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3.1_Helicopter approaches may be developed for
heliports that do not meet the design standards for an
IFR heliport. The majority of IFR approaches to VFR
heliports are developed in support of helicopter
emergency medical services (HEMS) operators.
These approaches can be developed from conventional NAVAIDs or a RNAV system (including GPS).
They are developed either as a Special Approach
(pilot training is required for special procedures due
to their unique characteristics) or a public approach
(no special training required). These instrument
procedures are developed as either an approach
designed to a specific landing site, or an approach
designed to a point-in-space.
3.1.1_Approach to a specific landing site. The
approach is aligned to a missed approach point from
which a landing can be accomplished with a
maximum course change of 30 degrees. The visual
segment from the MAP to the landing site is evaluated
for obstacle hazards. These procedures are annotated:
_PROCEED VISUALLY FROM (NAMED MAP)
OR CONDUCT THE SPECIFIED MISSED
APPROACH."
3.1.1.1_This phrase requires the pilot to either
acquire and maintain visual contact with the landing
site at or prior to the MAP, or execute a missed
approach. The visibility minimum is based on the
distance from the MAP to the landing site, among
other factors.
3.1.1.2_The pilot is required to maintain the
published minimum visibility throughout the visual
segment.
3.1.1.3_Similar to an approach to a runway, the
missed approach segment protection is not provided
between the MAP and the landing site, and obstacle
or terrain avoidance from the MAP to the landing site
is the responsibility of the pilot.
3.1.1.4_Upon reaching the MAP defined on the
approach procedure, or as soon as practicable after
reaching the MAP, the pilot advises ATC whether
proceeding visually and canceling IFR or complying
with the missed approach instructions. See
Section_ENR 1.10, paragraph_11.2, Canceling IFR
Flight Plan.
3.1.2_Approach to a Point-in-Space (PinS). At
locations where the MAP is located more than 2 SM
from the landing site, or the path from the MAP to the
landing site is populated with obstructions which
require avoidance actions or requires turns greater
than 30 degrees, a PinS procedure may be developed.
These approaches are annotated _PROCEED VFR
FROM (NAMED MAP) OR CONDUCT THE
SPECIFIED MISSED APPROACH."
3.1.2.1_These procedures require the pilot, at or prior
to the MAP, to determine if the published minimum
visibility, or the weather minimums required by the
operating rule, or operations specifications (whichever is higher) is available to safely transition from
IFR to VFR flight. If not, the pilot must execute a
missed approach. For Part 135 operations, pilots may
not begin the instrument approach unless the latest
weather report indicates that the weather conditions
are at or above the authorized IFR minimums or the
VFR weather minimums (as required by the class of
airspace, operating rule and/or Operations Specifications) whichever is higher.
3.1.2.2_Visual contact with the landing site is not
required; however, the pilot must maintain the
appropriate VFR weather minimums throughout the
visual segment. The visibility is limited to no lower
than that published in the procedure, until canceling
IFR.
3.1.2.3_IFR obstruction clearance areas are not
applied to the VFR segment between the MAP and
the landing site. Obstacle or terrain avoidance from
the MAP to the landing site is the responsibility of the
pilot.
3.1.2.4_Upon reaching the MAP defined on the
approach procedure, or as soon as practicable after
reaching the MAP, the pilot advises ATC whether
proceeding VFR and canceling IFR, or complying
with the missed approach instructions. See
Section_ENR 1.10, paragraph_11.2, Canceling IFR
Flight Plan.
3.1.2.5_If the visual segment penetrates Class B, C,
or D airspace, pilots are responsible for obtaining a
Special VFR clearance, when required.
AIP ENR 6.1-6
United States of America 15 MAR 07
Federal Aviation Administration
Nineteenth Edition
4. The Gulf of Mexico Grid System
4.1_On October 8, 1998, the Southwest Region of the
FAA, with assistance from the Helicopter Safety
Advisory Conference (HSAC), implemented the
world’s first Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) Grid
System in the Gulf of Mexico. This navigational route
structure is completely independent of ground-based
navigation aids (NAVAIDs) and was designed to
facilitate helicopter IFR operations to offshore
destinations. The Grid System is defined by over
300_offshore waypoints located 20 minutes apart
(latitude and longitude). Flight plan routes are
routinely defined by just 4 segments; departure point
(lat/long), first en route grid waypoint, last en route
grid waypoint prior to approach procedure, and
destination point (lat/long). There are over
4,000_possible offshore landing sites. Upon reaching
the waypoint prior to the destination, the pilot may
execute an Offshore Standard Approach Procedure
(OSAP), a Helicopter En Route Descent Areas
(HEDA) approach, or an Airborne Radar Approach
(ARA). For more information on these helicopter
instrument procedures, refer to FAA AC 90-80B,
Approval of Offshore Standard Approach Procedures, Airborne Radar Approaches, and Helicopter
En Route Descent Areas, on the FAA web site
http://www.faa.gov under Advisory Circulars. The
return flight plan is just the reverse with the requested
stand-alone GPS approach contained in the remarks
section.
