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NSF National Science Foundation.
, v7 v+ }9 X- \, ]NSFS Naval Surface Fire Support./ g2 z) z) m- g* r4 @, D( H
NSG Naval Security Group.
: f0 o0 L! Z1 S" L+ D' bNSIA National Security Industrial Association, Washington, DC.
& M7 P( s, B p' ]8 w! uNSIE Network Security Information Exchange.
* z# p* } k$ s3 x" bNSN National Stock Number (ILS term).' F8 f! E( a! q+ }- b9 x% r
NSNF Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces.
, u5 Q6 i: I6 j, a6 U. U' @NSOC (1) National Signals Intelligence Operations Center. (2) Navy Satellite
/ M' g2 B( b. U& }Operations Center.: t6 O+ {' F' t3 z7 | ^
NSP Not Separately Priced.5 c5 V( |% l" b; _2 B" a
NSSC National Space Surveillance Center, CMAFB.
2 x+ \6 H# v2 r2 _) h' I' LNSSD National Security Study Directive., c) u3 _2 Z9 L6 u9 \# u; t
NSTAC National Security Telecommunications and Information System Security
2 Z- z/ _( A/ T ICommittee.
$ }5 A1 _" [3 C' X& r2 g& wNSTC National Science and Technology Council (EOP term).
# G# @- J [/ b6 F- ] ^0 P) i8 CNSWC Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA.$ M5 ]+ m+ [+ l3 |( a2 a
NSWC/DD Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA.
7 a+ M2 P/ S: s* m4 Y, h4 P) {NSWC/PHL Naval Surface Weapons Center, Port Hueneme Division.
$ a+ A0 [' q( kNTACS Navy Tactical Air Control System.; ?3 \. y* C& ~0 l" S8 P
NTB National Test Bed.* j M1 C, n, T+ P' u
NTB/WAN OBSOLETE. National Test Bed/Wide Area Network.
: q$ R1 T) Q* R. Y9 @" gMDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 N* N' v8 f$ g: g6 U4 k
203 `, t4 V! Y0 J8 w M" R
NTBI OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Integration.
' m$ C+ f& A9 c( i; ]+ L: M% FNTBIC OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Integration Contract.* O4 N; E, G- b9 t
NTB-JPO OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Joint Project Office.
|" g) K& U: ^NTBN OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Network.
; F: b& i5 W9 K. @$ zNTC National Training Center, located at Ft. Irwin, CA. A large maneuver area that; g) T; v+ I4 I4 i S6 t! J, e0 f. z
serves as the Army’s primary training center for Army maneuver forces. Friendly
& _6 a: B* x# n& }forces are pitted against “enemy” forces to validate proposed procedures and9 R) ]; _* g' Q9 F
doctrine.
# _8 ?) ^$ k% \) Z: E4 o' JNTIC (1) Navy Tactical Intelligence Center. (2) National Technical Information Center.! ~% Q6 Z0 u ]3 b2 S( h( L
NTF National Test Facility.3 `1 ~6 s& k" l' I3 M: E
NTM National Technical Means.
& S* E% ^# V2 s0 }, U! v( w- FNTU New Threat Upgrade.& }0 J$ u6 o( [9 M
NTW OBSOLETE. Navy Theater-Wide. Now referred to as the Sea-Based Midcourse- S5 o& a% v' ^* t& ^, m+ |
Segment of BMDS.
# Y6 T' m m. q/ |NTWD(S) OBSOLETE. Navy Theater-Wide Defense (System).
! F% R5 ?' W, d) X# n( D# FNuclear,7 L. A; u! B" D1 _! D# `4 m; F5 d/ E! c
Biological, and- C$ C$ {7 a$ Q# S* T6 [. Q( L
Chemical/ i2 ?0 o& }7 Y( T3 M
Contamination, K* i. x. G' I. c; @8 n1 ^. W& {
(NBCC)( e" x; R# w4 d( }# \5 Y2 Z
The deposit and/or absorption of residual radioactive material or biological or
0 ~6 m% D8 p- ]# @5 {5 Zchemical agents on or by structures, areas, personnel, or objects.
: |$ b6 h6 \% `# r! P•Nuclear Contamination. Residual radioactive material resulting from fallout or
+ G( U5 T' V: _- n, c* V" B$ `rainout, and residual radiation from a system produced by a nuclear6 s! `. g6 T. |5 O( r# x, |- I! a
explosion, and persisting longer than one minute after burst.8 N* `0 A2 M* G# v3 i$ O' i
•Biological Contamination. Microorganisms and toxins that cause disease in
% G: k# j3 v3 R$ Thumans, plants, or animals or cause deterioration of material./ a7 V' T7 T# k S8 {
•Chemical Contamination. Chemical substances intended for use in military9 j. a# ~$ v1 N! j }1 v% s, D
operations to kill, seriously injure, incapacitate, or temporarily irritate humans.
