered safe. There are no design or procedure change options available with the current system that will eliminate this scenario. The rudder system enhancement will address this concern by eliminating the basic failure modes that can cause a full hinge moment hardover. 19. In the event of a return to land situation, there is no cockpit indication that the rudder has not transitioned from high flow to low flow. Why doesn't the requirement for higher maneuver speeds apply as when dispatching with the RPR inoperative which does require the higher block speeds? We concur that there is no indication if the RPR does not transfer from normal pressure to low pressure after takeoff. However, there is no reason to suspect that the RPR is not performing as designed in a return to land situation. Because of system design reliability an indication of this malfunction is not required. 20. ALPA noted that training for rudder upsets is not typically given and simulators do not model it. What is being done to upgrade simulator software packages to model a rudder hard-over, and also to upgrade the simulator hardware to allow for the required maximum effort rudder input? During 1999, Boeing made available updated 737-100 thru-500 simulator software with revised aerodynamic control laws. The revised s oftware incorporates changes determined during 737 RPR testing. Since the airplane can be upset for a variety of reasons and since the recovery technique is essentially the same regardless of the cause, we recommend that operators provide their crews with upset recovery training in accordance with the training aid that Boeing provided all operators. This training will prepare pilots to correctly respond to any upset event regardless of the cause. 21. During a flight control check, is there a structural implication to flight crews slamming the rudder stop-tostop? We recommend a smooth flight control motion (2 to 3 seconds) side to side during the flight control check, as opposed to slamming the rudder. System response to excessively rapid rudder pedal inputs could cause a momentary resistance to rudder operation due to rate capacity limitations within the system. A crew could mistake this normal system operation for a rudder system malfunction. FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS, DISPLAYS 22. Is AOA indication on PFD an option on the NG? Also comment from one operator that their R/A indication was located in the AOA indication position, and how will that be resolved? The AOA indication on the PFD is an option on the 737-NG. The AOA indication is located on the upper right corner of the PFD and replaces the Radar Altimeter indication which is normally in that location. The radar altitude indication then moves to the bottom center of the attitude indication on the PFD and is displayed as a digital number. Boeing Flight Operations Symposium October 24 – October 26, 2000 Seattle, Washington 737 Caucus Summary Report 6 January 15, 2001 23. A master change commitment for a CDS change only allows one month decision time. Can this be improved to give operators more time to study options? An additional month has recently been added to the process for acceptance/decision of CDS Master Changes. 24. Prior to engine start (-700 NG) a DEU failure would be indicated by a “CDS FAULT” but after engine start it would be indicated by a “DISPLAY SOURCE.” Why the change in name for identifying a DEU failure? Why doesn’t the name change occur at takeoff (air-ground sensor)? The nomenclature requirements for these annunciations were developed by Boeing Flight Deck Crew Operations engineers during the early design phase of the 737NG program. The intent of the design function is as follows: · The CDS FAULT message is intended to be activated on ground to tell the maintenance crew or air crew that the airplane is in a non-dispatchable condition. · The DISPLAY SOURCE message is annunciated in air to tell the crew that all the primary display information is from one source and should be compared with all other data sources (standby instruments, raw data, etc.) to validate its accuracy. Since the DISPLAY SOURCE message is intended to be activated in air and CDS FAULT is intended to be activated on ground, air/ground logic is used by CDS to determine which message is appropriate. The air/ground logic system uses a number of inputs to determine airplane state. One of the inputs used is “engines running”. CDS uses the “engines running” logic as the primary trigger for changing the CDS FAULT message to its in-air counterpart. The “engines running” logic is used in case the air/ground data isn't correct as a result of other air/ground sensing faults. FLIGHT MANAGEMENT, NAVIGATION 25. Flying a B737-700 between N. Norway and Spitzbergen (Sval bard) pos. Bear Island (N7430) at FL410 a message appeared in the