4.2_The large number (over 300) of waypoints in the
grid system makes it difficult to assign phonetically
pronounceable names to the waypoints that would be
meaningful to pilots and controllers. A unique
naming system was adopted that enables pilots and
controllers to derive the fix position from the name.
The five-letter names are derived as follows:
4.2.1_The waypoints are divided into sets of 3
columns each. A three-letter identifier, identifying a
geographical area or a NAVAID to the north,
represents each set.
4.2.2_Each column in a set is named after its position,
i.e., left (L), center (C), and right (R).
4.2.3_The rows of the grid are named alphabetically
from north to south, starting with A for the northern
most row.
EXAMPLE-
LCHRC would be pronounced _Lake Charles Romeo
Charlie." The waypoint is in the right-hand column of the
Lake Charles VOR set, in row C (third south from the
northern most row).
4.3_Since the grid system’s implementation, IFR
delays (frequently over 1 hour in length) for
operations in this environment have been effectively
eliminated. The comfort level of the pilots, knowing
that they will be given a clearance quickly, plus the
mileage savings in this near free-flight environment,
is allowing the operators to carry less fuel. Less fuel
means they can transport additional passengers,
which is a substantial fiscal and operational benefit,
considering the limited seating on board helicopters.
4.4_There are 3 requirements for operators to meet
before filing IFR flight plans utilizing the grid:
4.4.1_The helicopter must be IFR certified and
equipped with IFR certified TSO-C-129 GPS
navigational units.
4.4.2_The operator must obtain prior written
approval from the appropriate Flight Standards
District Office through a Certificate of Authorization
or revision to their Operations Specifications, as
appropriate.
4.4.3_The operator must be a signatory to the
Houston ARTCC Letter of Agreement.
4.5_FAA/NACO publishes the grid system waypoints on the IFR Gulf of Mexico Vertical Flight
Reference Chart. A commercial equivalent is also
available. The chart is updated annually and is
available from a FAA chart agent or FAA directly,
website address: http://naco.faa.gov.
AIP ENR 6.2-1
United States of America 15 MAR 07
Federal Aviation Administration Nineteenth Edition
ENR 6.2 Special Operations
1. Offshore Helicopter Operations
1.1_Introduction
1.1.1_The offshore environment offers unique
applications and challenges for helicopter pilots. The
mission demands, the nature of oil and gas
exploration and production facilities, and the flight
environment (weather, terrain, obstacles, traffic),
demand special practices, techniques and procedures
not found in other flight operations. Several industry
organizations have risen to the task of reducing risks
in offshore operations, including the Helicopter
Safety Advisory Conference (HSAC)
(http://www.hsac.org), and the Offshore Committee
of the Helicopter Association International (HAI)
(http://www.rotor.com). The following recommended practices for offshore helicopter operations
are based on guidance developed by HSAC for use in
the Gulf of Mexico, and provided here with their
permission. While not regulatory, these recommended practices provide aviation and oil and gas
industry operators with useful information in
developing procedures to avoid certain hazards of
offshore helicopter operations.
NOTE-
Like all aviation practices, these recommended practices
are under constant review. Any questions or feedback
concerning these recommended procedures may be
directed to the HSAC through the feedback feature of the
HSAC web site (http://www.hsac.org).
1.2_Passenger Management on and about
Heliport Facilities
1.2.1_Background._Several incidents involving
offshore helicopter passengers have highlighted the
potential for incidents and accidents on and about the
heliport area. The following practices will minimize
risks to passengers and others involved in heliport
operations.
1.2.2_Recommended Practices
1.2.2.1_Heliport facilities should have a designated
and posted passenger waiting area which is clear of
the heliport, heliport access points, and stairways.
1.2.2.2_Arriving passengers and cargo should be
unloaded and cleared from the heliport and access
route prior to loading departing passengers and cargo.
1.2.2.3_Where a flight crew consists of more than one
pilot, one crewmember should supervise the
unloading/loading process from outside the aircraft.
1.2.2.4_Where practical, a designated facility
employee should assist with loading/unloading, etc.
