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NSF National Science Foundation.
9 J: |& m5 E, @. ]) ZNSFS Naval Surface Fire Support.9 a0 S& T! M! U3 U( M6 O; b. d
NSG Naval Security Group.& p2 L1 [6 _1 ]9 F; s
NSIA National Security Industrial Association, Washington, DC.
k8 j1 g$ K, R0 H0 ~7 g; sNSIE Network Security Information Exchange.0 x. m6 K6 p* \1 _' K! N0 p
NSN National Stock Number (ILS term).
+ C L2 u, H* A' g/ j0 p- ANSNF Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces.5 K" q3 U& p5 ]5 U$ B6 [
NSOC (1) National Signals Intelligence Operations Center. (2) Navy Satellite
& ?* v- |5 c6 v4 T' l6 O* K2 HOperations Center.
) d+ V/ ]1 n: X* ZNSP Not Separately Priced.
3 g9 w+ \8 M* J; _+ yNSSC National Space Surveillance Center, CMAFB.
- B0 P1 Q& A5 I" s3 T. x ~NSSD National Security Study Directive.4 K3 P7 @8 ]* H/ y+ g
NSTAC National Security Telecommunications and Information System Security
# k# Y' C1 Y8 Q" ~' DCommittee.
' n! Q" ]* t% x1 i" k2 pNSTC National Science and Technology Council (EOP term).5 e& p& U7 S& w0 d% t- {
NSWC Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA.' `3 P2 a6 A+ c3 i9 Z
NSWC/DD Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA.
; }6 Z4 \2 Y/ u5 J: M$ L WNSWC/PHL Naval Surface Weapons Center, Port Hueneme Division.: l" r" x6 d6 ]6 p
NTACS Navy Tactical Air Control System.
0 `- J3 r0 K: ?" a3 a9 YNTB National Test Bed." `- z$ _, o( h, P& F
NTB/WAN OBSOLETE. National Test Bed/Wide Area Network.
3 j- B3 s+ B- ~$ L1 G. IMDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 N
9 C( s( k9 I5 K$ @' o1 ^( ?2032 ^& s$ a4 c$ v3 U' o% E
NTBI OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Integration.
: N. V A2 d) R1 D6 qNTBIC OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Integration Contract.& A5 O# `. ~- X) k# c* q9 v4 m$ J
NTB-JPO OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Joint Project Office.
3 q6 F9 P g2 X6 p9 ~5 H. gNTBN OBSOLETE. National Test Bed Network.
3 n- f8 s) ^! I6 j: KNTC National Training Center, located at Ft. Irwin, CA. A large maneuver area that
5 B% v+ k- q3 V; \ D" iserves as the Army’s primary training center for Army maneuver forces. Friendly
2 M+ j( D: \* L4 `+ D: y" o' dforces are pitted against “enemy” forces to validate proposed procedures and0 O% \& d- s# k; ^. j) D5 j, w8 _1 f! P
doctrine.
3 R, d2 q7 F( u2 Y6 fNTIC (1) Navy Tactical Intelligence Center. (2) National Technical Information Center.
# R! p2 d9 q% T+ {; e! NNTF National Test Facility.
1 P9 L; o( C" H3 [: m6 m8 z# rNTM National Technical Means.
* W7 I% X" y! `4 Q! @2 u8 e( JNTU New Threat Upgrade.
" {! d& E* D8 N' j% L ^! J. q& eNTW OBSOLETE. Navy Theater-Wide. Now referred to as the Sea-Based Midcourse
4 o: U4 k3 @) \Segment of BMDS.- |* [2 ?. _& C) y q
NTWD(S) OBSOLETE. Navy Theater-Wide Defense (System)./ P+ c5 Z9 B1 B! |# ]( X
Nuclear,
6 v* d; V$ Z# H2 m0 D: A( MBiological, and/ |! ^# V/ l% N, G* t
Chemical
, D6 |6 x: [+ \# p3 x) FContamination
( o/ E4 G$ }- E8 G% Z(NBCC)
0 h1 m- k4 K! L* w% u) S0 cThe deposit and/or absorption of residual radioactive material or biological or
7 D0 X( f3 G' h. g5 Hchemical agents on or by structures, areas, personnel, or objects.
1 ^0 l* ^. T0 r$ q# Y! p•Nuclear Contamination. Residual radioactive material resulting from fallout or
1 E& a3 m3 |" L: K. E1 arainout, and residual radiation from a system produced by a nuclear
/ v' k5 f. @* g6 k, |' o$ Yexplosion, and persisting longer than one minute after burst.& M y8 Y( u- R; j% f
•Biological Contamination. Microorganisms and toxins that cause disease in
$ b3 n. w$ k. e r1 u+ Nhumans, plants, or animals or cause deterioration of material.7 j0 m; f+ X |" c! w
•Chemical Contamination. Chemical substances intended for use in military: \, o) s N! @: |3 ]
operations to kill, seriously injure, incapacitate, or temporarily irritate humans.
