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NSF National Science Foundation.
. c: ?" i& a9 a- X. x( r$ b7 aNSFS Naval Surface Fire Support.1 u0 \7 t# Z# c2 [
NSG Naval Security Group.
2 i' i5 |8 C6 r* Y# e8 M/ L. CNSIA National Security Industrial Association, Washington, DC.! v8 |7 c$ |! U9 V' B! n
NSIE Network Security Information Exchange.
6 P7 M' J2 @4 l- H) m$ NNSN National Stock Number (ILS term).
+ u% x( K, ~3 ^! M3 H, CNSNF Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces.# ]( I% s- s4 L+ k/ @
NSOC (1) National Signals Intelligence Operations Center. (2) Navy Satellite" Z9 H5 K% d2 J* K4 F
Operations Center.
) j/ {" ]3 I' B* BNSP Not Separately Priced.
; \6 d% y0 h0 ^0 A' h aNSSC National Space Surveillance Center, CMAFB.( {9 C1 N3 j- i4 w2 `9 C
NSSD National Security Study Directive.
, P5 l7 g3 E, G& N6 ~. e* TNSTAC National Security Telecommunications and Information System Security+ y9 d" v$ p: C# b8 E6 X9 r5 v
Committee.
# Q' C7 W- t4 R {- R0 J" kNSTC National Science and Technology Council (EOP term).
- R8 \. h& C8 E% {5 O( c2 fNSWC Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA.
4 n; V/ A- r K; m2 r% CNSWC/DD Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA.0 R) Q, ?8 Q& q, y
NSWC/PHL Naval Surface Weapons Center, Port Hueneme Division.9 X3 \1 u0 s7 I1 Q3 g" X3 K* M
NTACS Navy Tactical Air Control System.9 @8 X7 M% [6 w
NTB National Test Bed.4 {' i( r! l5 h1 ^$ {. Q8 [
NTB/WAN OBSOLETE. National Test Bed/Wide Area Network.4 C! ]& S/ X! F) I
MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 N7 S. m! s. w+ e+ b6 k0 W! T% |7 J
203) Z5 d5 Y" R; @. a, }
NTBI OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Integration.
/ y( {1 p! H5 G1 B& i9 yNTBIC OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Integration Contract.
! u; _& l! ?! J' G2 J2 y3 U. u5 U6 fNTB-JPO OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Joint Project Office.7 D1 u, F. k' v: s3 k
NTBN OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Network.
1 G0 T4 l8 L* s( x& u1 U) i2 `NTC National Training Center, located at Ft. Irwin, CA. A large maneuver area that( b p$ g$ }7 x. E* x
serves as the Army’s primary training center for Army maneuver forces. Friendly
) W6 C- R% C% w- c7 Bforces are pitted against “enemy” forces to validate proposed procedures and ?6 I3 k$ q) u1 S% G
doctrine.
n( k$ c- H: U3 U3 HNTIC (1) Navy Tactical Intelligence Center. (2) National Technical Information Center.
5 [$ ~1 w+ S- _! b" Y- n9 T( @7 k9 ~NTF National Test Facility.
. `" v& X* e* H$ KNTM National Technical Means.
9 Q- M/ A1 n. C. G/ r8 M$ Q2 gNTU New Threat Upgrade.
$ C: M4 Y1 H% U( m' C( ]6 I0 W/ Q/ YNTW OBSOLETE. Navy Theater-Wide. Now referred to as the Sea-Based Midcourse3 D) Y) y8 M7 h9 K2 F7 u) G0 F
Segment of BMDS.
" T+ b9 x! M, Q- H( z. nNTWD(S) OBSOLETE. Navy Theater-Wide Defense (System).
% f; w5 Z: ~5 R O$ s7 | cNuclear,
( Y, f( m/ M) ]1 B" r* X/ \Biological, and
7 G0 K @4 K7 m/ jChemical( n, t) s; W5 s' W1 k+ v3 z2 s
Contamination( S3 }) w+ ~ C
(NBCC)
; [; G$ ?: i( u YThe deposit and/or absorption of residual radioactive material or biological or
( R7 i, t1 x- J' Ochemical agents on or by structures, areas, personnel, or objects.& P8 X, R# l; T& h5 Q
•Nuclear Contamination. Residual radioactive material resulting from fallout or
4 ~) H( J9 c5 _1 drainout, and residual radiation from a system produced by a nuclear
: H0 o% @* P: x" w- o" L! \9 h' C! Iexplosion, and persisting longer than one minute after burst.
6 v- o8 c1 A) F, w2 H- B•Biological Contamination. Microorganisms and toxins that cause disease in) y, a% [$ ^$ v( y
humans, plants, or animals or cause deterioration of material.( @& C7 U& Y1 k0 j
•Chemical Contamination. Chemical substances intended for use in military q) {. W2 x" ?- {8 Z7 {
operations to kill, seriously injure, incapacitate, or temporarily irritate humans.