scratchpad: “APP SPDS NOT SELECTED”. It appeared that the RNP had changed from 12 NM (oceanic) to 0.5 NM (approach). Why? This phenomena has been reported earlier. For some reason the FM C appears to have transitioned to the approach phase of flight. This should normally occur if: 1. The airplane descends below destination airport elevation plus 2000' or, 2. The active waypoint is an approach waypoint and the airplane is within 2 nm of it. Since the airplane was not below 2000', that leaves the approach waypoint as a possibility. There were some "on approach" logic problems in early versions of U10 FMC software which have been fixed. Boeing will continue to investigate any FMC anomalies reported through service engineering. A description of the flight plan, any edits, etc., etc., along with the FMC version should be included in these reports. 26. FMC update 10.3 has some options that are not basic. How can an airline receive some of these options? Operator must contact their customer Account Manager and initiate a Master Change process to purchase the desired options. Boeing Flight Operations Symposium October 24 – October 26, 2000 Seattle, Washington 737 Caucus Summary Report 7 January 15, 2001 27. Can the subject of FMC memory upgrade costs be worked with the vendors? If the currently installed FMC is U5, there are two ways to increase navigation database memory: 1. Purchase new 4MCU hardware from Smiths Industries. With the current 10.3 software, 2.5 meg words of navigation database storage are allocated. 2. Purchase additional memory boards from Smiths Industries for installation in existing U5 FMCs. Note that these parts are out of production, but Smiths may have some stock on hand. In either case, pricing is between the airline and Smiths Industries, Boeing is not involved. FUEL 28. Why are minimum fuel requirement different on the 737 NG, compared to the “classic”? An operator has stated that this is extra trip fuel that they do not believe they need to carry. For fuel planning they use an average of 800 kg more in reserve fuel on the NG as compared to the 300 so they do not get near the minimum fuel required limitation. Minimum fuel quantity requirements are set by regulatory authorities and vary somewhat from country to country. In general, 30 minutes of reserve fuel is the absolute minimum under most rules. There is no AFM "minimum fuel requirement" for either 737 variant. However, each variant does have a "Low Fuel Quantity" procedure in the AFM. The fuel quantity used to "trigger" the use of this procedure is established during type certification of a specific variant and is based on certification standards in effect at the time of certification. The differences in low fuel quantity values between the 737 "classic" and 737 NG variants are a result of this process. 29. On a 737 “classic”, if using fuel from center tank at takeoff and an engine failure occurs, a fuel imbalance will occur during climb because the center tank pump on the operating engine side will not be powered (until APU generator is online). Why not power the “L” center tank pump from Gen 1 Bus and “R” center tank pump from Gen 2 Bus? These design decisions were made during the original design of the 737. Although we do not have access to all the original design criteria, the most probable reasons for this pump architecture are a combination of electrical load distribution requirements and a requirement to protect the integrity of the fuel system from the effects of other airplane system failures. HYDRAULICS LANDING GEAR 30. Please explain proper use of brake cooling chart on NNC page PI 30.37. Brake cooling schedule table states that total energy is the sum of residual energy and energy of previous landing. For short runways and short legs in between, how is residual energy calculated? Residual brake energy cannot be determined from the tables in the QRH Performance Inflight section. Boeing Engineering would have to do a detailed analysis of an operator's routes and projected turn around times to get this information. The tables in the QRH are advisory information for determining required cooling times following a single landing. No wait is required as long as the landing weight is below the Quick Turn Around Limit Weight which can be determined by the table in Vol. 1 of the Operations Manual, Performance Dispatch section. 