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NSF National Science Foundation.
7 s! L+ A! ?0 c- O4 {' U. O4 oNSFS Naval Surface Fire Support." ^2 d1 K- ?. A! o# k# w1 v
NSG Naval Security Group. {1 g. C/ F" o, @6 h4 @9 [
NSIA National Security Industrial Association, Washington, DC.
% m. Z! N# s2 j/ e1 @7 Z# fNSIE Network Security Information Exchange.
2 h; x' z+ {5 C3 o1 d `4 J8 V$ DNSN National Stock Number (ILS term).
8 O4 f0 I( d$ M# X+ _9 g" aNSNF Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces.* ^: e( d, n- _& k7 ?4 u! p
NSOC (1) National Signals Intelligence Operations Center. (2) Navy Satellite9 {+ m& n! _( e2 L% Q4 M# \
Operations Center.# F) U. n/ L5 a( a! v+ Z
NSP Not Separately Priced.
1 S& [2 }) H1 N2 ENSSC National Space Surveillance Center, CMAFB.
3 f" M" x6 }7 j0 QNSSD National Security Study Directive.
7 v" O$ b4 R! ]: M7 SNSTAC National Security Telecommunications and Information System Security
$ u4 ^. g+ x5 h% QCommittee.3 l4 b e) B& ^( P, v2 a
NSTC National Science and Technology Council (EOP term).- T+ _$ O6 B5 e! @
NSWC Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA.4 R; D. i2 P3 R; W0 m. h9 k
NSWC/DD Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA.
! U4 Z* b) ^8 Z8 T% iNSWC/PHL Naval Surface Weapons Center, Port Hueneme Division.
! Y9 k% L7 R- J+ `3 V4 O. H. l* fNTACS Navy Tactical Air Control System.; Q2 | X+ J# [) {$ N
NTB National Test Bed., W7 J' @% Y1 W) v& m) V
NTB/WAN OBSOLETE. National Test Bed/Wide Area Network.
3 G P' T# f. [MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 N
- z R) b" @5 E8 H s( J203
3 P8 B4 m# K, i4 vNTBI OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Integration.
6 H% W1 _$ D& tNTBIC OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Integration Contract.
' a# I9 d6 i$ M$ ]# Q. gNTB-JPO OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Joint Project Office., r5 c# D) T9 v( l# G2 i1 f/ |, o
NTBN OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Network.
1 N+ U% m# Y$ U6 P; a7 g4 hNTC National Training Center, located at Ft. Irwin, CA. A large maneuver area that
7 [ V5 h9 F; f* Wserves as the Army’s primary training center for Army maneuver forces. Friendly9 s3 T0 e7 s/ c. V6 k4 i
forces are pitted against “enemy” forces to validate proposed procedures and
) Y+ i/ h) d a. e {0 @7 C7 _doctrine.
- H1 x/ O( d K; K4 m2 e6 ~NTIC (1) Navy Tactical Intelligence Center. (2) National Technical Information Center.
5 Q( H) ^7 N* b. y, q) V9 v; ?NTF National Test Facility.
2 y& L# X0 Q" \" e0 M, T UNTM National Technical Means.8 t( `" f" X- h/ K R
NTU New Threat Upgrade.
0 d: p! ^( X! C8 ]NTW OBSOLETE. Navy Theater-Wide. Now referred to as the Sea-Based Midcourse
; ]0 e0 v4 h3 F* aSegment of BMDS., b" f# ^0 T! d9 l7 f6 k
NTWD(S) OBSOLETE. Navy Theater-Wide Defense (System). ~% q! L( v* b7 y. ]3 q7 x, z3 U
Nuclear,% P! j) [$ V9 V' O+ @
Biological, and
& g+ `( A& ~& m! v0 d6 TChemical
- y/ _+ N4 b5 N% V. x: B" CContamination- w+ h9 g: a1 y
(NBCC)
* U" u* r+ H0 g, y. \! _The deposit and/or absorption of residual radioactive material or biological or9 J% ^" ?/ E7 U' k3 Z! l, w
chemical agents on or by structures, areas, personnel, or objects.) e, ~9 A$ Z# |4 Y |+ r! ~ J |
•Nuclear Contamination. Residual radioactive material resulting from fallout or
( G: u$ A5 l7 q; Z7 w" j& O% Y! O7 ?% R6 trainout, and residual radiation from a system produced by a nuclear
2 Q. q: B5 @. n" s9 sexplosion, and persisting longer than one minute after burst.
6 f. m f+ H% r$ c' A" E•Biological Contamination. Microorganisms and toxins that cause disease in+ v: a& l* C' s1 f0 E f" a! E
humans, plants, or animals or cause deterioration of material.
% D/ k* ]+ @& {* C•Chemical Contamination. Chemical substances intended for use in military7 V9 }3 h! S8 O2 G- G' J& `" h% q3 Y
operations to kill, seriously injure, incapacitate, or temporarily irritate humans.