1 y! y) y- c- S4 w5 b$ b/ Y# nNuclear,! T; m& b& Q {; z! w K# Q1 ~1 G
Biological, and
( O' I: t% c. c& m& qChemical
5 w% ?- z5 a) C' C& B( GContamination
& B3 F8 g( B# Z. n9 vSurvivability0 O9 U, X8 [8 Y
The capability of a system and its crew to withstand a NBCC environment and
4 _5 Y6 Y! a& I+ D& I( X' Orelevant decontamination without losing the ability to accomplish the assigned
5 b; _ C' P) Bmission. A NBCC survivable system is hardened against NBCC and3 s8 n& M+ @0 m6 y
decontaminates; it can be decontaminated, and it is compatible with individual' U# F' c; f9 k9 P
protective equipment.
* Y/ b) F# H i( ?$ Y•Hardness. The capability of material to withstand the materiel -damaging. B2 b( a, i; J
effects of NBCC and relevant decontamination.
# r& Z3 r9 ]3 y" C2 ~•Decontamination. The process of making personnel and materiel safe by, b4 Q. y& u* \, }9 a2 W+ D
rendering harmless or removing radioactive, chemical, or biological material./ W$ `* V. e, T' L0 A$ z" ~& U
•Compatibility. The capability of a system to be operated, maintained, and resupplied by persons wearing individual protective equipment, in all climates" ?) u" H* U0 T, ]
for which the system is designed, and for the period specified in the5 J2 |6 A4 ~4 E& k2 I2 ^; R
operational requirements document.
0 e6 T4 X/ w! {8 ]+ gNuclear Cloud See Radioactive Cloud.
' |4 S( s7 Z5 K9 t0 vNuclear Directed# ^- V0 }- @0 I; L+ f; x- g3 a
Energy Weapon
6 @# N* K }7 o1 q0 Q( i# w(NDEW)
' T1 o9 k6 g+ Y9 ~; s! ]# ?7 S% \- \A directed energy weapon for which the source of energy is a specially designed6 G! t: O, i6 ?/ s6 p L& T
nuclear device.% `: G* r/ P" K3 Z# g$ j& ~3 I4 a* h
MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 N8 U2 U! W! Y8 c
204
U* U1 ^( {! uNuclear* W$ V; Y! N3 V r; }
Environment
- L2 {! l' u8 s& R5 UThe environment, which results from the detonation of nuclear weapons. Some
! U, ~; P/ f( H, G; ?0 X# Vcomponents of this environment are directly emitted by the nuclear weapon and+ Z0 n/ c' y. I/ H$ z+ E8 i
other collateral effects are created by the interaction of the emitted nuclear
6 a/ H+ O$ t& y/ Z; \5 Iradiation with the earth’s atmosphere, the earth’s surface and the earth’s
, q' G6 w' S& s4 B$ `magnetic field. The nuclear environment consists of radiation, blast, shock,( `" @2 M: k( P. J
thermal, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), emissions from radioactive debris, trapped7 X1 }2 @( W+ m7 m' g! n
electrons, and disturbances to the atmosphere and to the propagation paths for) I5 F$ v7 L- r7 j+ q4 F
radar and communications. The nuclear environment exists in the3 b- s5 F' Q- F) z8 o! Q5 z
exoatmospheric, atmospheric and ground BMD operational regimes.* R% |* y+ c1 A3 N0 G6 u
Nuclear) Y2 F) Z4 K4 Y% I; i0 `; K
Hardness
) ~# m% o5 M% L" l8 AA quantitative description of the resistance of a system or component to4 H& M" G( ?) k* H! c
malfunction (temporary and permanent) and/or degraded performance induced
) J% _3 `0 g5 _. V$ c) t) tby a nuclear weapon environment. Resistance to physical quantities such as b1 n( p7 b: U' q) G: t+ i
overpressure, peak velocities, energy absorbed, and electrical stress measures7 b) Z# k, d3 Z7 ^7 A# w; u! O, E
hardness. Hardness is achieved through adhering to appropriate design
2 L* c6 h# h* [8 q: ^specifications and is verified by one or more test and analysis techniques.
4 t/ a" @/ ?3 B; xNuclear- M, I) p4 ?% i
Radiation" u0 L/ `( x, k7 \/ Q- \/ f$ z
Particulate and electromagnetic radiation emitted from atomic nuclei in various
" G, q' `) O) J' ^: ?0 Xnuclear processes. The important nuclear radiations, from the weapons standpoint, are alpha and beta particles, gamma rays, and neutrons. All nuclear
8 s: I5 l8 X5 W1 A5 ~- S3 ^& l3 ^radiations are ionizing radiations, but the reverse is not true; x-rays, for example,
" L1 x. L+ c7 W5 F; Z4 O; Iare included among ionizing radiations, but they are not nuclear radiations since
5 f# v" H4 q! l" S& y! H# Fthey do not originate from atomic nuclei. (See Ionizing Radiation and X-Rays.) |
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