1.3_Crane-Helicopter Operational Procedures
1.3.1_Background._Historical experience has
shown that catastrophic consequences can occur
when industry safe practices for crane/helicopter
operations are not observed. The following recommended practices are designed to minimize risks
during crane and helicopter operations.
1.3.2_Recommended Practices
1.3.2.1_Personnel awareness
a)_Crane operators and pilots should develop a
mutual understanding and respect of the others’
operational limitations and cooperate in the spirit of
safety;
b)_Pilots need to be aware that crane operators
sometimes cannot release the load to cradle the crane
boom, such as when attached to wire line lubricators
or supporting diving bells; and
c)_Crane operators need to be aware that
helicopters require warm up before takeoff, a
two-minute cool down before shutdown, and cannot
circle for extended lengths of time because of fuel
consumption.
1.3.2.2_It is recommended that when helicopters are
approaching, maneuvering, taking off, or running on
the heliport, cranes be shutdown and the operator
leave the cab. Cranes not in use shall have their booms
cradled, if feasible. If in use, the crane’s boom(s) are
to be pointed away from the heliport and the crane
shutdown for helicopter operations.
1.3.2.3_Pilots will not approach, land on, takeoff, or
have rotor blades turning on heliports of structures
not complying with the above practice.
AIP ENR 6.2-2
United States of America 15 MAR 07
Federal Aviation Administration
Nineteenth Edition
1.3.2.4_It is recommended that cranes on offshore
platforms, rigs, vessels, or any other facility, which
could interfere with helicopter operations (including
approach/departure paths):
a)_Be equipped with a red rotating beacon or red
high intensity strobe light connected to the system
powering the crane, indicating the crane is under
power;
b)_Be designed to allow the operator a maximum
view of the helideck area and should be equipped with
wide-angle mirrors to eliminate blind spots; and
c)_Have their boom tips, headache balls, and hooks
painted with high visibility international orange.
1.4_Helicopter/Tanker Operations
1.4.1_Background._The interface of helicopters and
tankers during shipboard helicopter operations is
complex and may be hazardous unless appropriate
procedures are coordinated among all parties. The
following recommended practices are designed to
minimize risks during helicopter/tanker operations.
1.4.2_Recommended Practices
1.4.2.6_Management, flight operations personnel,
and pilots should be familiar with and apply the
operating safety standards set forth in _Guide to
Helicopter/Ship Operations", International Chamber
of Shipping, Third Edition, 5-89 (as amended),
establishing operational guidelines/standards and
safe practices sufficient to safeguard helicopter/tanker operations.
1.4.2.7_Appropriate plans, approvals, and communications must be accomplished prior to reaching the
vessel, allowing tanker crews sufficient time to
perform required safety preparations and position
crew members to receive or dispatch a helicopter
safely.
1.4.2.8_Appropriate approvals and direct communications with the bridge of the tanker must be
maintained throughout all helicopter/tanker operations.
1.4.2.9_Helicopter/tanker operations, including
landings/departures, shall not be conducted until the
helicopter pilot-in-command has received and
acknowledged permission from the bridge of the
tanker.
1.4.2.10_Helicopter/tanker operations shall not be
conducted during product/cargo transfer.
1.4.2.11_Generally, permission will not be granted to
land on tankers during mooring operations or while
maneuvering alongside another tanker.
1.5_Helideck/Heliport Operational Hazard
Warning(s) Procedures
1.5.1_Background
1.5.1.1_A number of operational hazards can develop
on or near offshore helidecks or onshore heliports that
can be minimized through procedures for proper
notification or visual warning to pilots. Examples of
hazards include but are not limited to:
a)_Perforating operations:_subparagraph_1.6.
b)_H2S gas presence:_subparagraph 1.7.
c)_Gas venting:_subparagraph 1.8; or,
d)_Closed helidecks or heliports:_subparagraph_1.9 (unspecified cause).
1.5.1.2_These and other operational hazards are
currently minimized through timely dissemination of
a written Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) for pilots by
helicopter companies and operators. A NOTAM
provides a written description of the hazard, time and
duration of occurrence, and other pertinent information. ANY POTENTIAL HAZARD should be
communicated to helicopter operators or company
aviation departments as early as possible to allow the
NOTAM to be activated.
1.5.1.3_To supplement the existing NOTAM procedure and further assist in reducing these hazards, a
standardized visual signal(s) on the helideck/heliport
will provide a positive indication to an approaching
helicopter of the status of the landing area.
Recommended Practice(s) have been developed to
reinforce the NOTAM procedures and standardize
visual signals.