@. t! G2 d e; H, x" j6 g6 L( w* ENuclear,
, q4 ~' X8 d" V/ G% ~: PBiological, and7 u$ U8 ~. B" @
Chemical
" u0 T- _7 U6 j0 r8 ?Contamination7 n B4 J- ^9 A) w4 Y
Survivability
, v0 @: y Q) a$ C2 ?0 |The capability of a system and its crew to withstand a NBCC environment and8 M* w W5 p3 R2 \# {- s7 v$ R
relevant decontamination without losing the ability to accomplish the assigned* o( t! ?' q- c) g3 ~- Y
mission. A NBCC survivable system is hardened against NBCC and1 l* O9 x' u" n. U, }
decontaminates; it can be decontaminated, and it is compatible with individual1 y9 b" K9 g- j+ H. P
protective equipment.. C t$ I" F9 s# K1 P
•Hardness. The capability of material to withstand the materiel -damaging
; ?% E) W& X. P n3 }) ^+ M8 i3 Keffects of NBCC and relevant decontamination.- f) o, }5 Y, t5 k4 O( o- h4 U
•Decontamination. The process of making personnel and materiel safe by
$ _% i6 ~- r" ?4 _+ x1 xrendering harmless or removing radioactive, chemical, or biological material.
/ U; \( n i" V3 a+ Q•Compatibility. The capability of a system to be operated, maintained, and resupplied by persons wearing individual protective equipment, in all climates! i" M, G1 a- O% p/ [
for which the system is designed, and for the period specified in the: w& L @4 c) y7 p
operational requirements document.5 {" N9 ~4 _4 H# g; [! t3 y8 f
Nuclear Cloud See Radioactive Cloud.
6 o+ r- t6 b$ G' M s0 J& bNuclear Directed/ z7 G0 R1 }, J
Energy Weapon
$ G) h8 T* p% p(NDEW)) U' J! w9 I+ `* V" a. }' x* k. t
A directed energy weapon for which the source of energy is a specially designed7 b; T7 I7 O# J/ T/ P: z% D
nuclear device.
J5 T" w' P8 P5 [ nMDA GLOSSARY, VER. 4.0 N
% O& C" v) h& \& f; H( m204
0 q0 b# U" B% C1 K& ^0 N ~8 s+ t! fNuclear4 I) U* y# Z8 g A: l) {) V
Environment. p* y5 N; @- ]8 y
The environment, which results from the detonation of nuclear weapons. Some
2 @( \! W8 S4 j" X) qcomponents of this environment are directly emitted by the nuclear weapon and
2 [9 D. z* E# B9 A( v- r3 fother collateral effects are created by the interaction of the emitted nuclear
7 B+ i1 r! N9 A8 \radiation with the earth’s atmosphere, the earth’s surface and the earth’s$ R* e$ `) l& k( M% f$ y3 C W
magnetic field. The nuclear environment consists of radiation, blast, shock,: q$ b% f: L3 q$ _
thermal, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), emissions from radioactive debris, trapped
. O5 X7 k/ O/ Q3 Z4 @2 Pelectrons, and disturbances to the atmosphere and to the propagation paths for
$ a3 V- [0 C Nradar and communications. The nuclear environment exists in the
& G" O0 f0 H t1 mexoatmospheric, atmospheric and ground BMD operational regimes.7 D* U# k. J9 [1 a
Nuclear
1 [2 _# ~/ v1 P: h6 e: xHardness$ ^) C7 t' @" A! n: a1 O& D
A quantitative description of the resistance of a system or component to
, A* Y* l9 U9 z0 @% @' bmalfunction (temporary and permanent) and/or degraded performance induced" D$ l c7 ?: i* B# Q: L, k
by a nuclear weapon environment. Resistance to physical quantities such as! c3 w- ~! s, ]0 j1 j% `
overpressure, peak velocities, energy absorbed, and electrical stress measures2 a6 Q) G$ W3 T) K; p
hardness. Hardness is achieved through adhering to appropriate design* G( k' R# E. U- x! f2 o
specifications and is verified by one or more test and analysis techniques.
& ?7 k: a' x9 r( @( Q8 J* B+ MNuclear0 Y0 n! ]# }3 J, c0 o& |" z
Radiation; {1 \ z8 C5 ~& V% v( o
Particulate and electromagnetic radiation emitted from atomic nuclei in various' h) e. X+ ]. o0 W' Y/ ` x! |
nuclear processes. The important nuclear radiations, from the weapons standpoint, are alpha and beta particles, gamma rays, and neutrons. All nuclear
8 w, Q2 {! W# h$ N" l4 [/ S$ fradiations are ionizing radiations, but the reverse is not true; x-rays, for example,1 ]+ m9 V3 t9 P: h5 D# G$ n
are included among ionizing radiations, but they are not nuclear radiations since
# Q; Z* L: n% L. A/ c, ]3 v. Hthey do not originate from atomic nuclei. (See Ionizing Radiation and X-Rays.) |
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