) A9 J* p& w7 ]# ]8 p W0 W3 JNuclear,
8 v, m/ a% @8 n2 `3 b _. pBiological, and! @& T' G6 v$ `: L( e, o( g
Chemical
^! D/ T1 d7 N+ hContamination' p; l7 I0 y: Y6 b; ~0 p, B0 h
Survivability
: \2 n' Q( k7 R v. vThe capability of a system and its crew to withstand a NBCC environment and9 I' P9 O8 b: n9 ^
relevant decontamination without losing the ability to accomplish the assigned
1 g# Q- b# A: rmission. A NBCC survivable system is hardened against NBCC and
! K* n& U8 p' S1 I4 `5 O7 X/ D d$ {decontaminates; it can be decontaminated, and it is compatible with individual
. V9 N( r+ \4 I8 L1 ^$ @3 N5 Kprotective equipment.7 v' m5 a1 W; ^) _
•Hardness. The capability of material to withstand the materiel -damaging3 `/ `. u) T9 I( U! Z2 i
effects of NBCC and relevant decontamination.* n7 Y3 b% z" y+ U) Y4 m
•Decontamination. The process of making personnel and materiel safe by& D' A+ P9 c5 E' I
rendering harmless or removing radioactive, chemical, or biological material.
% v5 N- L8 @. I3 t/ B; F•Compatibility. The capability of a system to be operated, maintained, and resupplied by persons wearing individual protective equipment, in all climates
8 d7 K9 h; F7 M/ c* Qfor which the system is designed, and for the period specified in the5 F# G: G) N. K: }" F5 ?
operational requirements document.
2 _+ h2 ^' Z: a: [+ R/ KNuclear Cloud See Radioactive Cloud.
( D: `6 i! q+ G. I+ S1 M/ GNuclear Directed
9 k9 E* d! A8 h; n& n9 d4 x. ?3 TEnergy Weapon
9 ?6 F$ h( T1 Q* U3 z- n(NDEW)( ?9 x6 A; \* I
A directed energy weapon for which the source of energy is a specially designed1 W2 A$ [- y5 t& d8 E+ Z* b8 e
nuclear device.. \5 @' l9 Z; O
MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 N3 Q; k0 ]5 ]+ e2 [' M
204' `0 u. B8 `2 I$ I. ~
Nuclear
6 | k ^+ i# T8 h& D* {Environment
9 G Q1 O6 X) P5 P4 TThe environment, which results from the detonation of nuclear weapons. Some" d% v, w, ~& a
components of this environment are directly emitted by the nuclear weapon and
& ?( m4 i [3 B, cother collateral effects are created by the interaction of the emitted nuclear6 g8 C$ F# C. T" c
radiation with the earth’s atmosphere, the earth’s surface and the earth’s
$ m: S x3 W5 ?! M% Vmagnetic field. The nuclear environment consists of radiation, blast, shock,
! l5 |; V5 ]! [thermal, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), emissions from radioactive debris, trapped% Z8 T2 T6 s3 g( x8 k6 ~
electrons, and disturbances to the atmosphere and to the propagation paths for
1 o$ Z5 w, K( B* g; Wradar and communications. The nuclear environment exists in the
# S0 V$ ^/ l) }% U3 c7 P$ K6 ^exoatmospheric, atmospheric and ground BMD operational regimes.
, \3 A. `7 q, H4 ^2 s1 C$ }Nuclear
1 n6 a# P3 ]& uHardness
7 m* T1 d6 }) _A quantitative description of the resistance of a system or component to* \: a5 r& p$ f* [- m
malfunction (temporary and permanent) and/or degraded performance induced# p+ V0 l7 e' s# o$ y- v
by a nuclear weapon environment. Resistance to physical quantities such as/ x! l9 N9 ]1 t6 p' U; @. t
overpressure, peak velocities, energy absorbed, and electrical stress measures! i1 H0 V" i2 \3 D1 _5 q% v
hardness. Hardness is achieved through adhering to appropriate design/ e( u: V7 x5 r* a* {! \
specifications and is verified by one or more test and analysis techniques.9 R/ k% B v! i: Q6 I( j0 m) y: f
Nuclear
( T2 q) |8 J/ E c1 {6 sRadiation' ` a1 R5 }- f3 M
Particulate and electromagnetic radiation emitted from atomic nuclei in various8 a2 S; _% T& C0 S
nuclear processes. The important nuclear radiations, from the weapons standpoint, are alpha and beta particles, gamma rays, and neutrons. All nuclear
+ w. P2 Q) J. [7 P: l: j; Xradiations are ionizing radiations, but the reverse is not true; x-rays, for example,
8 j: {' x- M0 M: v& s6 h1 i0 Pare included among ionizing radiations, but they are not nuclear radiations since+ d Q6 S3 K' `1 N/ H# V: I6 k0 }2 M
they do not originate from atomic nuclei. (See Ionizing Radiation and X-Rays.) |
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