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Packaging,
1 H( T. x# P g, q) FHandling,
7 z1 O# |5 y7 }( LStorage, and
( n( d- j; _! A. D$ G; x3 oTransportation
2 P8 g' j! S( d" D(PHS&T)
, n' Y7 K# X/ Y1 I, P, f0 b6 ~The resources, processes, procedures, design considerations, and methods to d. m! c/ w0 \+ h$ t
ensure that all system, equipment, and support items are preserved, packaged,* A. z' U' M7 p! d
handled, and transported properly, including environmental considerations,. x5 X1 C5 Q/ l6 O+ a5 a+ n% r
equipment preservation requirements for short- and long-term storage, and
+ O* ?, y4 D; n# atransportability.- B) a- U/ R6 n
Packet Switching0 f, P; t5 _, f5 F: b) a
(PSW)
" M' t& U$ A+ [6 L5 `A data transmission process, utilizing addressed packets, whereby a channel is
, k4 D6 X, w7 qoccupied only for the duration of transmission of the packet. In certain data# c% ?+ j( h6 Y
communication networks the data may be formatted into a packet or divided and
. M( P/ M1 ^! w' s% [then formatted into a number of packets (either by the data terminal equipment4 T, a5 x3 b0 s2 R5 c- u
or by equipment within the network) for transmission and multiplexing purposes.
& @! a* i: _+ P ~" M; ?2 T' |/ |* FPACOM U.S. Pacific Command.
6 \! y) Q- R! W& V, @+ WPACOSS Passive and Active Controls of Space Structures.! S7 W. s/ H5 b% s: t% ^# ^+ l
PADIL Patriot Data & Information Link.
" E/ }# P9 l Y0 _1 T6 j1 j4 v/ a3 ^MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 P2 U1 B$ Z, }( x: |; I
218
- y! P. ^" @# j+ B- APAFB Patterson Air Force Base.
2 N3 H7 V0 G7 ~" V9 N* dPAL Permissive Action Link.
4 `% J' E- A* |% _9 f( b5 JPALS Protection Against Limited Strikes (SDIO term).
9 I: o: f$ V" S3 @8 K7 pPAM Pulse Amplitude Modulation.* O6 u' J2 b- D0 t+ l6 V
PAN Polyacrylonatrile [carbon fiber].% I M: z! |9 _: `- E: e
Pancake Altitude Altitude at which the trailing edge of a chaff puff/cloud effectively catches up to
1 `+ X; C# j1 athe leading edge because of atmospheric slowdown." G" B" ?: _8 ?* [) |2 [
PAP Predicted Aim Point." v1 G1 Z' Y% J- E, t& A1 \
PAR (1) Phased-Array Radar.
. b. {' }, Z2 f4 R(2) Perimeter Acquisition Radar. (See Phased Array.)
$ f" U# S3 c, g# K9 c- p4 O% q(3) Preprocessing Analysis Report.$ M( u. g! b1 o2 V4 K. b
(4) Program Assessment Report.
" D6 Q! I6 q4 m# c(5) Pulse Acquisition Radar.. S$ y9 Y+ N! ~
Parallel% U; f5 b0 f- @% J; Q
Processing% k! f) V' ~8 X
In parallel processing multiple processors (CPUs) divide up a large task into
- W& S- ^1 `/ k. f' S, q# R. asmaller ones and each CPU acts on the subdivided task simultaneously so that
0 b7 R- D# ^2 Z! S- N9 P ?much higher effective processing speeds can be attained.
9 z8 y1 T' n- M [- u7 }Parametric Cost
, a0 d# C5 r1 j' S! h+ TEstimate7 K1 `( m% `% \. H1 Q! s) y
A cost estimating methodology using statistical relationships between historical% ? j( [$ v9 f3 W. |
costs and other program variables such as system physical or performance1 `) q( t: g- V" X8 D* R% A
characteristics, contractor output measures, manpower loading, etc. Also" D+ W5 O X6 z3 g# ~
referred to as a top-down approach.0 H. u) ]5 `, Y3 K( [# _
PARCS Perimeter Acquisition Radar and Attack Characterization System.