AIP ENR 6.2-3
United States of America 15 MAR 07
Federal Aviation Administration Nineteenth Edition
1.6_Drilling Rig Perforating Operations:
Helideck/Heliport Operational Hazard
Warning(s)/Procedure(s)
1.6.1_Background._A critical step in the oil well
completion process is perforation, which involves the
use of explosive charges in the drill pipe to open the
pipe to oil or gas deposits. Explosive charges used in
conjunction with perforation operations offshore can
potentially be prematurely detonated by radio
transmissions, including those from helicopters. The
following practices are recommended.
1.6.2_Recommended Practices
1.6.2.1_Personnel Conducting Perforating
Operations._Whenever perforating operations are
scheduled and operators are concerned that radio
transmissions from helicopters in the vicinity may
jeopardize the operation, personnel conducting
perforating operations should take the following
precautionary measures:
a)_Notify company aviation departments, helicopter operators or bases, and nearby manned platforms
of the pending perforation operation so the Notice to
Airmen (NOTAM) system can be activated for the
perforation operation and the temporary helideck
closure.
b)_Close the deck and make the radio warning
clearly visible to passing pilots, install a temporary
marking (described in subparagraph_1.9.1.2 with the
words _NO RADIO" stenciled in red on the legs of
the diagonals. The letters should be 24 inches high
and 12 inches wide. (See FIG ENR 6.2-1.)
c)_The marker should be installed during the time
that charges may be affected by radio transmissions.
1.6.2.2_Pilots
a)_Pilots when operating within 1,000 feet of a
known perforation operation or observing the white
X with red _NO RADIO" warning indicating
perforation operations are underway will avoid radio
transmissions from or near the helideck (within
1,000_feet) and will not land on the deck if the X is
present. In addition to communications radios, radio
transmissions are also emitted by aircraft radar,
transponders, radar altimeters, and DME equipment,
and ELTs.
b)_Whenever possible, make radio calls to the
platform being approached or to the Flight Following
Communications Center at least one mile out on
approach. Ensure all communications are complete
outside the 1,000 foot hazard distance. If no response
is received, or if the platform is not radio equipped,
further radio transmissions should not be made until
visual contact with the deck indicates it is open for
operation (no white _X").
FIG ENR 6.2-1
Closed Helideck Marking - No Radio
AIP ENR 6.2-4
United States of America 15 MAR 07
Federal Aviation Administration
Nineteenth Edition
1.7_Hydrogen Sulfide Gas Helideck/Heliport
Operational Hazard Warning(s)/Procedures
1.7.1_Background._Hydrogen sulfide (H2S) gas:
Hydrogen sulfide gas in higher concentrations
(300-500 ppm) can cause loss of consciousness
within a few seconds and presents a hazard to pilots
on/near offshore helidecks. When operating in
offshore areas that have been identified to have
concentrations of hydrogen sulfide gas, the following
practices are recommended.
1.7.2_Recommended Practices
1.7.2.1_Pilots
a)_Ensure approved protective air packs are
available for emergency use by the crew on the
helicopter.
b)_If shutdown on a helideck, request the
supervisor in charge provide a briefing on location of
protective equipment and safety procedures.
c)_If while flying near a helideck and the visual red
beacon alarm is observed or an unusually strong odor
of _rotten eggs" is detected, immediately don the
protective air pack, exit to an area upwind, and notify
the suspected source field of the hazard.
1.7.2.2_Oil Field Supervisors
a)_If presence of hydrogen sulfide is detected, a red
rotating beacon or red high intensity strobe light
adjacent to the primary helideck stairwell or wind
indicator on the structure should be turned on to
provide visual warning of hazard. If the beacon is to
be located near the stairwell, the State of Louisiana
_Offshore Heliport Design Guide" and FAA
Advisory Circular AC 150/5390-2A, _Heliport
Design Guide," should be reviewed to ensure proper
clearance on the helideck.
b)_Notify nearby helicopter operators and bases of
the hazard and advise when hazard is cleared.
c)_Provide a safety briefing to include location of
protective equipment to all arriving personnel.
d)_Wind socks or indicator should be clearly
visible to provide upwind indication for the pilot.
1.8_Gas Venting Helideck/Heliport Operational
Hazard Warning(s)/Procedures - Operations
Near Gas Vent Booms
1.8.1_Background._Ignited flare booms can release
a large volume of natural gas and create a hot fire and
intense heat with little time for the pilot to react.
Likewise, unignited gas vents can release reasonably
large volumes of methane gas under certain
conditions. Thus, operations conducted very near
unignited gas vents require precautions to prevent
inadvertent ingestion of combustible gases by the
helicopter engine(s). The following practices are
recommended.
