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NSF National Science Foundation.
9 N2 Y2 V0 d5 g. a6 F7 N" e& TNSFS Naval Surface Fire Support., p6 T( E0 g$ q
NSG Naval Security Group.
; P$ |( w8 W/ n) m R+ h4 i0 y& ]NSIA National Security Industrial Association, Washington, DC.
! B; x( v, Q" Q" O0 y9 k" K0 U8 x4 [NSIE Network Security Information Exchange.
0 @" G7 h! W% ^* B5 t+ W" tNSN National Stock Number (ILS term).! `: c/ x) {+ \# U& p M o- ~
NSNF Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces.
" X- O- a& M) i: _NSOC (1) National Signals Intelligence Operations Center. (2) Navy Satellite: K' l. u, d/ r& @4 E9 i0 x& e: u
Operations Center.% Q/ ?2 v4 L- p5 w W5 s2 T
NSP Not Separately Priced.
~1 m! c- \2 { s# ?NSSC National Space Surveillance Center, CMAFB.
3 M9 T$ v: l" h8 p5 nNSSD National Security Study Directive.6 M! y: `) [$ A" V: ^
NSTAC National Security Telecommunications and Information System Security3 k* Z: P0 t2 ^8 Y0 [
Committee.1 p. e' |% H( N
NSTC National Science and Technology Council (EOP term).
6 N/ s W3 K; m V. E) Q( JNSWC Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA.% J: S* B) F+ `1 X% V3 s
NSWC/DD Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA.
& Q1 M( i. J( J9 \NSWC/PHL Naval Surface Weapons Center, Port Hueneme Division.+ X/ b3 z# T {1 ?9 R
NTACS Navy Tactical Air Control System.1 K0 U( V' {8 ~$ S# X+ m
NTB National Test Bed.
% M. ^' x7 s& E6 ~/ R! NNTB/WAN OBSOLETE. National Test Bed/Wide Area Network.0 u5 F' L( z* l- e$ u! }& D# w0 y1 f
MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 N
7 Z) r6 w6 _0 g' I1 I203
]: i+ \! W W: UNTBI OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Integration.* d! W/ ~ r0 Z% c
NTBIC OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Integration Contract.
, L5 u- }3 D* S* y/ n/ ~ ]NTB-JPO OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Joint Project Office.* M! H @7 l' \: d5 f
NTBN OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Network.
8 p0 V& M% K; m* r- BNTC National Training Center, located at Ft. Irwin, CA. A large maneuver area that, K% k- w {6 }0 ], S
serves as the Army’s primary training center for Army maneuver forces. Friendly
! a# h K; `( _/ K* d6 jforces are pitted against “enemy” forces to validate proposed procedures and
0 I( k b) l1 Ldoctrine.
8 d& ^6 @% F8 z- \0 L& y9 y7 `NTIC (1) Navy Tactical Intelligence Center. (2) National Technical Information Center.
( E: m) K8 O: X A1 z! M9 kNTF National Test Facility.
) b& i5 ?, B4 S# w& iNTM National Technical Means.
8 [ y" ^: E6 t2 B9 q5 E4 [" ONTU New Threat Upgrade.' L+ L( z+ A- X$ P& F
NTW OBSOLETE. Navy Theater-Wide. Now referred to as the Sea-Based Midcourse
! C' J: s8 c9 ~2 V) S ]9 u7 Y6 ^7 y* HSegment of BMDS.% R0 T5 Y' X# A; ]* t: C
NTWD(S) OBSOLETE. Navy Theater-Wide Defense (System).
* @) j9 }: i+ B9 gNuclear,2 e, w C1 w! f8 t U# d- p' R7 y; Q n
Biological, and
7 @& z3 c5 r$ l, dChemical) H7 r7 t2 Q d2 Z+ O
Contamination
" w' j; @# x) h" G4 R(NBCC)
" ]0 b- o H) K0 u) [9 j ]! O4 kThe deposit and/or absorption of residual radioactive material or biological or
" y2 ?/ r1 V; H& g+ X7 r+ [chemical agents on or by structures, areas, personnel, or objects. \5 ^5 V* E- i0 M$ E4 i' s
•Nuclear Contamination. Residual radioactive material resulting from fallout or" C+ |0 G! e$ p! C4 [
rainout, and residual radiation from a system produced by a nuclear
2 Z: g) s- W9 U" k8 |8 Lexplosion, and persisting longer than one minute after burst.- z I f+ _0 X) } f( v
•Biological Contamination. Microorganisms and toxins that cause disease in& v" Q% Y# y* h3 h* g3 E2 ^/ b
humans, plants, or animals or cause deterioration of material., v2 r u8 l% G$ ]7 T9 k: R
•Chemical Contamination. Chemical substances intended for use in military
# B/ z& q* }. h# C" B2 Z. Aoperations to kill, seriously injure, incapacitate, or temporarily irritate humans.
8 |6 C1 S4 {8 \! d( f5 r, H5 |Nuclear,: c0 i% t5 ^: O; n% n
Biological, and
$ `/ T0 s6 {& C& A, |' EChemical
9 b3 b# X0 e" T1 u% ^- LContamination) H' ^. ^* B: \. |$ x
Survivability5 i" A# ~- c k0 |9 z
The capability of a system and its crew to withstand a NBCC environment and
% w& x( N7 n. k; _6 i; Z' p6 k- Zrelevant decontamination without losing the ability to accomplish the assigned
1 k& z5 R! {5 d, Mmission. A NBCC survivable system is hardened against NBCC and3 ], J E6 T) R$ o7 G- s
decontaminates; it can be decontaminated, and it is compatible with individual: E9 r' Y9 i' T# H
protective equipment.
