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Packaging,/ ^7 T0 S0 `1 H6 L! _
Handling, v+ u0 Y' y5 y; [, ~8 @! g, G; r( W/ j
Storage, and
5 B; W$ W) E1 k# MTransportation+ b& a2 z6 X3 P' V9 l
(PHS&T)
: y3 E- p! }& \7 ~3 `The resources, processes, procedures, design considerations, and methods to
: V+ _( n+ }& p5 qensure that all system, equipment, and support items are preserved, packaged,7 J6 g: l- X9 @& I% A3 q/ t
handled, and transported properly, including environmental considerations,
0 B- U/ a) z- G* P2 e2 requipment preservation requirements for short- and long-term storage, and7 o4 v8 m1 P( A }1 Q. [
transportability.9 T/ s% a! ]5 R* s6 ]. n
Packet Switching- ]! n! g3 Q' z- u
(PSW)
) R9 H& _. K( ]: p dA data transmission process, utilizing addressed packets, whereby a channel is
# p# b/ E1 J k% H& i/ n+ i9 @occupied only for the duration of transmission of the packet. In certain data0 |" t' e7 E7 x- h- h }
communication networks the data may be formatted into a packet or divided and
) q$ o- f/ V- G& K1 g2 x) B# G& m4 ^- ~then formatted into a number of packets (either by the data terminal equipment
, w3 s( A) ]$ D; lor by equipment within the network) for transmission and multiplexing purposes. U" ?/ E; M& K% x, g# w2 q* F2 b. o
PACOM U.S. Pacific Command.( d5 \0 a8 T" d
PACOSS Passive and Active Controls of Space Structures.
# S- W$ R! j* n# R8 f3 SPADIL Patriot Data & Information Link.' g' l' |- Q# o; Y
MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 P
' z4 I1 I/ d4 U8 U218
9 c9 x1 o4 [, K! p/ s- z: D) IPAFB Patterson Air Force Base.
/ p8 c, P) h# ?. T2 l- yPAL Permissive Action Link.: y, ^! ?( P$ }( p1 Q0 H
PALS Protection Against Limited Strikes (SDIO term).1 {/ \; p/ [2 }0 Q# U! C8 M( \
PAM Pulse Amplitude Modulation.
' h( {+ T+ Z" P4 E0 f* Y @% _2 qPAN Polyacrylonatrile [carbon fiber].
, u- L6 B) d/ f, I: i- j4 d% vPancake Altitude Altitude at which the trailing edge of a chaff puff/cloud effectively catches up to
) T/ Z4 H, x5 K0 nthe leading edge because of atmospheric slowdown.
O; h) Q- D/ X! GPAP Predicted Aim Point." K6 g$ q& A% A3 q. R2 Y
PAR (1) Phased-Array Radar.
% Q8 T( q0 y2 Z+ Q4 P(2) Perimeter Acquisition Radar. (See Phased Array.)
: P/ u& U6 u% _) ?8 q- A(3) Preprocessing Analysis Report.$ |, q5 t. }2 d+ h: A
(4) Program Assessment Report.
1 t: O1 {. L& Q% }7 L2 G& [(5) Pulse Acquisition Radar.
9 ^5 {" i4 D6 l8 ]. I" I. C8 hParallel
. M% @ G$ \) w/ F; M9 CProcessing
e5 n. S* u) c/ ^5 v, B# UIn parallel processing multiple processors (CPUs) divide up a large task into1 B# V- h! O. y1 D2 ?- v
smaller ones and each CPU acts on the subdivided task simultaneously so that
4 f2 v1 H* B# J) [) `9 o' mmuch higher effective processing speeds can be attained.
3 O" x M1 x) T( ^4 V. [Parametric Cost
1 W7 C+ o1 M* L$ f" }1 [/ u% x( S+ REstimate, H$ q; s5 {1 ~% Z* d) Y
A cost estimating methodology using statistical relationships between historical) [5 |1 D" f& K) g8 M
costs and other program variables such as system physical or performance1 U! t% v8 B" o) L/ R
characteristics, contractor output measures, manpower loading, etc. Also5 N# @# `& u( L, Q, h
referred to as a top-down approach.
5 j- x6 T- t6 Z% B x- P! C j9 QPARCS Perimeter Acquisition Radar and Attack Characterization System.
+ c9 x7 g# H' h0 a3 cPARPRO Peacetime Application of Reconnaissance Programs.