# |5 Y4 _( m: y, @Nuclear,
& L6 K* N$ Q3 j, w/ u. p% hBiological, and0 Y; s( q/ K& |5 |
Chemical7 J% j0 C* y5 K5 S% z" y/ D0 B: n
Contamination3 P7 {7 d( Q" m8 Q1 h9 a
Survivability
8 J7 R) Y; p! i6 iThe capability of a system and its crew to withstand a NBCC environment and
( u: i- B9 S. J7 n b9 lrelevant decontamination without losing the ability to accomplish the assigned
3 T7 n; ?6 F! Amission. A NBCC survivable system is hardened against NBCC and
* Z+ n M/ d5 [decontaminates; it can be decontaminated, and it is compatible with individual! q5 T/ x5 l( x6 D: j/ F
protective equipment.0 j. l$ O% x5 Q6 F8 H8 a L
•Hardness. The capability of material to withstand the materiel -damaging- ~) ]% @' x, a3 D. R
effects of NBCC and relevant decontamination.7 J" y1 u# c/ m' P0 ~
•Decontamination. The process of making personnel and materiel safe by
+ e) I2 [4 J8 E4 jrendering harmless or removing radioactive, chemical, or biological material.1 D0 G, V" j* R W' x
•Compatibility. The capability of a system to be operated, maintained, and resupplied by persons wearing individual protective equipment, in all climates
f9 p4 m8 W: ~$ ]+ rfor which the system is designed, and for the period specified in the
5 k* k& ^8 E* n* |' u7 r1 ?/ J0 coperational requirements document.2 [$ J( A# v$ E/ s
Nuclear Cloud See Radioactive Cloud.
. i1 t% t$ t. C9 P# z) I8 n* {6 eNuclear Directed7 l3 @1 x% Y9 p5 n9 B
Energy Weapon
) o: K" t# u6 I8 t(NDEW)
7 a3 e4 W4 P# K: [) CA directed energy weapon for which the source of energy is a specially designed9 X3 {3 W+ A( n
nuclear device.1 c' M+ }/ v9 x3 N; f B! \ n; p: s
MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 N0 ?% |" L. m! {) d
204- x% r% ~6 |+ m3 o
Nuclear
8 ~9 k' K; | H+ B/ T+ rEnvironment- P! j7 ^8 m$ h# s& z
The environment, which results from the detonation of nuclear weapons. Some9 S7 R( I* w* t8 Y% s# }; f, j
components of this environment are directly emitted by the nuclear weapon and' k2 H- N! `7 c" ?7 O5 i. `
other collateral effects are created by the interaction of the emitted nuclear% ^9 H1 L5 ~$ x( m' E+ }; V
radiation with the earth’s atmosphere, the earth’s surface and the earth’s+ C y' i" o- ?) M1 Z a
magnetic field. The nuclear environment consists of radiation, blast, shock,8 q5 P' Z7 C% s7 T( }; d
thermal, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), emissions from radioactive debris, trapped
% {6 j% p9 m6 ?# K+ x, P. ~2 Belectrons, and disturbances to the atmosphere and to the propagation paths for
. i8 J. B3 `8 Y5 [" Gradar and communications. The nuclear environment exists in the4 N% N5 B) Q( n! u$ P
exoatmospheric, atmospheric and ground BMD operational regimes.
0 i# F, \9 l5 b6 Q# J) oNuclear
% a$ W8 P3 e2 N* {+ x( V: EHardness
9 m) V0 s+ W; Z$ kA quantitative description of the resistance of a system or component to/ J8 r! l& _8 e, F4 W
malfunction (temporary and permanent) and/or degraded performance induced
1 w. ?. c( w& _3 lby a nuclear weapon environment. Resistance to physical quantities such as9 ?, t8 {" u0 l
overpressure, peak velocities, energy absorbed, and electrical stress measures
, A X: {5 h9 m9 }hardness. Hardness is achieved through adhering to appropriate design
6 |& Q5 |9 x5 @' R% e9 m! Tspecifications and is verified by one or more test and analysis techniques./ Q& u8 L8 |) T) r, f6 l
Nuclear
: H- }* v1 z; e& n& [5 ~Radiation
% b9 z; q" p+ O* u8 s/ j7 @. z: fParticulate and electromagnetic radiation emitted from atomic nuclei in various, D6 I4 c" L$ Y! }, M3 [; X
nuclear processes. The important nuclear radiations, from the weapons standpoint, are alpha and beta particles, gamma rays, and neutrons. All nuclear# U% E3 f9 {6 l) W5 D0 \
radiations are ionizing radiations, but the reverse is not true; x-rays, for example,
# f2 a2 _& ~9 E( J9 z1 Iare included among ionizing radiations, but they are not nuclear radiations since, i4 ]/ o9 Z" k0 }
they do not originate from atomic nuclei. (See Ionizing Radiation and X-Rays.) |
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