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NSF National Science Foundation./ a" R' x' p2 y, w' c. j2 N
NSFS Naval Surface Fire Support.3 i$ j# M3 d9 K+ o4 j- n% i
NSG Naval Security Group.+ E& x2 T; {" w: U& @ h7 x
NSIA National Security Industrial Association, Washington, DC.
( i2 a/ `# y4 `# a' j) wNSIE Network Security Information Exchange.
+ t3 F) a; d6 }# v6 oNSN National Stock Number (ILS term).
7 _( m/ w1 F; o9 W3 @! l9 V& ONSNF Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces.
; p$ u% e/ ^6 Q9 m& o* }NSOC (1) National Signals Intelligence Operations Center. (2) Navy Satellite* [/ v2 V6 m- K3 x
Operations Center.5 G% H: S) X- [5 C- v7 ]
NSP Not Separately Priced.2 g8 T( T& y2 m# ?( j
NSSC National Space Surveillance Center, CMAFB.
, b! R, Q4 V- u7 q6 o+ v! l* ?NSSD National Security Study Directive.% n @( W% b; R% ?7 t8 y7 j, K
NSTAC National Security Telecommunications and Information System Security; l) X( z4 X' u d" m" G
Committee.! m% m& D9 w& ^3 b" O+ p' E0 O5 l
NSTC National Science and Technology Council (EOP term).
$ \0 }4 \3 h* B3 _# fNSWC Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA.
* V4 o4 x* s) e: oNSWC/DD Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA.
/ C# b3 O9 \0 wNSWC/PHL Naval Surface Weapons Center, Port Hueneme Division.6 @. F$ i2 G) p
NTACS Navy Tactical Air Control System.
2 h3 q/ R5 t5 ~. iNTB National Test Bed.
1 _) m) b) I5 n' m/ I0 W Y! INTB/WAN OBSOLETE. National Test Bed/Wide Area Network.
5 O7 k0 ^4 ]. b7 ^, Y' j- X3 CMDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 N
1 Q& \/ }1 @3 i5 ?/ C( c3 b- `2034 | t G* i1 e2 F! }. o W
NTBI OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Integration.; @3 ]5 a3 z6 @
NTBIC OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Integration Contract.+ a+ B* j, e$ C" ], `1 {
NTB-JPO OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Joint Project Office.
! O/ U) k; a5 e$ R( ] JNTBN OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Network.
$ P3 p/ Q# m' a/ I8 E. @. w4 tNTC National Training Center, located at Ft. Irwin, CA. A large maneuver area that
; S) q* a) E7 |7 C# V& Userves as the Army’s primary training center for Army maneuver forces. Friendly; B) N8 q6 {1 l
forces are pitted against “enemy” forces to validate proposed procedures and
- _9 p/ J+ [% o8 v. {doctrine.6 B6 W4 a6 y: o0 x+ q
NTIC (1) Navy Tactical Intelligence Center. (2) National Technical Information Center.
a8 ~& M; }5 X' j% T+ y- Z7 b9 tNTF National Test Facility.
0 }6 T v9 ~2 @& o- n0 M) INTM National Technical Means.
( i& Z, n6 t3 b. A1 |NTU New Threat Upgrade.
% e1 E1 T [. ~- o0 F3 }1 s% GNTW OBSOLETE. Navy Theater-Wide. Now referred to as the Sea-Based Midcourse
# s! |( Z7 M: }: JSegment of BMDS.
; a9 I% L5 E; c* t$ pNTWD(S) OBSOLETE. Navy Theater-Wide Defense (System).0 [+ c: P6 |3 }
Nuclear,5 R) F5 r! b4 U; G$ j
Biological, and2 t: |3 L5 c& K
Chemical
" C1 m6 S) b( G8 N5 d' o5 w. hContamination/ M1 x! ~2 E* V, S+ L2 Y5 u
(NBCC)0 d/ f7 Z2 b$ x' n* d7 l
The deposit and/or absorption of residual radioactive material or biological or1 p/ M0 N# M8 f
chemical agents on or by structures, areas, personnel, or objects. i) |$ I! D) h) S$ n) S+ _
•Nuclear Contamination. Residual radioactive material resulting from fallout or0 ?2 B* p# ?6 ^/ r/ P E/ @# m
rainout, and residual radiation from a system produced by a nuclear
, ~ H3 I9 u( u# @explosion, and persisting longer than one minute after burst.