31. The “Advisory Information” Brake Cooling Schedule in the 737-300 QRH does not take the use of reverse thrust into account. Is Boeing planning to revise these tables to include reverse thrust data as in the 737 NG? Boeing Flight Operations Symposium October 24 – October 26, 2000 Seattle, Washington 737 Caucus Summary Report 8 January 15, 2001 The reverse thrust information is available now in the Flight Planning and Performance Manual. This information will be added to the 737 classic QRH Performance Inflight section in a future revision. WARNING SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE 32. How is wet T/O data in the QRH used? Wet runway data was a part of the certification basis of the 737 next generation airplanes. Consequently the data is available in the QRH in the Performance Inflight section and Operations Manual Vol. 1 Performance Dispatch section. Wet Takeoff weight limits are obtained from the Dispatch section of Vol. 1. Using that weight, Wet Takeoff speeds are obtained using the tables in the QRH. Wet runway data was not part of the certification basis of the 737 classic airplanes. Consequently the data does not exist. The FAA does not require wet runway corrections for the classic airplanes. However to help those operators that operate under regulatory agencies that do require wet runway corrections, Advisory Information is provided in the QRH in the Performance Inflight section. Using the Tables in the QRH, Field Limit Weight is determined using reported braking action. An adjustment to the dry V1 speed is then determined using the Wet Field Limit Weight. 33. What is “Maximum Design Speed”? For the B737-700 the Maintenance Manual says it is when the overspeed clacker goes off. 20 knots over this speed requires an inspection. Should a crew write up an overspeed if the clacker is activated? Will a BITE test reveal this overspeed? “Maximum Design Speed” from the flight crew perspective is the appropriate “Placard Speed” for the current airplane configuration. A logbook write up is required any time the airplane exceeds this speed. Maintenance inspection limits are predicated on limit speeds that may be different than the operational limit speeds used by flight crews. Clacker activation is caused by exceeding one of these speeds (Vmo/Mmo) and should be written up accordingly. There are various operational data recording systems available on Boeing airplanes. Most of these systems will record overspeeds for retrieval by maintenance. 34. Some pilots are reluctant to accept airplanes with A/S inop. What is Boeing doing to provide better guidance on antiskid inop? Procedures and techniques? Boeing will review all current anti-skid inoperative procedural documentation for adequacy of content. Anti-skid inoperative procedures are in the 737 Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). We currently refer to the AFM procedures rather than including the actual procedures in the Dispatch Deviations Procedures Guide (DDPG) as is done in other Boeing model’s DDPGs. The 737 DDPG may be revised to include more procedural details. 35. Question regarding the fact that CAA/JAA approval basis is not provided in the OM performance data. Normally, regulatory agency approval basis is provided on the first page of the PI and PD sections right under the shaded title block. A typical example would be: 737-600 CFM56-3 22K KG FAA JAR. If that information has been inadvertently deleted on some operators manuals, it will re-instated in a future revision. Boeing Flight Operations Symposium October 24 – October 26, 2000 Seattle, Washington 737 Caucus Summary Report 9 January 15, 2001 36. An operator asks, “Why is there no PMC OFF performance data in the 737-300 QRH? During conversion to the new format Operations Manual, PMC OFF data was inadvertently omitted from the QRH. It will re-appear in the next revision in Spring of 2001. 37. An operator asks, “Is takeoff analysis data for landing gear extended available? For "classic" 737 airplanes, gear down dispatch was not certified and can only be done as a ferry flight. Boeing Flight Operations Engineering will provide data on a case-by-case basis. For 737NG airplanes, gear down dispatch is certified and available if operator has purchased the appropriate AFM appendix. PROCEDURES 38. The AIRSPEED UNRELIABLE non-normal checklist advises the pilot that, “Attitude and thrust information is provided in the Performance-Inflight section.” The chart is this section is titled, “Flight with Unreliable Airspeed…” Why is the chart named differently than the procedure? The original title for this checklist and supporting performance was "Flight with Unreliable Airspeed." The procedure title was changed to accommodate EICAS airplanes but the PI title was never changed. We will evaluate the feasibility of changing the PI title in a future operations manual revision. 39. Are there plans to update the MD80 and MD90 checklists using the same commonality philosophy as John Creighton is adopting for the 7-series? There are currently no plans to update the MD80 & MD90 procedures to make them more common with the Boeing Seattle models. 