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NSF National Science Foundation.* J4 L. ?9 X* e& \8 u6 N% c
NSFS Naval Surface Fire Support.0 h+ v- ?% ]9 |$ H3 I
NSG Naval Security Group.5 t; V% f9 G" ^, l
NSIA National Security Industrial Association, Washington, DC., c. @0 _0 }# |# @! M
NSIE Network Security Information Exchange.% f! E @% v* [
NSN National Stock Number (ILS term)." q+ i4 S9 ^( v5 p. T- |& L) f" X
NSNF Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces.% s1 e; l: u- p+ o* Q7 g
NSOC (1) National Signals Intelligence Operations Center. (2) Navy Satellite6 Z; ^$ y8 Z2 w
Operations Center.( x$ j0 _6 T, l6 t% O) I
NSP Not Separately Priced.
5 ^; y' R! ?! c# G' _NSSC National Space Surveillance Center, CMAFB.$ A$ L" s+ U7 K7 r, _5 r
NSSD National Security Study Directive.
J3 d7 J0 l7 I- \; q# QNSTAC National Security Telecommunications and Information System Security4 \9 |/ V/ ` z3 t+ S
Committee.0 Y* W: ]( B, R8 p, r! K
NSTC National Science and Technology Council (EOP term).
) _9 ^+ ^3 c' @! M/ cNSWC Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA.5 a5 q7 t3 s4 b
NSWC/DD Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA.
1 b Y8 o; p" }2 O7 S) ONSWC/PHL Naval Surface Weapons Center, Port Hueneme Division.* O7 N6 G. w: E7 o$ @/ F# H
NTACS Navy Tactical Air Control System.
M% Q8 J, f" ~, D/ t* uNTB National Test Bed.
9 E3 g! s9 C C) CNTB/WAN OBSOLETE. National Test Bed/Wide Area Network.
# e8 A6 p8 [, N/ n" Q) B& b* v- wMDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 N3 p! g j. x: T; `% ^( M' J
203
% s* n5 W+ H; bNTBI OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Integration.
- w3 C& g% Q. e6 @( \' P1 INTBIC OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Integration Contract.; r! ~# M2 B* {8 R5 n- F" Z" J
NTB-JPO OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Joint Project Office.7 _/ T+ H' L$ N
NTBN OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Network.- l( j' R, S- K1 c+ N1 z
NTC National Training Center, located at Ft. Irwin, CA. A large maneuver area that
/ E1 z, q1 x4 O' P' y8 J7 ?serves as the Army’s primary training center for Army maneuver forces. Friendly
, ~* \" b! p2 Jforces are pitted against “enemy” forces to validate proposed procedures and
) ]; b6 X! J6 z* v, h. ]$ u5 @doctrine.2 b$ [- v3 ^6 }6 G. m6 n9 p) J
NTIC (1) Navy Tactical Intelligence Center. (2) National Technical Information Center./ m% u* l, z I* z
NTF National Test Facility.
8 I5 b v$ n1 H/ @3 I9 YNTM National Technical Means.+ j* E! q# b# [% l4 J" \
NTU New Threat Upgrade.1 w% S0 v4 w* Q6 V; _$ \* D
NTW OBSOLETE. Navy Theater-Wide. Now referred to as the Sea-Based Midcourse' ^& J: c; }& k* U$ t1 t7 r
Segment of BMDS.
6 ~% v' R# Z5 L+ ENTWD(S) OBSOLETE. Navy Theater-Wide Defense (System).
( i4 D [1 s3 L- r$ x7 eNuclear,
% f& @" l% Z9 w2 G E- x; aBiological, and- a( ?/ C2 W! I; D; T) @# S
Chemical
- e! O1 v5 E0 G- ]* m+ r5 hContamination3 q* a1 }% Z( Z- ^" B
(NBCC)- r0 u r& n8 F8 Y
The deposit and/or absorption of residual radioactive material or biological or
% Q6 ^* [3 `% ?( ychemical agents on or by structures, areas, personnel, or objects.
# n& p8 X8 O3 P0 a8 E* t: Z) v•Nuclear Contamination. Residual radioactive material resulting from fallout or
B5 {$ T5 F) P6 Z- S& Orainout, and residual radiation from a system produced by a nuclear