! d9 M+ ^% v7 W' h% a; C, E•Biological Contamination. Microorganisms and toxins that cause disease in. P* |; t+ x* s4 B" `
humans, plants, or animals or cause deterioration of material." V* c2 p8 g# r1 J1 o: P! I
•Chemical Contamination. Chemical substances intended for use in military' |( l/ I3 }. v
operations to kill, seriously injure, incapacitate, or temporarily irritate humans." {' ^& u+ D* \! w% \6 H! ^
Nuclear,9 H5 A1 l4 w8 V: d1 @5 J
Biological, and j0 s0 ]+ M( ~. j3 X( z
Chemical
5 o' w# d/ `4 `& vContamination
$ Q: o& `. R$ ?) B! YSurvivability/ C/ J }1 Z( a# x3 E# z( H6 u0 F
The capability of a system and its crew to withstand a NBCC environment and, |1 _! }; m/ W7 S- l+ c
relevant decontamination without losing the ability to accomplish the assigned- T& X. x$ F( b
mission. A NBCC survivable system is hardened against NBCC and. ^1 k, D: T+ D' [2 Y7 E* U5 U
decontaminates; it can be decontaminated, and it is compatible with individual% _5 Q, \2 |3 l" f
protective equipment.' w( H. E7 e" V0 T2 G
•Hardness. The capability of material to withstand the materiel -damaging
+ |) U2 `+ B) P) N0 L# b# Z4 peffects of NBCC and relevant decontamination.- a2 e$ r0 y4 `' q9 `* ^
•Decontamination. The process of making personnel and materiel safe by
! F, E2 D$ P3 u) [' ^& Z$ zrendering harmless or removing radioactive, chemical, or biological material.
) _7 E: L/ K5 o& a1 V•Compatibility. The capability of a system to be operated, maintained, and resupplied by persons wearing individual protective equipment, in all climates
. A7 s2 c1 S3 f5 _for which the system is designed, and for the period specified in the
* n# K6 X7 I- c) Eoperational requirements document.
4 l- z* o5 ]4 U ?/ t7 s4 u5 i1 SNuclear Cloud See Radioactive Cloud.. N+ ^9 n/ [% X* t6 d* U* Z
Nuclear Directed
$ u/ r8 `% a/ c0 E( XEnergy Weapon; F& A: t1 ~! M; @+ x
(NDEW)* E# i" @% L; F4 Z
A directed energy weapon for which the source of energy is a specially designed" _4 ~3 N! H$ o U
nuclear device.
( }7 ? A, Z* R$ D, E, \8 a+ G/ a9 cMDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 N# V: ?( K% o0 m* W' Z6 Y
204
4 m9 E! n5 J5 w$ o( V$ n/ wNuclear
4 g/ w, X6 ?( B0 g( e. n; w5 vEnvironment
- ^- p, H: s) p' g& k4 Q/ W2 J! J0 S. tThe environment, which results from the detonation of nuclear weapons. Some. ?$ @* j* ]+ U$ x; |, g
components of this environment are directly emitted by the nuclear weapon and
8 M( |5 \( y- R iother collateral effects are created by the interaction of the emitted nuclear" G: @2 D) V! Q- [
radiation with the earth’s atmosphere, the earth’s surface and the earth’s
* l" W( r. ^* W+ n$ V6 amagnetic field. The nuclear environment consists of radiation, blast, shock,
& _) a% U8 q7 L. H. U) o2 `! \thermal, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), emissions from radioactive debris, trapped3 X2 c9 S& j# K
electrons, and disturbances to the atmosphere and to the propagation paths for- C+ X% ]* P7 T
radar and communications. The nuclear environment exists in the1 b: @' f7 l5 Y% ]
exoatmospheric, atmospheric and ground BMD operational regimes.
+ s) x9 w$ {1 o* k; t0 XNuclear, e8 z8 U! d! y: o
Hardness
7 I7 k" ~* X3 X6 C9 M5 F' ^$ U& pA quantitative description of the resistance of a system or component to
2 t4 U; p, {; G- ]malfunction (temporary and permanent) and/or degraded performance induced Z) ?8 r% G$ d
by a nuclear weapon environment. Resistance to physical quantities such as
4 A* |' F9 V$ `* O# C5 X \0 goverpressure, peak velocities, energy absorbed, and electrical stress measures
' ?1 }# ]! Y$ D9 ?' mhardness. Hardness is achieved through adhering to appropriate design; P( @3 {3 _( ^6 z: w
specifications and is verified by one or more test and analysis techniques.
( C2 N0 L0 d' x0 N+ G& T, D1 ?Nuclear
9 K9 I* F1 n. G$ m# ERadiation) q: K8 M$ m# Y6 {; y' [: N+ O: N& S
Particulate and electromagnetic radiation emitted from atomic nuclei in various
+ h( T+ L3 }0 \, T$ Z9 O; K cnuclear processes. The important nuclear radiations, from the weapons standpoint, are alpha and beta particles, gamma rays, and neutrons. All nuclear/ u2 L9 H$ J5 y" b7 [
radiations are ionizing radiations, but the reverse is not true; x-rays, for example,
: n1 m% g0 p( D5 Z% t" Y# bare included among ionizing radiations, but they are not nuclear radiations since
9 q& G. h8 m3 @% ^they do not originate from atomic nuclei. (See Ionizing Radiation and X-Rays.) |
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