4 j* _6 B# h; t' r0 [+ c8 |3 dPartial Mission6 B; @- u: K6 F; r2 F3 y: M. p$ n
Capable
$ l& W; F8 s' ^1 D# R2 \, G, R$ EMaterial condition of an aircraft or training device indicating that it can perform at2 z, f! i: L9 |- \. Z
least one, but not all, of its missions. Also called PMC. See also Full Mission
6 i- V+ r. ~( D2 |% d' SCapable.
- D) q3 ?6 |8 J5 f+ _( p/ E1 rParticipating
/ ]. H- H* N) aService
: s( h+ V/ t. O" k' b8 mA military Service that supports the lead Service in the development of a joint* E' p/ W) F* |1 q# l! f+ R& r
acquisition program by its contribution of personnel and/or funds.
9 b( v; a' O- l+ b& ?# k/ LParticle Beam
! u( k- t P1 @$ |( T! ?(PB)
O V/ E8 x1 kHigh-energy beam made up of atomic/sub-atomic particles (electrons, protons, or
6 y4 R; `9 B; K7 M! w0 [" Ineutrons) accelerated to near the speed of light.
, ` a+ l& X' ~; E" WParticle Beam0 i+ R) a: _& e4 [2 v" C
Weapon (PBW)/ j$ v* E' n% Y% g+ g2 z [: E
A weapon that relies on the technology of particle accelerators (atom-smashers). ^* g; B1 ]& o
to emit beams of charged or neutral particles, which travel near the speed of$ n$ [. _ y8 w
light. Such a beam could theoretically destroy a target by several means, e.g.,
" H+ i1 ~/ F7 s8 I, Uelectronics upset, electronics damage, softening/melting of materials, sensor% G+ I, b& |' E i& V
damage, and initiation of high explosives.
: r8 E& y# Z2 O7 U1 nPASS POET Advanced Submunition Study.7 l4 t2 I' b& ~9 n
Passive In surveillance, an adjective applied to actions or equipment, which emit no- I$ p2 \5 g( @& b
energy capable of being detected.
5 ~! Y- }% ]% T# [MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 P: M& y) S) i1 \& t$ d
2190 x; N9 |' d! w# @4 w
Passive Air
. w' |! F! z& X! J" A4 I; `; TDefense8 H1 _ Z5 L. x0 Q; ~
All measures, other than active air defense, taken to minimize the effectiveness
5 M, ~7 z D/ cof hostile air action. These measures include deception, dispersion, and the use
. G- k( {& u# l% x0 M7 _. c/ H9 n0 Mof protective construction.7 g! o' j* j" V7 E" g) F. m
Passive7 v3 |# Q9 v* J0 P8 k6 T7 G$ x7 Q* c
Communications
y1 Z* S" ?: N( P+ DSecurity Threats8 S" w; i8 u* v$ |; [
Threats to electronic systems posed by a capability to obtain intelligence through& s3 k8 p8 I% H) b I. z
intercepting and evaluating intentional and inadvertent electromagnetic
4 g1 J& C, E7 W" w* R d$ Aemanations from electronic components of the system; e.g. communications
2 U, |2 `6 H1 I" T, m. V7 Finterception and direction finding.1 V& G2 T) j+ b
Passive Defense (1) Measures taken to reduce the probability of and to minimize the effects x9 U3 m& q3 _- K
of damage caused by hostile action without the intention of taking the. Q x0 T2 x9 l7 P# x
initiative.4 t8 z' O- [2 T3 {
(2) Passive defense minimizes the probability and effects of theater missile
0 v- Y% h M! P$ z- a0 F$ Dattack by reducing an enemy’s ability to target friendly assets, reducing, @* `0 I3 r" d5 g# |
the vulnerability of critical forces and infrastructure, and improving the
( c H9 a7 H$ v$ q5 D( w$ Y; ?potential to survive and resume operations after an attack. Passive7 x. |0 X0 u3 j2 J% E
measures might include counter-surveillance, deception, camouflage and
. I* n4 b1 t3 `% p7 }7 {concealment, hardening, electronic warfare, mobility, dispersal, and" ^$ d+ ?$ n" r
redundancy. Passive defense is considered one of the four pillars of
, B2 ^0 p" @& T$ V2 P5 B! \TMD capability. (JCS J-38 CONOPS)
9 S" u/ ]- s5 t9 rPassive Sensor A sensor that detects naturally occurring emissions from a target for tracking
4 n$ \5 ^3 l9 U8 e* P P- wand/or identification purposes. |
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