40. Master Caution System - What will be the changes in usage due to modified checklists (John Creighton’s efforts)? Is this a major change in philosophy in use of the system in flight? How would dispatching the airplane with MCS inoperative be impacted? The Master Caution Sy stem will be used to help verify that airplane systems are in the correct configuration for engine start. This is a change in the extent to which the Master Caution System is used in the pre-flight phase of flight but not an overall change in philosophy. We do not anticipate any impact on dispatching the airplane with the MCS inoperative. 41. Will there be a separate approach and descent checklist? There will now only be an Approach Checklist, which is consistent with other Boeing models. There will be separate Descent and Approach Procedures, which is also consistent with the other models. 42. Comment on adopting the checklists in which airlines typically don’t have the option to not utilize the new checklists due to regulatory agency requirements. Will the FAA require airlines to adopt these procedures? The intent is to make these new procedures and checklist’s available to those operators that want to use them. The old procedures and checklists will remain for those operators that wish to continue using them. Boeing is still going through an internal review of the new procedures. When that review is complete, the new procedures will be presented to the FAA for their approval. The current procedures have already been approved by the FAA. Consequently, Boeing Flight Operations Symposium October 24 – October 26, 2000 Seattle, Washington 737 Caucus Summary Report 10 January 15, 2001 there should not be a problem with other regulatory agency’s continuing to accept the current procedures. 43. Can labels for gear up, flaps 15, single engine and the regulatory basis be added to PI and PD charts/tables such as go around climb gradients, landing climb, etc. to make them more specific for the benefit of the flight crews? The figures and tables in the Flight Planning and Performance Manual have the exact configuration spelled out. Boeing will investigate the feasibility of including similar configuration and regulatory information in the tables in the QRH Performance Inflight section and Operations Manual Vol. 1 Dispatch section, in the next Operations Manual revision. 44. For operations manual revision cycle, could a draft be sent out to operators first? Due to the number of revisions (manuals) currently handled by the Boeing Technical Publications group, this is not possible except for those operators with a Plan II customized manual. 45. Why is the nomenclature of Engine Ignition and Air Conditioning Pack switch positions in QRH steps different that the nomenclature shown in the OM? Numerous switch position nomenclatures have evolved over the life of the 737 fleet. For example, older 737-200s have ignition switch positions named GRD, OFF, LOW IGN and FLT while newer 737s use GRD, OFF, CONT and FLT. QRH nomenclature for the 737 is designed to be generic for operators with mixed fleets consisting of old and new versions of the 737. 46. In the 737 INFLIGHT ENGINGE START non-normal checklist, there is a note that says, “Position engine start lever to IDLE detent at a minimum of 15% N2 (11% on NG).” Why is this note located below the step it references rather than above? Boeing non-normal checklist use philosophy is detailed in QRH Chapter CI. Pilots are expected to read checklist reference items, including the response or action and notes/information items before completing checklist steps. In this specific case, we would expect the pilot not flying to read the 15% N2 note before the pilot flying completes the start lever step. The pilot flying "….should acknowledge that the items were heard and understood." MISCELLANEOUS 47. SAS asking about 737NG noise on flight deck. Pilots are reporting ringing in the ears, etc. Is there any plan to study this and look at this issue? Using the flight deck noise levels measured by Boeing Noise Engineering during a typical flight profile (entire flight), a daily A-weighted sound exposure was calculated using ISO/DIS 1999 standards. This calculation indicates the time weight noise exposure is below 80 db(A) and should not cause hearing damage. Flight deck noise improvement continues to be a part of current Boeing product quality improvement activities. Boeing Flight Operations Symposium October 24 – October 26, 2000 Seattle, Washington 737 Caucus Summary Report 11 January 15, 2001 Results of Airline Caucus Report 10/25/00 First Priority (By show of hands) No RPR fail light on takeoff. 3 RPR fail light on landing 3 Procedural AD proposal 5 Standardized Maint Protocol 0 Ground to 1000 feet controllability Numerous Second priority RPR fail light on takeoff Third priority Procedural AD Fourth Priority Standardized Maint Protocol Fifth Priority RPR Light on Landing

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Boeing Flight Operations Symposium