# [1 p* O3 c$ H/ Oexplosion, and persisting longer than one minute after burst.
- _3 u, y$ q4 k) U4 r' W( g! U# @5 e•Biological Contamination. Microorganisms and toxins that cause disease in2 }/ f9 C$ t+ W2 ]% v6 I; c( I# J( A
humans, plants, or animals or cause deterioration of material./ u" ] F9 f2 X+ M$ {- X/ z: `( l
•Chemical Contamination. Chemical substances intended for use in military8 ~4 g4 Q6 N/ V* Q, e4 I
operations to kill, seriously injure, incapacitate, or temporarily irritate humans." g) ~4 H2 S; `* h9 w6 r
Nuclear,
! D6 ]' j+ k/ q! m# U8 j+ ZBiological, and
# F. {4 J; f6 p) x! kChemical" ?5 |* n2 T* r0 N/ H
Contamination+ ^ h% `) K0 f: p2 d/ E) a4 A
Survivability- Y8 A! K# T9 K( `% Z9 h
The capability of a system and its crew to withstand a NBCC environment and+ K2 b( V9 [% i; o' R$ V
relevant decontamination without losing the ability to accomplish the assigned8 @/ ]7 K. `% h$ H/ {! m
mission. A NBCC survivable system is hardened against NBCC and! h4 z5 |$ R1 z( T. \( Q
decontaminates; it can be decontaminated, and it is compatible with individual
4 x5 ^7 }+ r) K$ N. Xprotective equipment.2 z2 h% c6 N, m4 l7 Y1 O) m% q. B
•Hardness. The capability of material to withstand the materiel -damaging
% }5 \7 p+ F+ y# M# u e% ?effects of NBCC and relevant decontamination.. I: k7 N; A0 S R% z
•Decontamination. The process of making personnel and materiel safe by
8 V& n: u( G: b2 j. U/ Erendering harmless or removing radioactive, chemical, or biological material.
3 R$ E G# q+ d/ y- v5 m: q: n•Compatibility. The capability of a system to be operated, maintained, and resupplied by persons wearing individual protective equipment, in all climates5 g7 Y$ j( X/ K8 F5 L) d0 ?
for which the system is designed, and for the period specified in the5 B4 M+ X% F3 Y- z) q
operational requirements document.7 E4 I- ~& S1 e% q4 m
Nuclear Cloud See Radioactive Cloud.
: @+ D E0 L, U( }0 u. U- WNuclear Directed
5 O9 F# U9 k9 S- \) q* l% S& zEnergy Weapon8 |7 R5 h- q9 w Y) c
(NDEW)/ `. Y" {( i S
A directed energy weapon for which the source of energy is a specially designed
- H' E+ B: K/ m3 Y) \$ dnuclear device.+ P$ D$ H Y- o, d
MDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 N* |- g5 m H, z- A) H
204+ c- n$ S1 J0 ^* G% i2 J* V
Nuclear
4 F8 O5 Q! G+ v6 E0 t! ?Environment; @2 v7 v' u7 f* M& W, U) [
The environment, which results from the detonation of nuclear weapons. Some# x$ q7 Z* K! e8 {5 A
components of this environment are directly emitted by the nuclear weapon and
- s* d/ R$ q0 }/ `9 r! \4 M' `other collateral effects are created by the interaction of the emitted nuclear
, F; {/ M2 Y/ f7 m, u! ?radiation with the earth’s atmosphere, the earth’s surface and the earth’s+ E: M# Y- U3 [( K6 H
magnetic field. The nuclear environment consists of radiation, blast, shock,
1 y/ a1 ]8 W6 f% vthermal, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), emissions from radioactive debris, trapped
* K) o+ _" W9 y% delectrons, and disturbances to the atmosphere and to the propagation paths for
0 W) M! H; F1 U8 E) Tradar and communications. The nuclear environment exists in the3 l( Q. L0 z3 q% m- F
exoatmospheric, atmospheric and ground BMD operational regimes.2 ~4 N) J0 Y: U
Nuclear( h& l, v& P7 }" R. @& N
Hardness
$ f# b) R+ k" z1 z+ |A quantitative description of the resistance of a system or component to2 `9 F+ |1 }, K |% G
malfunction (temporary and permanent) and/or degraded performance induced# K/ C" g! D9 m. \' C
by a nuclear weapon environment. Resistance to physical quantities such as8 w. G. o$ |0 w2 s2 C- g
overpressure, peak velocities, energy absorbed, and electrical stress measures
+ `& A6 G2 \2 w1 l% f1 [hardness. Hardness is achieved through adhering to appropriate design i7 T& i [* U) f: F$ u$ L
specifications and is verified by one or more test and analysis techniques.' `# Z8 O, h! ?2 Q9 d+ _; h
Nuclear1 K5 y2 }9 [& m% |
Radiation
2 Z! w4 J' f2 L$ `5 ?/ RParticulate and electromagnetic radiation emitted from atomic nuclei in various8 E' s# B6 V: a Z$ f+ f
nuclear processes. The important nuclear radiations, from the weapons standpoint, are alpha and beta particles, gamma rays, and neutrons. All nuclear8 Q; u, Y9 E0 Z8 d/ a* b' A
radiations are ionizing radiations, but the reverse is not true; x-rays, for example, L. J7 T+ v4 \& g" m# }
are included among ionizing radiations, but they are not nuclear radiations since- r, L9 |* o8 [# D4 f
they do not originate from atomic nuclei. (See Ionizing Radiation and X-Rays.) |
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