5 D# A' Q8 j, e; m9 I2 DPARPRO Peacetime Application of Reconnaissance Programs.
7 \8 N, H" }9 r, YPartial Mission, _) X6 m1 ~2 E! {
Capable
- N6 t- v. ]9 vMaterial condition of an aircraft or training device indicating that it can perform at! s+ N2 l$ I9 h+ z; A' a* d
least one, but not all, of its missions. Also called PMC. See also Full Mission
9 R; m+ p5 w% b0 [Capable.# G% d, \2 a6 {, ?+ W6 W; j
Participating6 W1 I5 @& W: f& X. i
Service2 d3 i/ w) F2 m) n+ t2 B
A military Service that supports the lead Service in the development of a joint1 |* ]: G2 X, {3 d4 _8 b) Y; k: @
acquisition program by its contribution of personnel and/or funds.
2 U: C9 t7 B8 p1 KParticle Beam+ t2 E. `+ j7 L& D
(PB)
- v0 A! w& B- r0 l( ^0 L$ d" n" E+ `High-energy beam made up of atomic/sub-atomic particles (electrons, protons, or: W. U1 C3 w3 }
neutrons) accelerated to near the speed of light. @3 l# l K# f0 k3 X W2 ]' C
Particle Beam
& N3 Y" \7 o9 x; xWeapon (PBW)4 C) }9 g* G- D
A weapon that relies on the technology of particle accelerators (atom-smashers)
% Q+ E( E( Z) U1 B6 S1 J* |% W+ vto emit beams of charged or neutral particles, which travel near the speed of) h8 R( @; \" U* V' ^
light. Such a beam could theoretically destroy a target by several means, e.g.,
- i j- t; @3 q% V" Z# C' j% Q8 O' _4 p _electronics upset, electronics damage, softening/melting of materials, sensor
0 X7 ~8 x0 q, D0 t+ Q* r3 _) wdamage, and initiation of high explosives.
# `5 r( q/ y8 F% _% \/ I: IPASS POET Advanced Submunition Study.
& N* Q0 d+ n8 lPassive In surveillance, an adjective applied to actions or equipment, which emit no' P; Y; ^+ X- N$ a. ~" r$ _! x
energy capable of being detected.
6 a% p/ g" V) H* }, [) c: [MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 P
6 W- R) ^( ~. B219$ m, T4 ]; h4 J2 \8 B( e) {
Passive Air
) X! ?0 X9 ~: O' l/ m& oDefense9 I U" g" B+ c/ A: |; t
All measures, other than active air defense, taken to minimize the effectiveness @1 E( v$ Y% C. p
of hostile air action. These measures include deception, dispersion, and the use) s. k' `7 I- f
of protective construction.: ]$ n0 z; q ~* }* }/ t$ J
Passive
8 D5 j( p! `, P! h2 Y3 A7 RCommunications
) w/ {* C3 U0 p3 z, d& h* `2 P! C2 ~( BSecurity Threats
& S Y- j1 L# kThreats to electronic systems posed by a capability to obtain intelligence through( v6 ^ C# Z9 ?% \: }5 v
intercepting and evaluating intentional and inadvertent electromagnetic2 }1 C Q& A) B" V% N& g
emanations from electronic components of the system; e.g. communications
/ N3 f# v& d0 D7 W% K7 \7 ^3 Iinterception and direction finding.: W( `5 u2 W8 F- V5 s
Passive Defense (1) Measures taken to reduce the probability of and to minimize the effects1 f2 a8 [% d: m- l. J
of damage caused by hostile action without the intention of taking the
, ~" I9 X$ s+ w( b7 ?5 ~9 `initiative./ s& e7 C$ G6 }. I, S
(2) Passive defense minimizes the probability and effects of theater missile; C' _$ I: F) K
attack by reducing an enemy’s ability to target friendly assets, reducing
5 `" P3 b) c$ x Uthe vulnerability of critical forces and infrastructure, and improving the8 C6 y; o$ k' l6 W! @0 A1 {/ S; S: F
potential to survive and resume operations after an attack. Passive
' ^/ o: s- v" w% I3 v3 Ameasures might include counter-surveillance, deception, camouflage and
/ D) c# g& V0 E* X! X, z, fconcealment, hardening, electronic warfare, mobility, dispersal, and
% g) ?* z7 F$ ?/ e' }redundancy. Passive defense is considered one of the four pillars of
, W; G, u% `2 D3 d4 UTMD capability. (JCS J-38 CONOPS)
% D0 }* P! i: y$ ]Passive Sensor A sensor that detects naturally occurring emissions from a target for tracking
* p, p/ i' k: i5 `5 _: h- @; aand/or identification purposes. |
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