2 W, Z: T1 f+ Y$ v$ m% n5 ?•Hardness. The capability of material to withstand the materiel -damaging
& g1 c$ X9 @. |# k2 l9 a( Feffects of NBCC and relevant decontamination.
( Q6 }# o, v1 o0 B. E9 z( J9 U! y•Decontamination. The process of making personnel and materiel safe by3 V: a: s0 K9 F, ~
rendering harmless or removing radioactive, chemical, or biological material.
% v4 M2 H8 e/ z' g•Compatibility. The capability of a system to be operated, maintained, and resupplied by persons wearing individual protective equipment, in all climates$ H# r" B8 h# W; Y; P9 j& ]7 h1 i {
for which the system is designed, and for the period specified in the
- S7 f, Q% {3 K/ x. V' foperational requirements document.
. v* s! E! l# z7 R# r$ E0 NNuclear Cloud See Radioactive Cloud.
" v, U5 a$ p9 |0 H4 d+ K, U/ |8 ^! ONuclear Directed, y7 z. u$ ], ?8 Q1 W
Energy Weapon
6 Y% D9 ^6 Y9 _' a(NDEW)
' w8 Q. g1 J0 ]# RA directed energy weapon for which the source of energy is a specially designed
9 h" O e5 ~2 E/ A0 A; R' q, x `nuclear device.
4 I5 Q: S4 X" g$ u+ h* YMDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 N
/ g ]+ ~: O* ^& [204
/ ?! n5 C- K, w* W: p$ L S6 BNuclear# c% R) S! o0 y1 i
Environment; d. U( c% h3 |* R. K3 A
The environment, which results from the detonation of nuclear weapons. Some" d3 H5 N' p$ v! R1 T, k
components of this environment are directly emitted by the nuclear weapon and: X0 U& h3 m3 b' \
other collateral effects are created by the interaction of the emitted nuclear
" r# t5 }/ V5 h s) Q8 @0 p; W0 n9 Iradiation with the earth’s atmosphere, the earth’s surface and the earth’s
# m9 S( _7 V' T4 m s" ]0 ]3 ~+ a+ dmagnetic field. The nuclear environment consists of radiation, blast, shock,0 K0 u1 s5 {( M4 `1 a
thermal, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), emissions from radioactive debris, trapped
0 v4 o* l9 i# J; relectrons, and disturbances to the atmosphere and to the propagation paths for
, `$ G# n0 @6 @) K- nradar and communications. The nuclear environment exists in the
7 Y' u+ c3 a t, vexoatmospheric, atmospheric and ground BMD operational regimes.1 @. f) b7 A4 O6 A7 ]
Nuclear- J6 Y9 O6 t. L( ~( I! _
Hardness
. v4 U. [1 `, M b! zA quantitative description of the resistance of a system or component to
[( c" g' L- B$ x# s* F2 Q1 umalfunction (temporary and permanent) and/or degraded performance induced
( ?1 \/ R$ A' L) B0 r$ qby a nuclear weapon environment. Resistance to physical quantities such as
9 H8 E5 i4 A0 N, \overpressure, peak velocities, energy absorbed, and electrical stress measures
$ w7 q7 s, l6 D3 O+ rhardness. Hardness is achieved through adhering to appropriate design) }" ?9 n( A0 Y- U- x& J5 J6 o
specifications and is verified by one or more test and analysis techniques.5 Y) U; F0 O% i# D4 a/ c6 t
Nuclear+ ^0 h+ n7 [+ O( [$ u. m% l. A: x
Radiation
" j5 U3 a! ~) T& x+ v9 Y' O0 rParticulate and electromagnetic radiation emitted from atomic nuclei in various
" Y* I* y1 d( |6 c! Y3 ~' ~nuclear processes. The important nuclear radiations, from the weapons standpoint, are alpha and beta particles, gamma rays, and neutrons. All nuclear
9 n' D/ Z. O; `6 e! lradiations are ionizing radiations, but the reverse is not true; x-rays, for example,' k0 H( c" l3 j5 U1 K2 ?; j' Z
are included among ionizing radiations, but they are not nuclear radiations since& q# w5 d8 m$ n) Q1 X' T7 R
they do not originate from atomic nuclei. (See Ionizing Radiation and X-Rays.) |
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