1.8.2_Pilots
1.8.2.1_Gas will drift upwards and downwind of the
vent. Plan the approach and takeoff to observe and
avoid the area downwind of the vent, remaining as far
away as practicable from the open end of the vent
boom.
1.8.2.2_Do not attempt to start or land on an offshore
helideck when the deck is downwind of a gas vent
unless properly trained personnel verify conditions
are safe.
1.8.3_Oil Field Supervisors
1.8.3.1_During venting of large amounts of unignited
raw gas, a red rotating beacon or red high intensity
strobe light adjacent to the primary helideck stairwell
or wind indicator should be turned on to provide
visible warning of hazard. If the beacon is to be
located near the stairwell, the State of Louisiana
_Offshore Heliport Design Guide" and FAA
Advisory Circular AC 150/ 5390-2A, Heliport
Design Guide, should be reviewed to ensure proper
clearance from the helideck.
1.8.3.2_Notify nearby helicopter operators and bases
of the hazard for planned operations.
1.8.3.3_Wind socks or indicator should be clearly
visible to provide upward indication for the pilot.
1.9_Helideck/Heliport Operational Warning(s)/
Procedure(s) - Closed Helidecks or Heliports
1.9.1_Background._A white _X" marked diagonally from corner to corner across a helideck or heliport
touchdown area is the universally accepted visual
indicator that the landing area is closed for safety of
other reasons and that helicopter operations are not
permitted. The following practices are recommended.
AIP ENR 6.2-5
United States of America 15 MAR 07
Federal Aviation Administration Nineteenth Edition
1.9.1.1_Permanent Closing._If a helideck or
heliport is to be permanently closed, X diagonals of
the same size and location as indicated above should
be used, but the markings should be painted on the
landing area.
NOTE-
White Decks: If a helideck is painted white, then
international orange or yellow markings can be used for
the temporary or permanent diagonals.
1.9.1.2_Temporary Closing._A temporary marker
can be used for hazards of an interim nature. This
marker could be made from vinyl or other durable
material in the shape of a diagonal _X." The marker
should be white with legs at least 20 feet long and
3_feet in width. This marker is designed to be quickly
secured and removed from the deck using grommets
and rope ties. The duration, time, location, and nature
of these temporary closings should be provided to and
coordinated with company aviation departments,
nearby helicopter bases, and helicopter operators
supporting the area. These markers MUST be
removed when the hazard no longer exists. (See
FIG ENR 6.2-2.)
1.10_Offshore (VFR) Operating Altitudes for
Helicopters
1.10.1_Background._Mid-air collisions constitute a
significant percentage of total fatal offshore helicopter accidents. A method of reducing this risk is the use
of coordinated VFR cruising altitudes. To enhance
safety through standardized vertical separation of
helicopters when flying in the offshore environment,
it is recommended that helicopter operators flying in
a particular area establish a cooperatively developed
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for VFR operating altitudes. An example of such an SOP is
contained in this example.
1.10.2_Recommended Practice Example
1.10.2.1_Field Operations._Without compromising
minimum safe operating altitudes, helicopters working within an offshore field _constituting a cluster"
should use altitudes not to exceed 500 feet.
1.10.2.2_En Route Operations
a)_Helicopters operating below 750’ AGL should
avoid transitioning through offshore fields.
b)_Helicopters en route to and from offshore
locations, below 3,000 feet, weather permitting,
should use en route altitudes as outlined in
TBL ENR 6.2-1.
TBL ENR 6.2-1
Magnetic Heading Altitude
0_ to 179_ 750’
1750’
2750’
180_ 359_ 1250’
2250’
c)_Area Agreements._See HSAC Area Agreement Maps for operating procedures for onshore high
density traffic locations.
NOTE-
Pilots of helicopters operating VFR above 3,000 feet above
the surface should refer to the current Federal Aviation
Regulations (14 CFR Part 91), and Section_ENR 1.4,
Paragraph_1.7, Basic VFR Weather Minimums, of the AIP.
FIG ENR 6.2-2
Closed Helideck Marking
AIP ENR 6.2-6
United States of America 15 MAR 07
Federal Aviation Administration
Nineteenth Edition
d)_Landing Lights._Aircraft landing lights
should be on to enhance aircraft identification:
1)_During takeoff and landings;
2)_In congested helicopter or fixed wing traffic
areas;
3)_During reduced visibility; or,
4)_Anytime safety could be enhanced.
1.11_Offshore Helidecks/Landing
Communications
1.11.1_Background._To enhance safety, and provide appropriate time to prepare for helicopter
operations, the following is recommended when
anticipating a landing on an offshore helideck. |
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